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Abstract
The wireless medium is a shared resource. If nearby devices transmit at the same time,
their signals interfere, resulting in a collision. In traditional networks, collisions cause the
loss of the transmitted information. For this reason, wireless networks have been designed
with the assumption that interference is intrinsically harmful and must be avoided.
This dissertation takes an alternate approach: Instead of viewing interference as an
inherently counterproductive phenomenon that should to be avoided, we design practical
systems that transform interference into a harmless, and even a beneficial phenomenon.
To achieve this goal, we consider how wireless signals interact when they interfere, and
use this understanding in our system designs. Specifically, when interference occurs, the
signals get mixed on the wireless medium. By understanding the parameters of this mix-
ing, we can invert the mixing and decode the interfered packets; thus, making interference
harmless. Furthermore, we can control this mixing process to create strategic interference
that allow decodability at a particular receiver of interest, but prevent decodability at un-
intended receivers and adversaries. Hence, we can transform interference into a beneficial
phenomenon that provides security.
Building on this approach, we make four main contributions: We present the first WiFi
receiver that can successfully reconstruct the transmitted information in the presence of
packet collisions. Next, we introduce a WiFi receiver design that can decode in the pres-
ence of high-power cross-technology interference from devices like baby monitors, cord-
less phones, microwave ovens, or even unknown technologies. We then show how we can
harness interference to improve security. In particular, we develop the first system that se-
cures an insecure medical implant without any modification to the implant itself. Finally,
we present a solution that establishes secure connections between any two WiFi devices,
without having users enter passwords or use pre-shared secret keys.
Thesis Supervisor: Dina Katabi
Title: Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Wireless and mobile systems play an increasingly important role in our lives. Studies
show that mobile traffic will increase by multiple orders of magnitude over the next few
years [119]. This increase is driven by user demands for mobile video and their desire to
access data from hand-held devices. It is also emphasized by the incorporation of wireless
communication in most modern applications, including public safety, vehicular networks,
home networks, and health care. In fact, nowadays even medical implants are equipped
with wireless connectivity and rely on wireless communication to send data and receive
commands.
Wireless systems, however, are severely limited by the phenomenon of interference.
The wireless medium is a shared resource. If nearby devices transmit at the same time,
their signals interfere, resulting in a collision. Traditionally, collisions have been consid-
ered to cause the loss of the transmitted information. For this reason, practical wireless
systems have been designed with the assumption that interference is intrinsically harmful,
and must be avoided. Completely avoiding interference however is infeasible, particularly
for systems operating in the unlicensed spectrum like WiFi and sensors [13, 15]. Hence,
these technologies try to hide interference underneath a logical interface called a "packet".
Packets that suffer from interference are considered lost, and the system processes only
interference-free packets. While simple, this all-or-nothing packet-based interface becomes
inefficient as te iet wi ok scales to a 11argeI ner of userS and e CVeUS L SUpp0I newap-
plications. The more devices try to access the medium and the larger the diversity of their
23
technologies, the higher the chances of interference and the less effective today's systems
are at hiding it [138, 136, 8, 20].
E 1.1 Embracing Wireless Interference
In this dissertation, we take an alternate approach: instead of hiding interference, we em-
brace it -i.e., we aim to understand how interfering wireless signals interact over the wire-
less medium and exploit this understanding in our designs. We are motivated by theoret-
ical results in information theory which show that interference does not necessarily cause
the loss of information [48, 136]; when interference happens, the signals get mixed on the
wireless medium. By understanding the parameters of this mixing in practical systems
over real wireless channels, this dissertation develops systems that can invert the mixing
and decode the interfered packets, hence rendering interference harmless. Furthermore,
it also shows how to manipulate the interfering signals by controlling the parameters of
the mixing, so that we create strategic interference that allows decodability at a particu-
lar receiver of interest, but prevents decodability at unintended receivers and adversaries.
Hence we can transform interference into a beneficial phenomenon that provides security.
The dissertation introduces a family of algorithms and system architectures for treat-
ing interference in practical wireless networks. Our designs have three key properties
that make them practical: First, they do not assume global knowledge of the network and
can operate in a fully distributed manner. Second, they take into account realistic limita-
tions such as radio frequency offset, the lack of very tight signal synchronization, feedback
overhead, bursty traffic, etc. Third, they are all implemented and empirically evaluations
in wireless testbeds to demonstrate their feasibility and high performance.
Our systems do not limit themselves by the traditional packet-based interface to the
wireless medium; they take an integrated approach that jointly optimizes signal trans-
mission over the wireless medium and packet-based network protocols. Empirical results
from our systems show that such an integrated approach delivers large performance and
security gains.
The systems developed in this thesis address the following four challenges that face
today's wireless systems, contributing to both wireless performance and security:
* Decoding collisions: ZigZag is the first receiver design that decodes WiFi collisions
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without sender modification and without any assumptions of packet synchroniza-
tion, large differences in power, or special codes. This work exploits the natural
asynchrony between colliding transmitters which results in stretches of interference-
free bits at the start of a collision; it uses these interference free bits to infer important
parameters regarding the structure of the collision which it exploits to bootstrap the
decoder.
e Combating high-power cross-technology interference: The unlicensed spectrum is increas-
ingly crowded with multitude of diverse technologies, which interfere with WiFi and
cause loss of connectivity. We have designed and built TIMO, the first WiFi receiver
that can decode in the presence of high-power cross-technology interference. TIMO
is agnostic to the interferer's technology and hence allows us to have one solution
to deal with interference from diverse technologies. We also introduce a new form
of cognitive communication where different technologies do not necessarily have
to use isolated frequencies, as in traditional cognitive communication, but could in
crowded environments use the same frequency band. This enables packing more
radios and data in the wireless spectrum.
" Securing wireless medical implants without access to the implant itself Today, millions
of people have medical implants (e.g., pacemaker) with wireless connectivity. Past
work has shown that these devices are susceptible to attacks over the wireless chan-
nel that can change their therapy or listen to their private data. Medical implants
however have a lifetime of about ten years. Fixing the security problem in the mil-
lions of implanted devices will require the patients to go through difficult surgery.
We present the first system that provides confidentiality for implants' transmissions
and protects them against commands from unauthorized parties, without requiring
any modification to the implants themselves. Further, because our design provides
protection at the signal level, it can also be used as a complementary defense-in-
depth solution to devices that feature cryptographic or other application-layer pro-
tection mechanisms.
" Making security easy for ordinary users: Last we introduce the first system that en-
ables WiFi users to establish secure connections without any passwords, prior key
distribution, or out-of-band channels. The main idea is to exploit that once a ran-
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dom wireless signal is transmitted, an attacker cannot eliminate the energy that the
signal produces on the wireless medium. Hence, the attacker cannot hide the fact
that the signal was transmitted. Leveraging this simple idea, we construct a new
secure message type that can neither be altered nor hidden without detection. We
analytically prove the security of the resulting protocol and empirically demonstrate
its practicality.
Before we dig into the details of these systems, we provide the high-level idea underly-
ing each of them and describe their relation to prior work.
0 1.1.1 Decoding 802.11 Collisions
ZigZag, the subject of Chapter 2, introduces the first WiFi receiver that decodes packet
collisions. Collisions are a known problem in WiFi networks [29, 82, 78, 108, 143]. Current
WiFi networks attempt to counter collisions by making senders sense the medium, and
abstain from transmitting when the medium is busy. This approach, however, fails in
multiple cases including the classic hidden terminal problem [79, 211. Specifically, consider
the scenario in Fig. 1-1, where two transmitters, Alice and Bob, want to communicate with
the access point (AP). Yet, due to some obstruction (e.g., a wall) they cannot sense each
other's signals. As a result, they end up transmitting at the same time causing the packets
to collide at the access point and become undecodable. Since neither node receives an
acknowledgement, Alice and Bob retransmit the same packets with a small random jitter.
The small jitter is originally intended to enable one of the two transmitters to start first,
which in the absence of hidden terminal effects, causes the other transmitter to sense the
ongoing transmission and abstain from transmitting. However, in the hidden terminal
scenario, since the two transmitters do not hear each other, Alice and Bob will continue
increasing the jitter and retransmitting their packets, until eventually they get a packet
through or they time out. Either way, both transmitters experience a loss rate that is too
high for useful applications [78, 143].
In contrast to all prior work on hidden terminals which aims to avoid collisions [79, 21,
107], we ask the following question: Can we design an access point that takes two collisions
- such as the collision of Alice's and Bob's packets and that of their retransmissions - and
decodes the content of the two colliding packets? If we can design such an access point,
we can deliver the two original packets, as if they were transmitted one after the other and
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Figure 1-1: Wireless Collisions. When two wireless devices, Alice and Bob, transmit at the same time,
their packets interfere with each other, resulting in packet collisions.
Figure 1-2: ZigZag Decoding. ZigZag first decodes chunk 1 in the first collision, which is interference-
free. It subtracts chunk 1 from the second collision which causes chunk 2 to become interference-free and
hence decodable. It then decodes chunk 2 and subtracts from the first collision causing chunk 3 to become
interference-free and hence decodable. It proceeds like that until it has decoded both packets.
no collision occurred.
The answer to this question is positive. In particular, we have developed ZigZag, a
WiFi receiver that decodes collisions. ZigZag leverages that WiFi senders insert a small
random delay before they start transmitting (the protocol requires them to pick a random
slot from a window of 32 slots). Thus, if we consider the collision of Alice's and Bob's
packets, and the collision resulting from their retransmission of the same two packets, it is
likely that Bob's packet has a different offset in the two collisions, i.e., Ai # A2, as shown
in Fig. 1-2. Consequently, the access point (AP) can find a chunk of bits that is interference-
free in one collision but experiences some interference in the other, such as chunk 1, in the
figure. Since chunk 1 is interference-free in the first collision, the AP can decode it using
a standard decoder. The AP then subtracts chunk 1 from the second collision to obtain
chunk 2. Now, chunk 2 is interference-free, and hence can be decoded using a standard
decoder. Next, the access point goes back to the first collision, subtracts chunk 2, which
causes chunk 3 to become interference-free and hence decodable. A ZigZag access point
proceeds in this manner decoding a chunk from one collision and subtracting it from the
other until both packets are fully decoded. Thus, even in the face of collisions, ZigZag can
correctly deliver two packets in two timeslots, as if the packets were transmitted sequen-
tially with no collisions.
The above description is at a high-level. Of course in practice we cannot subtract chunks
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of bits; we need to regenerate the signal associated with a chunk and apply the channel
coefficients to it, before we subtract it from the received collision signal. Further, we need
to estimate the offset values, A1 and A 2, from the received signals. In Chapter 2, we
describe how ZigZag addresses these practical issues and further, generalize ZigZag to
collisions between more than two devices.
Relation to Prior Work: ZigZag is the first WiFi receiver that decodes packet collisions.
ZigZag builds on work in both networked systems and communication theory. Prior work
in networked systems addresses the problem of collisions by trying to avoid them [79, 21].
In contrast, ZigZag decodes packet collisions. Prior work in communication theory intro-
duces the concept of interference cancellation [64, 69]. However, traditional interference
cancellation assumes that the transmitters know a priori that their packets will collide and
coordinate their choice of code or transmission power accordingly. However, WiFi colli-
sions typically happen because the transmitters cannot hear each other and hence cannot
coordinate their transmissions. Thus, traditional interference cancellation cannot be used
to decode WiFi collisions. ZigZag provides a new form of interference cancellation that
does not require any such coordination and hence is suitable for fully distributed wireless
networks, e.g., WiFi.
M 1.1.2 Combating High-Power Cross-Technology Interference
In the previous section, we presented ZigZag, a solution for decoding packets in the pres-
ence of WiFi interference. But, what about non-WiFi interference? Current WiFi net-
works suffer from strong cross-technology interference [7]. Devices like baby monitors,
microwave ovens, and cordless phones can cause WiFi networks to experience a complete
loss of connectivity [8]. According to Cisco, these devices are responsible for more than
50% of customer complaints with WiFi [131. Today, there is no solution to enable WiFi to
work in the frequencies used by these devices.
A natural question is whether we can use ZigZag to address interference from these
devices? Intuitively, in ZigZag, we considered the interfered signal as a linear equation
with two unknowns: Alice's packet and Bob's packet. With two such independent linear
equations, one can solve for the two unknowns and decode the two packets. Since WiFi
transmitters retransmit their packets, we had two equations in two unknowns and hence
ZigZag was able to decode both packets. Unlike WiFi devices, non-WiFi devices typically
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Figure 1-3: Dealing with cross-technology interference using multiple antennas. The two antennas on the
access point receive two independent linear equations which can be used to decode the WiFi signal in the
presence of interference.
do not retransmit. Thus, with cross-technology interference, we do not have two indepen-
dent linear equations and hence we cannot decode in the presence of interference.
In Chapter 3, we present TIMO, the first WiFi receiver that can decode in the presence
of high-power cross-technology interference. The basic idea underlying TIMO is simple:
let us leverage the fact that most WiFi devices today come with multiple antennas. For
example, a typical WiFi access point has about two or three antennas. These multi-antenna
devices exhibit a well-known property: Since the antennas are placed in different locations,
a signal traverses different paths on the wireless medium and arrives at each antenna with
a different channel (amplitude and phase). For example, as shown in Fig. 1-3, the signal
from the WiFi client traverses two different channels, hi and h2 , to reach the two antennas
on the access point. Similarly, a baby monitor has channels, h3 and h4 , to the access point's
antennas. Thus, when the baby monitor interfers with the WiFi client, a two-antenna WiFi
access point receives two independent linear equations on its two antennas. Hence, if the
access point can estimate the channels, it can solve the two linear equations and decode
the WiFi signal.
The challenge, however, is that WiFi and baby monitors are diverse technologies that do
not understand each other. As a result, a WiFi access point cannot compute a baby moni-
tor's channel. In Chapter 3, we describe a gradient-descent style algorithm that enables us
to decode the WiFi signal, without estimating the interferer's channel. Further, we show
that our algorithm is oblivious to the technology of the interferer -i.e., it decodes the WiFi
signal in the presence of interference from cordless phones, baby monitors, microwave
ovens, or even an unknown technology.
Relation to Prior Work: TIMO is the first WiFi receiver that can decode in the presence
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of high-power cross-technology interference. TIMO builds on work in both networked
systems and wireless communication. In network systems, TIMO builds on work in cog-
nitive systems that avoid interference by having devices dynamically look for unused fre-
quencies and using those frequencies [28, 115]. In contrast, TIMO provides a new cogni-
tive framework where diverse technologies coexist on the same frequency and hence can
achieve much higher spectral efficiency. In wireless communication, TIMO builds on work
in multi-antenna systems [4]. Traditional multi-antenna systems enable multiple transmit-
ters of the same technology to transmit concurrently without interference. TIMO builds on
this work and develops new algorithms that enable multi-antenna systems to work across
diverse technologies.
0 1.1.3 Non-Invasive Approach to Securing Medical Implants
Next, we harness interference to secure medical implants. Modern implantable medical
devices (IMDs), including pacemakers, cardiac defibrillators, and neurostimulators, all
feature wireless communication [110]. Adding wireless connectivity to IMDs has enabled
remote monitoring of patients' vital signs and improved care providers' ability to deliver
timely treatment, leading to a better health care system [94]. Recent work, however, has
demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidential-
ity of IMDs' transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs -even com-
mands that cause the device to deliver an electric shock to the patient [65].
Traditionally, designers use cryptographic methods to provide confidentiality and pre-
vent unauthorized access. However, adding cryptography directly to implants is diffi-
cult for two main reasons. First, millions of patients already have these unsecured im-
plants [155]. Once implanted, the device can last up to 10 years [45]. It would be imprac-
tical for patients to undergo surgery to replace their implants with cryptography-enabled
ones. Second, if the patient has an emergency and is taken to a foreign hospital where the
doctor does not have the secret key, the implant cannot be accessed, which could be fatal.
In Chapter 4, we present IMDShield, the first solution that secures medical implants
without modifying them. Our design delegates an implant's security to an external wear-
able device called the shield. Such an approach enhances the security of IMDs for patients
who already have them, and empowers medical personnel to access a protected IMD by
removing the external device or powering it off.
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Figure 1-4: IMDShield. The external device (shield) transmits a random signal that interferes with the
implant's transmission, preventing the adversary from decoding it. Further, the external device leverages
our full-duplex radio design to decode the implant's transmission despite interference.
The shield protects the confidentiality of the IMD's transmitted data and also provides
access control. Let us focus on the confidentiality question. Say an eavesdropper is snoop-
ing on the implant's data transmission. The shield monitors the medium, and whenever
the implant transmits, it jams the implant's transmission with a random signal, as shown
in Fig. 1-4. Since the eavesdropper does not know the random interference signal, it cannot
decode the implant's signal. However, simply creating interference and jamming not only
prevents an eavesdropper from decoding the implant's transmissions but also prevents
legitimate devices, including the shield, from receiving these transmissions.
Thus, the key question is: how can the shield use interference to prevent adversaries
from decoding the implant's signal, yet still be able to decode that signal and forward it to
the doctor? At a high level, the received signal is a linear combination of the shield's ran-
dom interference signal and the implant's signal. Since the shield generated the random
interference signal, in principle, it can subtract this signal and decode the implant's trans-
missions. To do so, however, the shield needs to be able to jam and receive simultaneously.
Thus, we design a novel duplex radio that can act as a jammer-cum-receiver. This design
allows the shield to jam the IMD's messages, while being able to decode them.
Relation to Prior Work: IMDShield is the first system that secures implanted medical de-
vices without modifying them. Prior work on the topic [65, 123] assumes that secure com-
munication requires the transmitter to encrypt transmissions and the receiver to decrypt
these transmissions. In contrast, IMDShield leverages interference to design a commu-
nication system where the receiver (shield) encrypts the transmissions on behalf of the
transmitter (implant). IMDShield also builds on, and contributes to, the emerging topic of
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full-duplex radios [38, 311. In comparison to prior work in this area, ours differs in that it
is the first to demonstrate the value of using full-duplex radios for security and it presents
a compact portable design, significantly smaller than its predecessor [31].
0 1.1.4 Secure Pairing Without Passwords or Prior Secrets
In the previous section, we leverage physical-layer signal transmissions to secure im-
planted wireless device. But what about more typical wireless devices? Establishing secure
connections between wireless devices is a general problem that we face while pairing our
laptop with a wireless router, a wireless headset with a cellphone, or a home surveillance
sensor with its reader. The goal is to ensure that an adversary cannot get access to any of
these devices. The traditional approach to achieve this goal requires the user to enter or
validate some form of a shared secret such as a password. However, this is difficult for
two main reasons. First, ordinary users struggle with picking long and random passwords
and often choose vulnerable passwords [81, 146, 109]. Second, even if the user can pick
the right kind of a password, there are many devices, e.g., headsets, home surveillance
sensors, and medical sensors, which do not have the interface to enter these passwords. So
the question we ask is: Can we establish secure wireless pairing with no pre-shared keys
or passwords?
The key challenge in designing such a system is the well-known Man-in-The-Middle at-
tack. Say we have Alice and Bob who want to pair with each other, and say Alice transmits
a pairing message to Bob. Since wireless is a broadcast medium, an adversary can easily
tamper with this message to impersonate Alice to Bob and pair with Bob, and vice versa.
Past work assumes that attackers can arbitrarily tamper with wireless messages and
as a result they do not trust any messages on the wireless channel. They instead require
passwords or other out-of-band channels [26, 98, 132, 60, 118, 97]. We question this basic
assumption.
In particular, we observe that an attacker cannot eliminate the energy that a random
signal produces on the wireless medium. Hence, the attacker cannot hide the fact that
such a signal was transmitted. Leveraging this simple idea, we construct a new secure
message type that can neither be altered nor hidden without detection. We call such a
message, a tamper-evident message. Now, that we can detect tampering, we can trust that
certain messages have not suffered tampering, and hence use these trusted messages to
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Figure 1-5: The format of a Tamper-Evident Message.
establish secure wireless connections.
Fig. 1-5 shows a simplified version of our tamper-evident message that cannot be al-
tered (but can be hidden). To ensure that an adversary cannot alter the payload of Alice's
message, we force any tamper-evident message to include silence periods. As shown in
Fig. 1-5, the payload of the message is followed by a sequence of short equal-size slots. The
transmission of a random signal in a slot is interpreted as a "1" bit, and an idle medium
is interpreted as a "0" bit. The bit sequence produced by the slots must match a hash of
the message's payload. If an adversary overwrites Alice's message with his own, he must
transmit slots corresponding to a hash of his message, including staying silent during any
zero hash bits. However, since the hash of the attacker's message differs from that of Al-
ice's message, Alice's message will show up on the medium during the attacker's "0" slots.
The attacker cannot eliminate the energy produced by Alice's random signal during her
"1" slots. Hence, Bob will detect a mismatch between the slots and the message hash, and
reject the tampered message.
By exploiting a deeper understanding of how signals interact as they interfere on the
wireless medium, we can design a wireless message that cannot be altered without being
detected at the receiver. Of course, instead of altering Alice's message, an adversary can
simply jam and hide Alice's message. In Chapter 5, we build on the above idea, and design
tamper-evident messages, which can neither be altered nor hidden, without being detected
at the receiver. We then design TEP, a protocol to establish wireless connections that is
provably secure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Finally, we integrate TEP with the
existing WiFi stack and show how to implement TEP with off-the-shelf WiFi radios.
Relation to Prior Work: TEP is the first wireless pairing protocol that works in-band,
with no pre-shared keys, and protects against Man-In-The-Middle attacks. Over the past
decade, there has been significant work on secure pairing without passwords. Past efforts
to address this problem, however, rely on prior key distribution or out-of-band commu-
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nication channels [98, 132, 60, 118, 97, 26]. For example, devices can exchange keys over
a visual channel between an LCD and a camera [98], an audio channel [60], an infrared
channel [19], a dedicated wireless channel allocated exclusively for key exchange [26], etc.
In contrast, by understanding how signals interact when they interfere, we establish secure
connections without any passwords, prior key distribution, or out-of-band communication
channels.
* 1.2 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe ZigZag
decoding in more detail and how it deals with realistic wireless channels and radio im-
perfections. Chapter 3 describes how TIMO decodes in the presence of cross-technology
interference. We first present a measurement study of the impact of cross-technology inter-
ference in today's WiFi networks. We then describe TIMO's algorithms and prototype im-
plementation. Next, Chapter 4 presents IMDShield and describes in detail our full-duplex
radio design. Further, it demonstrates how the system both protects the confidentiality
of the implant's transmitted data and provides access control, preventing an adversary
from sending unauthorized commands to the implant. Finally, Chapter 5 describes our
tamper-evident message primitive in more detail and builds on this primitive to develop
a protocol for securing wireless connections against man-in-the-middle attacks.
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CHAPTER 2
Decoding 802.11 Collisions
Collisions are a known problem in 802.11 networks [29, 82, 78, 108, 143]. Current 802.11
networks rely on carrier sense (CSMA) to limit collisions-i.e., senders sense the medium
and abstain from transmission when the medium is busy. This approach is successful
in many scenarios, but when it fails, the impact on the interfering senders is drastic. To
see this, consider the hidden terminal scenario in Fig. 2-1. Here Alice and Bob are not in
range, and hence cannot sense each other. Thus, Alice and Bob are hidden with respect to
each other. In such scenarios, the senders either repeatedly collide and their throughputs
plummet, or one sender captures the medium preventing the other from getting pack-
ets through [82, 78, 143]. The 802.11 standard proposes the use of RTS-CTS to counter
collisions, but experimental results show that enabling RTS-CTS significantly reduces the
overall throughput [78, 143, 151, 108], and hence access point (AP) manufacturers disable
RTS-CTS by default [91, 107]. Ideally, one would like to address this problem without
changing the 802.11 medium access protocols (MAC) or affecting senders that do not suf-
fer from hidden terminals.
In this chapter, we introduce ZigZag, a new 802.11 receiver that increases wireless net-
work's resilience to collisions. ZigZag requires no changes to the 802.11 MAC and intro-
duces no overheard in the case of no collision. In fact, in the absence of collisions, ZigZag
acts like a typical 802.11 receiver. But, when senders collide, ZigZag achieves the same
performance as if the colidimg packets were a priori scheduled in separate time slots.
ZigZag exploits a subtle opportunity for resolving collisions, an opportunity that arises
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from two basic characteristics of 802.11:
1. An 802.11 sender retransmits a packet until it is acked or timed out, and hence when
two senders collide they tend to collide again on the same packets.
2. 802.11 senders jitter every transmission by a short random interval,1 and hence col-
lisions start with a random stretch of interference free bits.
To see how ZigZag works, consider again the scenario in Fig. 2-1, where Alice and
Bob, unable to sense each other, transmit simultaneously, causing collisions. When Alice's
packet collides with Bob's, both senders retransmit their packets causing a second colli-
sion, as shown in Fig. 2-2. Further, because of 802.11 random jitters, the two collisions are
likely to have different offsets, i.e., Ai # A2. Say that the AP can compute these offsets (as
explained in §2.4.1), the AP can then find a chunk of bits that experience interference in one
collision but is interference-free in the other, such as chunk 1 in Fig. 2-2. A ZigZag AP uses
this chunk to bootstrap its decoder. In particular, since chunk 1 is interference-free in the
first collision, the AP can decode it using a standard decoder. The AP then subtracts chunk
1 from the second collision to decode chunk 2. Now, it can go back to the first collision,
subtract chunk 2, decode chunk 3, and proceed until both packets are fully decoded.
ZigZag's key contribution is a novel approach to resolving interference, different from
prior work on interference cancellation [138, 69] and joint decoding [136]. Basic results on
the capacity of the multi-user channel show that if the two hidden terminals transmit at
the rate supported by the medium in the absence of interference, i.e., rate R in Fig. 2-3, the
aggregate information rate in a collision, being as high as 2R, exceeds capacity, precluding
any decoding [136, 48]. Thus, state-of-the-art interference cancellation and joint decoding,
designed for cellular networks with non-bursty traffic and known users [138, 16], have a
fundamental limitation when applied in 802.11 networks: they require a sender to change
the way it modulates and codes a packet according to whether the packet will collide or
not. This leaves 802.11 senders with the following tradeoff: either they tune to a subop-
timal rate that works in the presence of collision, though not every packet will collide, or
they send at the best rate in the absence of collision, but accept that the network cannot use
these methods to resolve collisions. In contrast, with ZigZag, the senders need not make
such a tradeoff. ZigZag allows the senders to transmit at the best rate supported by the
'Each transmission picks a random slot between 0 and CW [144].
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Figure 2-1: A Hidden Terminals Scenario.
medium in the absence of collisions. However, if collisions occur, ZigZag decodes pairs of
collisions that contain the same packets. The average information rate in such a collision
pair is 2R/2 = R. This rate is both decodable and as efficient as if the two packets were
scheduled in separate time slots.
ZigZag has the following key features.
" It is modulation-independent: In ZigZag, every chunk is first rid of interference then
decoded. Hence, ZigZag can employ a standard 802.11 decoder as a black-box, which
allows it to work with collisions independent of their underlying modulation scheme
(i.e., bit rate), and even when the colliding packets are modulated differently.
" It is backward compatible: A ZigZag receiver can operate with unmodified 802.11
senders and requires no changes to the 802.11 protocol (see §2.6).
" It generalizes to more than a pair of colliding packets, as explained in §2.7 and experimen-
tally demonstrated in §2.9.6.
We have implemented a ZigZag prototype in GNU Radio, and evaluated it in a 14-node
testbed, where 10% of the sender-receiver pairs are hidden terminals, 10% sense each other
partially, and 80% sense each other perfectly. Our results reveal the following findings.
" The loss rate averaged over scenarios with partial or perfect hidden terminals de-
creases from 72.6% to less than 0.7%, with some severe cases where the loss rate goes
down from 100% to zero.
" Averaging over all sender-receiver pairs, including those that do not suffer from hid-
den terminals, we find that ZigZag improves the average throughput by 25.2% when
compared to current 802.11.
" Our BPSK implementation and our 4-QAM and 16-QAM simulations show that
ZigZag and collision-free decoding achieve the same bit error (BER) for compara-
ble SNRs. Surprisingly, at BPSK and 4-QAM, ZigZag has a slightly lower BER than if
the two packets were collision-free. This is because, in ZigZag, every bit is received
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Figure 2-2: ZigZag Decoding. ZigZag decodes first chunk 1 in the first collision, which is interference
free. It subtracts chunk 1 from the second collision to decode chunk 2, which it then subtract from the first
collision to decode chunk 3, etc.
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Figure 2-3: Standard Interference Cancellation and Joint Decoding Require Inefficient Rates. The figure
shows the capacity region of the multi-user channel. If Alice and Bob transmit close to the best rate sup-
ported by the medium in the absence of interference, R, their combined rates will be (R, R), which is
outside the capacity region, and hence cannot be decoded.
twice, once in every collision, improving its chances of being correctly decoded.
* 2.1 Related Work
Related work falls in the following two areas.
(a) Collisions in WLAN and Mesh Networks. Recent work [63, 641 advocates the use of
successive interference cancellation (SIC) and joint decoding to resolve 802.11 collisions.
As explained in §2, these schemes work only when the colliding senders transmit at a bit
rate (i.e., information rate) significantly lower than allowed by their respective SNRs and
code redundancy. The authors have built a Zigbee prototype of successive interference
cancellation [64]. Since ZigBee has no rate adaptation and employs a high redundancy
code (every 4 bits are expanded to 32 bits), it experiences scenarios in which the bit rate is
significantly below what can be supported by the SNR and the code rate. In such scenarios,
SIC could significantly improve the throughput. In contrast, ZigZag works even when
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a sender uses a bit rate that matches its channel's SNR and the redundancy of its code
(as would be the case for systems with proper rate adaptation). In that respect, ZigZag
provides an attractive alternative to SIC.
Our work is also related to our prior work on analog network coding (ANC) [80]. An
ANC receiver however can decode collisions only if it already knows one of the two col-
liding packets. It cannot deal with general collisions or hidden terminals. In principle, one
can combine ANC and ZigZag to create a system both addresses hidden terminals, and
collects network coding gains.
Additionally, prior works have studied wireless interference [116, 61, 29, 82, 78, 108,
143], and proposed MAC modifications to increase resilience to collisions [157, 47, 79,
21, 106]. In comparison, ZigZag presents mechanisms that decode collisions rather than
avoiding them, and works within the 802.11 MAC rather than proposing a new MAC.
(b) Communication and Information Theory: The idea of decoding interfering users has
received much interest in information and communications theories [136, 138, 27, 137, 139].
The main feature that distinguishes ZigZag from prior works in those areas is that ZigZag
resolves 802.11 collisions without requiring any scheduling, power control, synchroniza-
tion assumptions, or coding.
Among the deployed systems, CDMA receivers decode a user by treating all other users
as noise [27]. A CDMA solution for hidden terminals in WLANs, however, would require
major changes to 802.11 including the use of power control and special codes [16, 27].
Furthermore, CDMA is known to be highly suboptimal in high SNR regimes (e.g., worse
than TDMA [136]), which are typical in WLANs.
Finally, successive interference cancellation (SIC) has been used to decode interfering
users in CDMA cellular networks [161. SIC requires the interfering senders to have signif-
icantly different powers [138], or different levels of coding [69, 1361. It also requires tight
control from the base station to ensure that the total information rate stays below capacity.
Conceptually, SIC may be perceived as a special case of ZigZag, in which a chunk is a full
packet, i.e., a full packet is decoded and subtracted from the collision signal to decode the
other packet. However, by iterating over strategically-picked chunks, ZigZag can resolve
interference even when the colliding senders have similar SNRs, are not coordinated, and
do not use special codes.
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* 2.2 Scope
ZigZag is an 802.11 receiver design that decodes collisions. It focuses on hidden terminals
in WLANs. ZigZag's benefits extend to mesh networks, where having receivers that can
decode collisions could enable more concurrent transmissions and hence higher spatial
reuse. Exploring mesh benefits is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
ZigZag adopts a best effort design; in the absence of collisions it acts like current 802.11
receivers, but when collisions occur it tries to decode them. Of course there are colli-
sion patterns that ZigZag cannot decode and there are cases where, though the pattern
is decodable, decoding may fail because of insufficient SNR. However, since ZigZag does
not introduce any overhead for the case of no collision, its presence can only increase the
throughput of the WLAN. In §2.6, we explain how one can deploy ZigZag in a WLAN by
changing only the access points and without modifying the clients.
ZigZag resolves a variety of collision patterns. The main idea underlying its decoding
algorithm is to find a collision free chunk, which it exploits to bootstrap the decoding
process. Once the decoder is bootstrapped the process is iterative and at each stage it
produces a new interference-free chunk, decodable using standard decoders. For example,
as explained in §2, ZigZag can decode the pattern in Fig. 2-2 by decoding first chunk 1 in
the first collision, and subtracting it from the second collision, obtaining chunk 2, which it
decodes and subtracts from the first collision, etc. Using the same principle, ZigZag can
decode other patterns like those in Fig. 2-4. In particular, it can decode patterns where the
collisions overlap as in Fig. 2-4a, and patterns in which colliding packets change order as
in Fig. 2-4b, or even patterns where the packets have different sizes, as in Fig. 2-4c.
ZigZag also exploits collision patterns that arise from capture effects. Say that Alice's
power at the AP is significantly higher than Bob's, and hence her packets enjoy the capture
effect [1431. Currently such a scenario translates into significant unfairness to Bob whose
packets do not get through [82, 78, 143]. Like current APs, a ZigZag AP decodes every
packet from Alice, the high power sender. Unlike current APs however, ZigZag subtracts
Alice's packet from the collision signal and try to decode Bob's packet. However, if Alice's
power is excessively high, even a small imperfection in subtracting her signal would con-
tribute a significant noise to Bob's, preventing correct decoding of his packets. In this case,
the next collision will involve a new packet from Alice and Bob's retransmission of the
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Figure 2-4: ZigZag applies to various collision patterns. Subscripts refer to a packet's sender and id, e.g.,
Pai is Alice's first packet. The top three patterns are decoded chunk-by-chunk. The forth pattern may occur
when Alice's SNR is significantly higher than Bob's. The fifth pattern occurs when Alice's SNR is higher
than Bob's, and the bit rates are too low for the SNRs. The last pattern occurs when two groups of nodes
are hidden from each other.
same packet, as shown in Fig. 2-4d. ZigZag decodes Alice's new packet and subtracts it to
obtain a second version of Bob's packet, which may also contain errors. ZigZag however
combine the two faulty versions of Bob's packet to correct the errors. This is done using
Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC) [23], a classic method for combining information from
two receptions to correct for bit errors.
In addition, whenever the powers permit, ZigZag decodes patterns that involve a sin-
gle collision like those in Fig. 2-4e. This occurs when Alice's power is significantly higher
than Bob's, and both senders happen to transmit at a bit rate lower than the best rate sup-
ported by the channel. In this case, ZigZag can apply standard successive interference
cancellation [138], i.e., ZigZag decodes Pa and subtracts it from the received signal to de-
code Pb, decoding both packets using a single collision. As explained in §2.1, successive
interference cancellation is a special case of ZigZag, in which a chunk is a full packet. This
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special case applies only when the bit-rate is too low given the senders' SNRs, and one of
the senders has significantly more SNR than the other.
ZigZag can also decode patterns that involve more than two nodes, like that in Fig. 2-4f.
This pattern may occur when two groups of nodes cannot sense each other. For example,
nodes A and B, which are in the same room, can sense each other, but cannot sense nodes
C and D, which happen to be in a different room.
ZigZag can also decode collisions that involve more than a pair of packets, which we
discuss in §2.7.
* 2.3 A Communication Primer
A wireless signal is typically represented as a stream of discrete complex numbers [103].
To transmit a packet over the wireless channel, the transmitter maps the bits into complex
symbols, in a process called modulation. For example, the BPSK modulation (used in
802.11 at low rates) maps a "0" bit to ej" = -1 and a "1" bit to e 0 - 1. The transmitter
generates a complex symbol every T seconds. In this chapter, we use the term x[n] to
denote the complex number that represents the nth transmitted symbol.
The received signal is also represented as a stream of complex symbols spaced by the
sampling interval T. These symbols differ, however, from the transmitted symbols, both in
amplitude and phase. In particular, if the transmitted symbol is x[n] the received symbol
can be approximated as:
y[n] = Hx[n] + w[n], (2.1)
where H = he is also a complex number, whose magnitude h refers to channel attenuation
and its angle -} is a phase shift that depends on the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver, and w[n] is a random complex noise. 2
If Alice and Bob transmit concurrently their signals add up, and the received signal can
be expressed as:
y[n]= YA[n]+ yB [n] +w[n],
where YA[n] = HAXA[n] and YB[n] = HBXB[n] refer to Alice's and Bob's signals after
traversing their corresponding channels to the AP. Note that the above does not mean
2This models flat-fading quasi-static channels.
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that we assume the n/h symbol from Alice combines with the nth symbol from Bob. The
notation is only to keep the exposition clear.
0 2.3.1 Practical Issues
A few practical issues complicates the process of estimating the transmitted symbols from
the received symbols: frequency offset, sampling offset, and inter-symbol interference.
Typically, a decoder has built-in mechanisms to deal with these issues [103].
(a) Frequency Offset and Phase Tracking: It is virtually impossible to manufacture two
radios centered at the same exact frequency. Hence, there is always a small frequency
difference, 6f, between transmitter and receiver. The frequency offset causes a linear dis-
placement in the phase of the received signal that increases over time, i.e.,
y[n] = Hx[n]ej2 n6 fT + w[n].
Typically, the receiver estimates of and compensates for it.
(b) Sampling Offset: The transmitted signal is a sequence of complex samples separated
by a period T. However, when transmitted on the wireless medium, these discrete values
have to be interpolated into a continuous signal. The continuous signal is equal to the
original discrete samples, only if sampled at the exact same positions where the discrete
values were. Due to lack of synchronization, a receiver cannot sample the received signal
exactly at the right positions. There is always a sampling offset, p. Further, the drift in the
transmitter's and receiver's clocks results in a drift in the sampling offset. Hence, decoders
have algorithms to estimate p and track it over the duration of a packet.
(c) Inter-Symbol Interference (ISI) While Eq. 2.1 makes it look as if a received symbol
y[n] depends only on the corresponding transmitted symbol x[n], in practice, neighboring
symbols affect each other to some extent. Practical receivers apply linear equalizers [86] to
mitigate the effect of ISI.
* 2.4 ZigZag Decoding
We explain ZigZag decoding using the hidden terminal scenario in Fig. 2-6, where Alice
and Bob, not able to sense each other, transmit simultaneously to the AP, creating repeated
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collisions. Later in §2.7, we extend our approach to a larger number of colliding senders.
Like current 802.11, when a ZigZag receiver detects a packet it tries to decode it, assum-
ing no collision, and using a typical decoder. If decoding fails (e.g., the decoded packet
does not satisfy the checksum), the ZigZag receiver will check whether the packet has
suffered a collision, and proceed to apply ZigZag decoding.
U 2.4.1 Is It a Collision?
To detect a collision, the AP exploits that every 802.11 packet starts with a known pream-
ble [144]. The AP detects a collision by correlating the known preamble with the received
signal. Correlation is a popular technique in wireless receivers for detecting known signal
patterns [27]. Say that the known preamble is L samples. The AP aligns these L samples
with the first L received samples, computes the correlation, shifts the alignment by one
sample and re-computes the correlation. The AP repeats this process until the end of the
packet. The preamble is a pseudo-random sequence that is independent of shifted ver-
sions of itself, as well as Alice's and Bob's data. Hence the correlation is near zero except
when the preamble is perfectly aligned with the beginning of a packet. Fig. 2-5 shows the
correlation as a function of the position in the received signal. The measurements are col-
lected using GNURadios (see §2.9). Note that when the correlation spikes in the middle
of a reception, it indicates a collision. Further, the position of the spike corresponds to the
beginning of the second packet, and hence shows A, the offset between the packets.
The above argument is only partially correct because the frequency offset can destroy
the correlation, unless the AP compensates for it. Assume that Alice's packet starts first
and Bob's packet collides with it starting at position A. To detect Bob's colliding packet,
the AP has to compensate for the frequency offset between Bob and itself. The frequency
offset does not change over long periods, and thus the AP can maintain coarse estimates
of the frequency offsets of active clients as obtained at the time of association. The AP uses
these estimates in the computation.
Mathematically, the correlation is computed as follows. Let y be the received signal,
which is the sum of the signal from Alice, YA, the signal from Bob, YB, and the noise term
w. Let the samples s[k], 1 < k < L, refer to the known preamble, and s* [k] be the complex
conjugate. The correlation, F, at position A is:
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Figure 2-5: Detecting Collisions by Correlation with the Known Preamble. The correlation spikes when
the correlated preamble sequence aligns with the preamble in Bob's packet, allowing the AP to detect the
occurrence of a collision and where it starts.
L
F(A) = Zs*[k]y[k + A]
k=1
L
= Zs*[k](yA[k+A] +yB [k] +w[k
k=1
The preamble, however, is independent of Alice's data and the noise, and thus the corre-
lation between the preamble and these terms is about zero. Since Bob's first L samples are
the same as the preamble, we obtain:
L
F(A) = s*[k]yB[k]
k=1
L
S Zs* [k ] H Bs [k]ej
2 rk6 fBT
k=1
L
= HB s[k 2ej 2,rkfBT
k=1
Since a frequency offset exists between Bob and the AP, i.e., ofB # 0, the terms inside
the sum have different angles and may cancel each other. Thus, the AP should compute
the value of the correlation after compensating for the frequency offset, which we call F'.
At position A this value becomes:
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L
F'(A) = HB s[k] 2 ej 2,rk6fBT x e-j2,k 6 fBT
k=1
L
= HB E s[k] 2 .
k=1
The magnitude of r'(A) is the sum of energy in the preamble, and thus it is significantly
large, i.e., after compensating for the frequency offset, the magnitude of the correlation
spikes when the preamble aligns with the beginning of Bob's packet, as shown in Fig. 2-5.
Imposing a threshold enables us to detect whether the AP received a collision signal and
where exactly the second packet starts.
E 2.4.2 Did the AP Receive Two Matching Collisions?
Now that it is clear that the received signal is the result of collision, the AP searches for
a matching collision, i.e., a collision of the same two packets. The AP stores recent un-
matched collisions (i.e., stores the received complex samples). It is sufficient to store the
few most recent collisions because, in 802.11, colliding sources try to retransmit a failed
transmission as soon as the medium is available [144].
We use the same correlation trick to match the current collision against prior collisions.
Assume the AP is trying to match two collisions (P1 , P2 ), and (P', Ps). Without loss of gen-
eralization, let us focus on checking whether P 2 is the same as P2 . The AP already knows
the offset in each collision, i.e., A and A'. The AP aligns the two collisions at the positions
where P2 and P2 start. If the two packets are the same, the samples aligned in such a way
are highly dependent (they are the same except for noise and the retransmission flag in the
802.11 header), and thus the correlation spikes. If P 2 and P2 are different, their data is not
correlated and the correlation does not spike at that alignment.
0 2.4.3 How Does the AP Decode Matching Collisions?
Say that the AP found a pair of matching collisions like those in Fig. 2-6. Note that Fig. 2-6
is the same as Fig. 2-2 in the introduction except that we distinguish between two images
of the same chunk that occur in different collisions, e.g., chunk 1 and chunk 1'. By now the
AP knows the offsets A1 and A2, and hence it can identify all interference-free symbols
and decode them using a standard decoder.
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Figure 2-6: ZigZag decodes then re-encodes a chunk. Before subtracting a decoded chunk, like chunk 1,
ZigZag needs to re-encode the bits to create an image of chunk 1', as received in the second collision.
Next, the AP performs ZigZag decoding, which requires identifying a bootstrapping
chunk, i.e., a sequence of symbols marred by interference in one collision and interference-
free in the other. Say that the first collision has the larger offset, i.e., A1 > A2 , the bootstrap-
ping chunk then is located in the first collision starting at position A 2 and has a length of
A1 - A2 samples. This is chunk 1 in Fig. 2-6.
The rest of the decoding works iteratively. In each iteration, the AP decodes a chunk, re-
encodes the decoded symbols and subtract them from the other collision. For example, in
Fig. 2-6, the AP decodes chunk 1 from the first collision, re-encodes the symbols in chunk 1
to create an image of chunk 1', which it subtracts from the second collision to obtain chunk
2. The AP iterates on the rest of the chunks as it did on chunk 1, until it is done decoding
all chunks in the colliding packets.
(a) The Decoder. ZigZag can use any standard decoder as a black box. Specifically, the
decoder operates on a chunk after it has been rid from interference, and hence can use
standard techniques. This characteristic allows ZigZag to directly apply to any modulation
scheme as it can use any standard decoder for that modulation as a black box. Further, the
two colliding packets may use different modulation (different bit rates) without requiring
any special treatment.
(b) Re-Encoding a Chunk. Now that the AP knows the symbols that Alice sent in chunk 1,
it uses this knowledge to create an estimate of how these symbols would look after travers-
ing Alice's channel to the AP, i.e., to create an image of chunk 1', which it can subtract from
the second collision.
In §2.4.4 we explain how the AP computes channel parameters, but for now, let us
assume that the AP knows Alice's channel, i.e., HA, 6 fA, and PA. Denote the symbols in
chunk 1 by XA[n] ... XA[n + K]. A symbol that Alice sends, XA[n], is transformed by the
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channel to YA [n] where:
yA[n] = HAXA[n]eJ 2 fAT
The AP would have received YA [n] had it sampled the signal exactly at the same loca-
tions as Alice. Because of sampling offset, the AP samples the received signal A seconds
away from Alice's samples. Thus, given the samples yA[n] ... yA[n + K], the AP has to
interpolate to find the samples at yA[n + I ... yA[n + K + pA).
To do so, we leverage that we have a band-limited signal sampled according to the
Nyquist criterion. Nyquist says that for such signals, one can interpolate the signal at any
discrete position, e.g., n + pA, with complete accuracy, using the following equation [103]:
yA[n - AA] = yA[i]sinc(r(n + PA - ,
i=-Oo
where sinc is the sinc function. In practice, the above equation is approximated by taking
the summation over few symbols (about 8 symbols) in the neighborhood of n.
Now that the AP has an image of chunk 1' as received, it subtracts it from the second
collision to obtain chunk 2, and proceeds to repeat the same process on this latter chunk.
0 2.4.4 Estimating and Tracking System Parameters
The receiver estimates the system's parameters using the preamble in Alice's and Bob's
packets. Without loss of generality, we focus on Bob, i.e., we focus on the sender that
starts second. This is the harder case since the preamble in Bob's packet, typically used for
channel estimation, is immersed in noise. We need to learn HB, PB, and 6fB.
(a) Channel. Again we play our correlation trick, i.e., we correlate the received samples
with the known preamble. Recall that the correlation at the peak is:
L
V'(A) = HB I s[k] 1.
k=1
The AP knows the magnitude of the transmitted preamble i.e., it knows Is[k] 2. Hence,
once it finds the maximum value of the correlation over the collision, it substitutes in the
above equation to compute HB.
(b) Frequency Offset. The frequency offset does not change significantly. Since decoders
already estimate the frequency offset, an initial coarse estimate can be computed using any
prior interference free packet from the client (e.g., the association packet).
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This coarse estimate, however, is not sufficient since any residual errors in estimating
6f translate into linear displacement in the phase that accumulates over the duration of
a packet. Any typical decoder tracks the signal phase and corrects for the residual errors
in the frequency offset. Since ZigZag uses a typical decoder as a black box, it need not
worry about tracking the phase while decoding. However, as it reconstructs an image of a
received chunk, ZigZag tracks the phase. Consider as an example, reconstructing an image
of chunk 1'. First we reconstruct the image using the current estimate of the frequency
offset, as explained in §2.4.3(b). Next we subtract that image from the second collisions
to get chunk 2. Now, we reconstruct chunk 2 and subtracted from the second collision,
creating an estimate of chunk 1', which we term chunk 1". We compare the phases in
chunk 1' and chunk 1". The difference in the phase is caused by the residual error in our
estimate of the frequency offset. We update our estimate of the frequency offset as follows:
6f = 6f + ao/t,
where a is just a small multiplier, 6# is the phase error which accumulated over 6t.
(c) Sampling Offset. The procedure used to update and track the sampling offset is fairly
similar to that used to update and track the frequency offset. Namely, the black-box de-
coder tracks the sampling offset when decoding a chunk. When reconstructing the image
of a chunk, like chunk 1', we use the differences between chunk 1' and 1" to estimate the
residual error in the sampling offset and track it.3
(d) Inter-Symbol Interference. When we reconstruct a chunk to subtract it from the re-
ceived signal, we need to create as close an image of the received version of that chunk
as possible. This includes any distortion that the chunk experienced because of multipath
effects, hardware distortion, filters, etc. To do so, we need to invert the linear filter (i.e., the
equalizer) that a typical decoder uses to remove these effects. The filter takes as input the
decoded symbols before removing ISI, and produces their ISI-free version, as follows:
L
x[i] = hi xisi[i + 1],
where the hl's are known as the filter taps. For our purpose, we can take the filter from
the decoder and invert it. We apply the inverse filter to the symbols x[n] before using them
3We use the Muller-and-Muller algorithm [103] to estimate sampling offset errors.
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Figure 2-7: Errors Die Exponentially Fast. The error causes the AP to sum yA instead of subtracting it.
Hence, the error propagates from YA to the estimate yB, i.e., from one chunk to the next, only when the
angle between the vectors is smaller than 600, which occurs with probability }.
0.7 
,BPSK 
-
4QAM --0.6 16QAM - - - -
0
3 0.5
0.4
6
0.3
0.1
0.1. - - - 15 20-- -
0 5 10 15 20
Run-length of Symbol Errors
Figure 2-8: The probability of error propagation dies fast.
in Eq. 2.4.3 to ensure that our reconstructed chunk incorporates these distortions.
N 2.5 Dealing with Errors
Up to now, we have described the system assuming correct decoding. But what happens
if the AP makes a mistake in decoding a symbol? For example, in Fig. 2-6, say the AP
mistakenly decodes the first bit in chunk 1 as a "0" bit, when it is actually a "1" bit. Since
chunk 1 is subtracted from the second collision to obtain chunk 2, the error will affect the
first symbol in chunk 2. This in turn will affect the first symbol in chunk 3, and so on. We
will show the following:
* If a symbol error occurs while decoding, it may affect later chunks, but this propaga-
tion does not persist. It dies exponentially fast.
* The errors can be further reduced by appling ZigZag in both the forward and back-
ward directions and combining the results.
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(a) Errors Die Exponentially Fast. Intuitively, say the AP made a random error in de-
coding a symbol; the error will propagate to subsequent symbols making them random.
However, any modulation scheme has only a few possible symbol values (e.g., a BPSK
symbol can be either "0" or "1"). Even when a symbol is randomly decoded, there is a
reasonable chance the randomly picked value is correct. Thus, a decoding mistake propa-
gates for a stretch of symbols until it is corrected by chance, at which point it stops affecting
subsequent symbols. Assume the probability of randomly picking the right symbol is p,
the errors dies at a rate 1.
We formalize the above argument for the case of BPSK, which maps a "0" bit to -1
and a "1" bit to +1. Assume the AP makes a mistake in decoding some symbol YA, and
tries to use the erroneous symbol to decode YB by subtracting the decoded vector from
the received signal y = YA + YB. 4 In the worst case, and as shown in Fig. 2-7, the error
causes the AP to add the vector instead of subtracting it, and hence the AP estimates jB
as yB + 2YA. In BPSK, the AP will decode yB to the wrong bit value only if the estimate
yB has the opposite sign of the original vector. This will happen only if the angle between
the two vectors yB and yA is less than -60o. The frequency offset between Alice and Bob
means that the vectors yB and YA can have any angle with respect to each other. Thus, the
error propagates with probability less than - = 1, i.e., in BPSK, errors die exponentially
fast at a rate 
.
Fig 2-8 shows a simulation of error propagation in ZigZag. We insert a decoding error
by randomly mistaking a symbol as one of its neighbors in the constellation. We compute
the number of subsequent symbols that are affected by this error. The figure shows that
errors die exponential quickly. The figure however shows that errors die faster in BPSK and
4-QAM than in 16-QAM, and hence ZigZag performs better in these modulation schemes.
(b) Forward and Backward Decoding. The ZigZag algorithm described so far decodes
forward. In Fig. 2-2, it starts with chunk 1 in the first collision and proceeds until both
packets are decoded. However, clearly the figure is symmetric. The AP could wait until it
received all samples, then decode backward. If the AP does so, it will have two estimates
for each symbol. ZigZag combines these estimates to both combat error propagation and
reduce the overall errors. To do so, ZigZag builds on prior results in diversity combin-
4We ignore the noise term w since it has a random effect on the error and can equally emphasize it or correct
it.
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ing [148, 23]; whenever there is a mismatch between forward and backward decoding,
ZigZag uses the soft values of the decoded symbols as a confidence measure. It picks the
results of forward or backward decoding depending on which one has a higher confidence
(the details are in [57]). In practice, instead of decoding all the way forward and then back-
ward, one can do it on a chunk-by-chunk basis, using the most recently decoded chunk as
a bootstrapping chunk for backward decoding.
U 2.6 Backward Compatibility
It would be beneficial if ZigZag requires no changes to senders. In this case, one can
improve resilience to interference in a WLAN by purely changing the APs, and without
requiring any modifications to the clients (e.g., laptops, PCs, PDAs). Compatibility with
unmodified 802.11 senders requires a ZigZag receiver to ack the colliding senders once
it decoded their packets; otherwise the senders will retransmit again unnecessarily. Re-
call that an 802.11 sender expects the ack to follow the packet, separated only by a short
interval called SIFS [144]; Can a ZigZag receiver satisfy such requirement?
The short answer is "yes, with a high probability." To see how, consider again the
example where Alice and Bob are hidden terminals, and say that the AP uses ZigZag to
decode two of their packets, Pai and Pbl, as shown in Fig. 2-9. The AP acks the packets
according to the scheme outlined in Fig. 2-9. Specifically, by time ti, the AP has fully
decoded both Pai and Pbl. Even more, by ti the AP has performed both forward-decoding
and backward decoding for all bits transmitted so far, i.e., all bits except the few bits at the
end of Pbl.5 Thus, at ti the AP declares both packets decoded. It waits for a SIFS and acks
packet Pai. Though the ack collides with the tail of packet Pbl, the ack will be received
correctly because Alice cannot hear Bob's transmission. Bob too will not be disturbed by
the AP's ack to Alice because practical transmitters cannot receive and transmit at the
same time. The AP then transmits some random signal to prevent Alice from transmitting
her next packet, Pa2 , before Bob's packet is acked. The AP knows how long this padding
signal should be since it already has a decoded version of Bob's packet and knows its
length. After Bob finishes his transmission the AP acks him as well.
One question remains, however, would the offset between the two colliding packets
5 This assumes the receiver tries in parallel to use standard decoding and ZigZag, and takes whichever
satisfies the checksum.
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Figure 2-9: How ZigZag sends 802.11 synchronous acks.
suffice to send an ack? Said differently, in Fig. 2-9, how likely is it that t 2 - ti > SIFS +
ACK. One can show that, given 802.11 timing, the likelihood that the time offset between
the two packets is sufficient to send an ack is quite high. In particular, for the common
deployment of backward compatible 802.11g, we prove the following.
Lemma 2.1 In 802.11g, the probability that the time offset between two colliding packets is suffi-
cient for sending an ACK is higher than 93.7%.
Proof: Let us denote the duration of the slot time by S, ACK duration by ACK, SIFS
duration by SIFS, and the initial congestion window by CW. We need the offset between
the two colliding packets in the second collision to be greater than SIFS + ACK. Since
in the second collision, Alice and Bob randomly pick a slot in the congestion window of
size 2CW, the probability that Alice picks a slot close enough to Bob to have an offset of
less than SIFS+ACK is upper bounded by SIFS ACK. Thus the probability that the offset
between the packets suffices to send an ACK is lower bounded by 1 - SIFS ACK. For
the backward-compatible 802.11g networks, the parameters are S = 20ps, ACK = 30ps,
SIFS = 10ps [49]. Substituting in the above equations, we find that the success probability
is at least 0.9375.
There exist however patterns that ZigZag can decode but cannot ack synchronously. For
example, in Fig. 2-4, with a high probability, we can synchronously ack the first four pat-
terns. However, the last two patterns require asynchronous acks. ZigZag always prefers to
use synchronous acks. Specifically, the AP identifies ZigZag-aware senders during associ-
ation. It always tries to send synchronous acks but if that fails and the sender is ZigZag-
aware, the AP sends the ack asynchronously in a manner similar to [1481. In practice, how-
ever, most collisions tend to involve two terminals and the autorate algorithm matches the
bit rate to the SNR. Thus, we believe that even if the AP does not implement asynchronous
acks, it can still resolve the majority of the collisions that occur in practice.
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N 2.7 Beyond Two Interferers
Our description, so far, has been limited to a pair of colliding packets. ZigZag, however,
can resolve a larger number of colliding senders. Consider the scenario in Fig. 2-10, where
we have three collisions from three different senders. We refer to the colliding packets by
P1, P2 and P3 , and collision signals by C1, C 2 and C3. The figure shows a possible decoding
order. We can start by decoding chunk 1 in the first collision, C1, and subtract it from C2
and C3. As a result, chunk 2 in C2 becomes interference-free and thus decodable. Next,
we subtract chunk 2 from both C1 and C3. Now, chunk 3 in C3 becomes interference-free;
so we decode it and subtract it from both C1 and C2. Thus, the idea is to find a decoding
order such that, at each point, at least one collision has an interference-free chunk ready
for decoding.
The following linear-time algorithm provides a chunk-decoding order for any number
of collisions.
* Step 1: For each of the collisions, decode all the overhanging chunks that are
interference-free.
" Step 2: Subtract the known chunks wherever they appear in all collisions.
" Step 3: Decode all the new chunks that become interference free as a result of Step 2.
* Step 4: Repeat the last two steps until all the chunks from all the packets are decoded.
We would like to estimate how often this linear-time algorithm succeeds in resolving
collisions, i.e., the probability that it will not get stuck before fully decoding all symbols.
To do so, we simulate the behavior of the 802.11 MAC. Specifically, we have n nodes, all
hidden from each other, and all want to transmit a packet at t = 0. Each node maintains
a congestion window cw, which is initialized to 32 slots. Each node randomly picks a slot
in its congestion window to transmit the packet. If a collision occurs and the AP fails to
decode the packet, the sender doubles its congestion window, up to a maximum of 1024
slots. The experiment is repeated 10,000 times for each value of n. Fig. 2-11 shows the
probability that the greedy decoder fails to decode n packets given n collisions. It shows
that this probability ranges between .01%- 1%, and hence is negligible in practice.
Intuitively, one may think of the system of n collisions of n packets as a linear system of
n equations and n unknowns. The collisions are the linear equations, whereas the packets
are the unknowns. Such system is solvable if the equations are linearly independent, i.e.,
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Figure 2-10: Applying ZigZag to Three Collisions.
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Figure 2-11: Failure probability of our linear-time decoder as a function of the number of colliding nodes.
the packets combine differently in different collisions. A general system of linear equa-
tions, however, is not always solvable in linear-time (it requires a matrix inversion). But
the equations in the case of collisions have a special structure because the symbols in a
packet appear in all collisions in the same order. Fig. 2-11 shows that for such a struc-
ture a linear-time decoder is quite powerful. Indeed, for three collisions (or less) we can
show that our linear-time algorithm is as powerful as a non-linear decoder. Specifically,
we prove in [57] that:
Lemma 2.2 Given three collisions of three packets, if for any packet pair P and P, there exists 2
collisions such that this pair has combined differently (in terms of offsets) in these 2 collisions, the
above greedy algorithm always succeeds in decoding all symbols in all colliding packets.
Finally, note that Fig. 2-11 is an upper bound on the performance of our linear decoder. In
practice, imperfections in the implementation of the decoder limit the maximum number
of colliding senders that can be correctly decoded. In §2.9.6, we show experimental results
for scenarios with three interfering senders.
* 2.8 Complexity
ZigZag is linear in the number of colliding senders. In comparison to current decoders,
ZigZag requires only two parallel decoding lines so that it can decode two chunks in the
same time that it would take a current decoder to decode one chunk. Most of the com-
ponents that ZigZag uses are typical to wireless receivers. ZigZag uses the decoders and
the encoders as black-boxes. Correlation, tracking, and channel estimation are all typical
functionalities in a wireless receiver [103, 27].
55SECTION 2.8. COMPLEXITY
* 2.9 Experimental Environment
We evaluate ZigZag in a 14-node GNURadio testbed. The topology is shown in Fig. 2-12.
Each node is a commodity PC connected to a USRP GNU radio [72].
(a) Hardware and Software Environment. We use the Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral (USRP) [72] for our RF frontend. We use the RFX2400 daughterboards which operate
in the 2.4 GHz range. The software for the signal processing blocks is from the open source
GNURadio project [44].
(b) Modulation. ZigZag uses the modulation/demodulation module as a black-box and
works with a variety of modulation schemes. Our implementation, however, uses Binary
Phase Shift Keying, BPSK, which is the modulation scheme that 802.11 uses at low rates.
(c) Configuration Parameters. We use the default GNURadio configuration, i.e., on the
transmitter side, the DAC rate is 128e6 samples/s, the interpolation rate is 128, and the
number of samples per symbol is 2. On the receiver side, the ADC rate is 64e6 samples/s
and the decimation rate is 64. Given the above parameters and a BPSK modulation, the
resulting bit rate is 500kb/s. Each packet consists of a 32-bit preamble, a 1500-byte payload,
and 32-bit CRC.
(d) Implementation Flow Control. On the sending side, the network interface pushes
the packets to the GNU software blocks with no modifications. On the receiving side, the
packet is first detected using standard methods built in the GNURadio software package.
Second, we try to decode the packet using the standard approach (i.e., using the BPSK
decoder in the GNURadio software). If standard decoding fails, we use the algorithm
in §2.4.1 to detect whether the packet has experienced a collision, and where exactly the
colliding packet starts. If a collision is detected, the receiver matches the packet against
any recent reception, as explained in §2.4.2. If no match is found, the packet is stored in
case it helps decoding a future collision. If a match is found, the receiver performs chunk-
by-chunk decoding on the two collisions, as explained in §2.4.3. Note that even when the
standard decoding succeeds we still check whether we can decode a second packet with
lower power (i.e., a capture scenario).
(e) Compared Schemes. We compare the following:
* ZigZag: This is a ZigZag receiver as described in §2.4 augmented with the backward-
decoding described in §2.5.
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Figure 2-12: Testbed Topology.
* 802.11: This approach uses the same underlying decoder as ZigZag but operates over
individual packet.
* Collision-Free Scheduler: This approach also uses the same basic decoder but pre-
vents interference altogether by scheduling each sender in a different time slot.
(f) Metrics. We employ the following metrics:
* Bit Error Rate (BER): The percentage of incorrect bits averaged over every 100 packets.
* Packet Loss Rate (PER): This is the percentage of incorrectly received packets. We
consider a packet to be correctly received if the BER in that packet is less than 10-3.
This is in accordance with typical wireless design, which targets a maximum BER of
10-3 before coding (and 10- after coding) [33, 134].6
* Throughput: This is the number of delivered packets normalized by the GNU Radio
transmission rate. Again a packet is considered delivered if the uncoded BER is
less than 10-3. In comparison to packet loss rate, the throughput is more resilient to
hidden terminals in scenarios that exhibit capture effects. This is because the terminal
that captures the medium transmits at full rate and gets its packets through, causing
unfairness to the other sender, but little impact on the overall throughput.
N 2.9.1 Setup
Since ZigZag acts exactly like current 802.11 receivers except when a collision occurs, our
evaluation focuses on scenarios with hidden terminals, except in §2.9.5 where we experi-
ment with various nodes in the testbed irrespective of whether they are hidden terminals.
6 For example, 802.11a target packet error rate (PER) is 0.1 for a packet size of 8000 bits. Given a maximum
uncoded BER of 10-3, practical codes like BCH Code(127,99) and BCH Code(15,5) achieve the desired PER.
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In every run, two (or three) senders transmit 500 packets to an access point. The AP (i.e.,
the receiver) logs the received signal and the logs are processed offline with the evaluated
receiver designs.
Software radios are incapable of accurately timing their carrier sense activity (CSMA)
because they perform all signal processing in user mode on the PC. To approximate CSMA,
we take the following measures. First, we setup an 802.11a node next to each of our USRP
nodes. The objective is to create an 802.11a testbed that matches the topology in our USRP
testbed but uses standard 802.11a cards, and copy the results of carrier sense from it to our
USRP testbed.
For each USRP experiment, we check whether the corresponding 802.11a nodes can
carrier sense each other. Specifically, we make each pair of the 802.11 nodes transmit at full
speed to a third node considered as an AP, log the packets, and measure the percentage of
packets each of them delivers to the AP. Next, we try to mimic the same behavior using
the USRP nodes, where each packet that was delivered in the 802.11 experiments results
in a packet delivery in the USRP experiments between the corresponding sender-receiver
USRP pairs. Lost 802.11 packets are divided into two categories: collisions and errors.
Specifically, a lost 802.11 packet that we can match with a loss from the concurrent sender is
considered a collision loss. Other losses are considered as medium errors and ignored. We
try to make each USRP experiment match the collisions that occurred in the corresponding
802.11a experiment by triggering as many collisions as observed in the 802.11a traces. The
USRP experiments are run without CSMA. Each run matches an 802.11 run between the
corresponding nodes. Each sender first transmits the same number of packets that the
corresponding 802.11 correctly delivered in the matching 802.11 run. Then both senders
transmit together as many packets as there were collisions in the matching 802.11 run.
Software radios also cannot time 802.11 synchronous acks. Given the 802.11a traces,
we know when a collision occurs, and that the sender should retry the packet, in which
case the sender transmits each packet twice. However, if the ZigZag AP manages to de-
code using a single collision, we ignore the retransmission and do not count it against the
throughput. Our prototype does not include the acking scheme described in §2.6.
U 2.9.2 Micro-Evaluation
We examine the role of various components of ZigZag.
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Table 2-1: Micro-Evaluation of ZigZag's components
Correlation False Positives 3.1%
False Negatives 1.9%
Frequency Pkt size(Bytes) 800 1500
& Success With 99.6% 98.2%
Phase Tracking Success Without 89% 0%
SNR 10dB 20dB
ISI Filter Success With 99.6% 100%
Success Without 47% 96%
(a) Correlation as a Collision Detector: We estimate the effectiveness of the correlation-
based algorithm (@2.4.1) in detecting the occurrence of collisions. Our implementation sets
the threshold to l''(Delta) > # x L x SNR, where # is a constant, L is the length of the
preamble and SNR is a coarse estimate of the SNR of the colliding sender, which could
be obtained from any previously decoded packets or from one of the sender's interfer-
ence free chunks. For our testbed, /3 = 0.6-0.7 balances false positives with false negatives.
Higher values eliminate false positives but make ZigZag miss some collisions, whereas
lower values trigger collision-detection on clean packets. Note that neither false positives
nor false negatives produce end-to-end errors. The harm of false positive is limited to com-
putational resources, because in ZigZag marking a packet as a collision does not prevent
correct decoding of that packet. The algorithm behaves as if the packet suffered capture
effect and hence is decodable despite being marred by collision. False negatives, on the
other hand, make ZigZag miss opportunities for decoding collisions but do not produce
incorrect decoding. Our evaluation sets # = 0.65.
For SNRs in [6-20]dB, we run the collision detector on sets of 500 non-collision packets
and 500 collisions, and report the results in Table 2-1. The average false positive rate (pack-
ets mistaken as collisions) is 3.1% and the average false negative rate (missing collisions)
is 1.9%. Thus, the collision detector is pretty accurate for our purpose.
(b) Frequency and Phase Tracking: We evaluate the need for the frequency and phase
tracking described in §2.4.4b. We disable our tracking algorithm (but leave the decoder
unchanged) and provide the encoder with an initially accurate estimate of the frequency
offset (as estimated by the decoder). We run ZigZag with and without tracking on 500
collision-pairs of 1500B packets. We find that without tracking none of the colliding pack-
ets is decodable (BER > 10-3), whereas with tracking enabled, 98.2% of the colliding pack-
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Figure 2-13: Effects of Residual Frequency Offset and ISI.
ets are decodable.
Fig. 2-13(a) explains this behavior. It plots the error as a function of the bit index in one
of the colliding packets (black shades refer to errors). It shows that the first 6000 bits are
decoded correctly, but as we go further the bits start getting flipped, and eventually most
of the bits are in error. This is expected since even a small residual error in the frequency
offset causes a phase rotation that increases linearly with time. Hence after some time
the phase becomes completely wrong causing high decoding error rates. This effect is
particularly bad for long packets since the errors accumulate over time. Table 2-1 shows
that while ZigZag can decode 89% of the 800Byte packets without phase tracking, none of
the 1500Byte packets is successfully decoded unless we enable phase tracking.
(c) Effect of ISI: Fig. 2-13(b), shows a snapshot of the ISI-affected received bits in our
testbed. Recall that BPSK represents a "0"' bit with -1 and a "1" bit with +1. The figure
shows that the value of a received bit depends on the value of its neighboring bits. For
example, a "1" bit tends to take a higher positive value if it is preceded by another "'",
than if the preceding bit is a "0" bit.
We evaluate the importance of compensating for these distortions using the inverse
filter described in §2.4.4d. We try to decode 500 collision pairs at different SNRs, with the
filter on and off. Table 2.1 shows that, while the filter is not important at high SNRs, i.e.,
20dB, it is necessary at low SNRs. This is expected as at low SNRs, the decoder has to
combat both higher noise and ISI distortions.
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Figure 2-14: Impact of SINR. The figure plots the throughput of the hidden terminals Alice and Bob, as
Alice moves closer to the AP, i.e., as SINR SNRA - SNRB increases. It shows that ZigZag achieves
higher throughput than both 802.11 and the Collision-Free Scheduler. ZigZag is also fairer than 802.11,
where Bob cannot get any packets through.
E 2.9.3 Does ZigZag Work?
We would like to understand the impact of the signal-to-interference ratio (SINR) on
ZigZag's performance. We want to check that ZigZag does not suffer from the same restric-
tions as traditional interference cancellation, i.e., it works even when the colliding senders
have comparable SNRs. We also want to check that ZigZag continues to work as the SNR
difference becomes large, i.e., in scenarios that may cause capture effects [87, 78].
We consider the hidden terminal scenario in Fig. 2-1, where Alice and Bob cannot sense
each other and hence transmit simultaneously to the AP. We start from a setting where both
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senders are at equal distance from the AP, i.e., SNRA = SNRB, and hence SINR = 0.
Gradually, we move Alice closer to the AP. As Alice moves closer, her SNR at the AP
increases with respect to Bob's, making it easier for the AP to capture Alice's signal. We
plot the results of this experiment in Fig. 2-14, for when the nodes use a Collision-Free
Scheduler, 802.11, and ZigZag.
Fig. 2-14 shows that ZigZag improves both throughput and fairness. In 802.11, when
Alice and Bob are equal distance from the AP, their signals collide, and neither can be
received. As Alice moves closer, her signal improves with respect to Bob's. When Alice's
signal is 4-6 dB higher than Bob's, the capture effect starts, and we see a slight increase
in Alice's throughput. As Alice gets even closer, Bob's signal becomes irrelevant. Note,
however, that at all times Bob is never received at the AP with 802.11. In contrast, with
the Collision-Free Scheduler, both Alice and Bob get a fair chance at accessing the AP. But
the scheduler cannot exploit that as Alice gets closer, the capacity increases [136], making
it possible to decode both Alice and Bob.
ZigZag outperforms both current 802.11 and the Collision-Free Scheduler. When Alice
and Bob are equal distance from the AP, it ensures that they are both received, as if they
were allocated different time slots. As Alice moves closer to the AP, the capture effect starts
kicking off. As a result, the AP can decode Alice's signal without the need for a second
collision. The AP then subtracts Alice's signal from the collision and decode Bob's packet,
and thus the total throughput becomes twice as much as the radio transmission rate. As
Alice gets even closer, her signal completely covers Bob's signal making it impossible to
decode Bob's packet. Thus, this experiment reveals the following:
" At low SINRs, ZigZag significantly outperforms 802.11 and is similar to a Collision-
Free Scheduler, i.e., it delivers the same throughput as if the colliding packets were
scheduled in separate time slots.
" At high SINR, ZigZag can outperform both 802.11 and the Collision-Free Scheduler.
This is because neither 802.11 nor the Collision-Free Scheduler can benefit from sce-
narios where the network capacity is higher than the sum of the rates of the two
senders. In contrast, ZigZag can exploit such scenarios to double the throughput of
the network, decoding both hidden terminals using a single collision. Furthermore,
ZigZag does not need to be explicitly informed of the capacity of the network to ex-
ploit it. It naturally transitions to exploit the increased capacity as the SNR increases.
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Figure 2-15: Comparison of Bit Error Rate (BER). For all modulation schemes, ZigZag and the Collision-
Free Scheduler achieve the same BER for comparable SNRs (+/- 1 dB of each other).
M 2.9.4 The Impact of the SNR
The standard performance metric for a receiver is the BER as a function of the SNR [134, 33,
136], and the ultimate test for a design that resolves collisions is whether it can match the
uncoded BER of a collision-free reception at every SNR, and for every modulation scheme.
To test performance under various SNRs and modulation schemes, we consider the
scenario where Alice and Bob cannot sense each other and hence transmit simultaneously
to the AP. In contrast to §2.9.3 however, Alice and Bob stay at a fixed and equal distance
from the AP. We control their transmission powers to ensure that they have the same SNR,
and plot the BER as a function of the SNR. Our GNURadio prototype employs BPSK but
to check performance with other modulation schemes (e.g., 4-QAM, 16-QAM), we use
simulations. The simulations are based on an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel [136]. Other parameters (e.g., the packet size and frequency offset) are set to their
values in the testbed.
Figs. 2-15a and 2-15b plot the BER as a function of the SNR, both in the testbed and in
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Figure 2-16: Normalized Throughput for the Whole Testbed. The figure shows a CDF of the throughputs
in our testbed for pairs of competing flows, for both hidden and non-hidden terminal scenarios. ZigZag
improves the average throughout in our testbed by 25.2%.
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Figure 2-17: Loss Rate for the Whole Testbed. The figure shows a CDF of the packet loss rate in our testbed
for pairs of competing flows, for both hidden and non-hidden terminal scenarios. ZigZag improves the
average loss rate in our testbed from 15.8% to 0.2%.
simulations.7 The plots are only for ZigZag and the Collision-Free Scheduler because, in
this scenario, 802.11 performed extremely poorly with BER close to 50%. The figures show:
" For all modulation schemes, ZigZag and the Collision-Free Scheduler achieve the
same BER for comparable SNRs, i.e., the required SNRs are within 1 dB of each other.
* At BPSK and 4-QAM, ZigZag has a slightly better BER than if the two packets were
received collision-free. This is because, in ZigZag, every bit is received twice, once
in every collision, improving its chances of being correctly decoded. This impact is
countered by error propagation (see §2.5). Since errors propagate further in denser
modulations, ZigZag's performance is slightly worse at 16-QAM.
7 As expected BPSK in the testbed works at slightly higher SNR than in simulations because of hardware
and software imperfections.
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Figure 2-18: Scatter Plot of Flow Throughputs. The figure shows a scatter plot of ZigZag and 802.11 through-
puts for each sampled sender-receiver pairs. ZigZag helps when there are hidden terminals and never
hurts.
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Figure 2-19: CDF of Loss Rate at Hidden Terminals. The figure zooms on scenarios with full or partial
hidden terminals. ZigZag reduces the average loss rate for hidden terminals in our testbed from 72.6% to
about 0.7%.
0 2.9.5 Testbed Throughput and Loss Rate
In this section, we use the testbed in Fig. 2-12 as a case study to investigate how ZigZag
affects various sender-receiver pairs. The testbed has 14 nodes that form a variety of line-
of-sight and non-line-of-sight topologies. While up to now we have focused only on sce-
narios with hidden terminals, in this section, we experiment with various testbed nodes
irrespective of whether they are hidden terminals. Specifically, we pick two senders ran-
domly. We pick an AP randomly from the nodes reachable by both senders. We mimic
CSMA as explained in §2.9.1 and make each sender transmit 100 packets to the AR We re-
peat the experiment with random set of sender pairs and different choice of APs. Among
the sender pairs that we sampled 10% are perfect hidden terminals, 10% can sense each
other partially, and 80% can sense each other perfectly.
First, we compare the throughput and loss rate under current 802.11 and ZigZag, for
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Figure 2-20: ZigZag's Performance with Three Hidden Terminals. Cumulative distribution of the through-
put of three hidden terminals.
the whole network. Fig. 2-16 plots a CDF of the aggregate throughput, i.e., the sum of
the throughput of each pair of concurrent senders. The figure shows that in our testbed,
ZigZag increases the average throughput by 25.2%. This improvement arises from two
factors. For all cases where the normalized aggregate throughput is less than 1, the im-
provement comes purely from ZigZag' s ability to resolve successive collisions. For cases
where the aggregate throughput is higher than 1, the improvement is caused by a combi-
nation of being able to resolve a single collision whenever possible, and successive colli-
sions otherwise. Note that traditional interference cancellation applies only to cases whose
throughputs are between 1.5 and 2, which are very few. Fig. 2-17 plots a CDF of the loss
rates of individual sender-receiver pairs, i.e., the flows we experimented with. The figure
shows that in our testbed, ZigZag reduces the average packet loss rate from 15.8% to 0.2%.
Next, we check that a ZigZag AP is always a conservative choice and does not hurt any
flow. Fig. 2-18 shows a scatter plot of the throughout of every sender-receiver pair in our
experiments, both under 802.11 and ZigZag. The figure shows that ZigZag consistently
improves the throughput and does not hurt any sender-receiver pair.
Next, we zoom on the hidden terminals in our testbed, which we define as sender pairs
that fail to sense each other fully or partially. Fig. 2-19 shows a CDF of the packet loss rate
in transfers that suffered such hidden terminal scenarios. The figure shows that ZigZag
improves the average loss rate for hidden terminals in our testbed from 72.6% to 0.7%.
Further, for some severe cases, the packet loss rate goes down from 99-100% to about zero.
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* 2.9.6 Many Hidden Terminals
In @2.7 we generalized ZigZag to deal with many colliding sources. Here, we evaluate how
ZigZag performs on three collisions. In this experiment, we have three hidden terminals
that transmit concurrently to a random AP. Fig. 2-20 shows the CDF of the throughput un-
der ZigZag. The figure shows that all three senders see a fair throughput that is about one
third of the medium throughput. Thus, even with more than a pair of colliding senders,
ZigZag performs almost as if each of the senders transmitted in a separate time slot.
* 2.10 Discussion
This chapter presents ZigZag, a receiver that can decode collisions. Our core contribu-
tion is a new form of interference cancellation that iteratively decodes strategically picked
chunks, exploiting asynchrony across successive collisions. We show via a prototype im-
plementation and testbed evaluation that ZigZag addresses the hidden terminal problem
in WLANs, improving the throughput and loss rate.
ZigZag has wider implications for wireless system design than explored in this chapter.
It motivates a more aggressive medium access protocols (MAC) that exploits concurrent
transmissions in order to increase spatial reuse and network throughput. Further, ZigZag
can be combined with ideas in network coding into one system that improves concurrency,
addresses hidden terminals, and collects network coding gains.
Beyond these gains, ZigZag introduced a new approach to deal with 802.11 collisions.
Traditionally, networking researchers have considered wireless collisions to be a harmless
phenomenon and designed mechanisms to avoid them. ZigZag flips this conventional
wisdom on its head, and transforms collisions from an intrinsically harmful phenomena
to a harmless one. Since ZigZag was published, our approach has been applied to re-
design MAC protocols for single-antenna [89, 125, 88], and multi-antenna radios [90, 128],
to design radios that can transmit and receive on the same channel, i.e., full-duplex ra-
dios [31, 38], and also to reduce the power consumption of low-power RFID devices [1411.
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CHAPTER 3
Combating High-Power
Cross-Technology Interference
Cross-technology interference is emerging as a major problem for 802.11 networks. In-
dependent studies in 2010 by the Farpoint Group [8], BandSpeed [201, and Miercom [10]
all show that high-power interferers like baby monitors and cordless phones can cause
802.11n networks to experience a complete loss of connectivity. Other studies from Of-
com [7], Jupiter Research [1], and Cisco [13] report that such interferers are responsible for
more than half of the problems reported in customer networks. Today's high-power non-
WiFi sources in the ISM band include surveillance cameras, baby monitors, microwave
ovens, digital and analog cordless phones, and outdoor microwave links. Some of these
technologies transmit in a frequency band as wide as 802.11, and all of them emit power
that is comparable or higher than 802.11 devices [20]. Further, the number and diversity of
such interferers is likely to increase over time due to the proliferation of new technologies
in the ISM band.
Traditional solutions that increase resilience to interference by making 802.11 fall down
to a lower bit rate are ineffective against high-power cross-technology interference. As a
result, the most common solution today is to hop away to an 802.11 channel that does not
suffer from interference [6, 152, 105, 115]. However, the ISM band is becoming increasingly
crowded, making it difficult to find an interference-free channel. The lack of interference-
free channels has led WiFi device manufacturers [6, 11, 3] and researchers [85] to develop
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signal classifiers that inform the 802.11 user about the root cause of the problem (e.g., Blue-
tooth, microwave, baby monitor). However, these classifiers put the burden of addressing
the problem on the user and cannot solve the problem on their own.
In this dissertation, we ask whether it is possible to use the MIMO capability inherent to
802.11n to address high-power cross-technology interference. MIMO achieves most of its
throughput gains by enabling multiple concurrent streams (e.g., packets). Current MIMO
decoding, however, fails if any of these concurrent streams belongs to a different tech-
nology. Nonetheless, if MIMO can be made to work across technologies, a 3 x 3 802.11n
transmitter can then treat the signal from a baby monitor or microwave as one stream and
still deliver two concurrent streams to its receiver.
The challenge in harnessing MIMO across different technologies stems from the fact
that MIMO decoding hinges on estimating the channel between all transmit and receive
antennas. These estimates rely on understanding the signal structure and assume a known
preamble. Hence, it has been infeasible to use MIMO across different and potentially un-
known technologies.
We present TIMO,1 an 802.11n receiver design robust to high-power cross-technology
interference. TIMO introduces a MIMO technique that enables a receiver to decode a signal
of interest, even when the channel from other concurrent transmissions is unknown. The
intuition underlying TIMO is best explained via an example. Consider a pair of 2-antenna
802.11n nodes that want to communicate in the presence of a high-power unknown inter-
ferer. Let s(t) be the signal of interest and i(t) the interference signal. The 802.11n receiver
node will receive the following signals on its two antennas:2
y1(t) = hii(t) + h.s(t) (3.1)
y2(t) = h'i(t) + h' s(t), (3.2)
where hi and h' are the channels from the interferer to the 802.11n receiver, and h, and h'
are the channels from the 802.11n sender to the 802.11n receiver. The 802.11n receiver has
to solve these equations to obtain its signal of interest s(t). It knows the received samples,
y1 (t) and Y2 (t), and the channels from its transmitter, h, and h', which can be computed
'Technology Independent Multi-Output (TIMO) receiver design.
2The equations here are for single-tap channels. Subsequent sections extend these equations to multi-tap
channels.
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in the presence of interference (see 53.5.4). The receiver, however, cannot compute the
channels from the interferer, hi and h', because it does not know the interferer's signal
structure or preamble. Hence, it is left with two equations in three unknowns (s(t), hii(t),
and h'i(t)),3 which it cannot solve.
Note that the receiver can cancel the interference if it knows the interferer's channel
ratio -. In particular, the receiver can rewrite equations 3.1 and 3.2 to express the signal
of interest as:
S (t) y1(t) - /3y2(t) for hi
sht)/3for# = . (3.3)hs - Ohl h'
The only unknown in the above equation is f. Thus, though the 802.11n receiver cannot
compute the exact channels of the interferer, it can still cancel its interference using only
its channel ratio.
Still, how do we obtain this ratio given no support from the interferer? The receiver can
obtain this ratio as follows: Say that for some time instance t = to, our transmitter sends a
known symbol s(to). Our receiver can then substitute in equations 3.1 and 3.2 to obtain:
hi 
_ y1(to) - hos(to) 3.4)
h' y2 (to) - h' s(to)'
where all terms are known except for the ratio L. In @3.5, we develop this idea further
and eliminate the need for having the transmitter send a known symbol, which makes
the scheme applicable to existing 802.11n frames. We further generalize the solution to
address scenarios in which different frequencies have different interferers, or the interferer
hops across frequencies.
A MIMO transmitter can also encode its signal using interference nulling [136] so that it
does not interfere with a concurrent transmission from a competing technology. However,
using a similar computation, we show that it is necessary to obtain the ratio hs', where
hsi and hs2 are the channels from the MIMO transmitter to the receiver of the compet-
ing technology. These channels can only be estimated if the receiving node transmits data
at some point, i.e., if the competing technology uses bidirectional communication, e.g., a
cordless phone. If this constraint is met, however, TIMO can be used not only to protect
3We can lump i(t) with the channel variable because we are not interested in decoding the symbols of the
interferer.
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802.11n networks from high-power interference, but also as a cognitive mechanism that
enables MIMO-based nodes to peacefully coexist in the same frequency band with bidirec-
tional non-MIMO nodes from a different technology. In this case, the simpler non-MIMO
nodes just transmit bidirectionally, and the more complex MIMO nodes take on the bur-
den of preventing interference. This approach can lead to a new form of spectrum sharing
in which different technologies do not necessarily have to find unoccupied bands and, in
crowded environments, could instead occupy the same band thereby increasing spectral
efficiency.
We have built a prototype of TIMO using 2-antenna USRP2 radios [73]. We have evalu-
ated our design in the presence of interference from three technologies: a microwave oven,
an analog baby monitor, and a DSSS cordless phone. We first use commercial 802.11n cards
and iperf [131] to transmit in the presence of these interferers. We find that, in our testbed,
the cordless phone and the baby monitor prevent 802.11 from establishing any connection,
reducing its throughput to zero. The microwave, on the other hand, results in a through-
put reduction of 35-90%. We replace the commercial 802.11n cards with our USRP2 nodes
and repeat the experiment with and without TIMO. We find that in the absence of TIMO,
when the USRP2 nodes are less than 31 feet away from the cordless phone or the baby
monitors, they cannot deliver any packets. In contrast, in the presence of TIMO, and for
the same locations, their throughput increases to 13-23 Mb/s. We also implement cross-
technology interference nulling and show that it enables a MIMO node to significantly
reduce the packet loss at the receiver of a competing technology, with the reduction in
packet loss being as high as 14x in some locations.
* 3.1 Impact of Cross-Technology Interference on 802.11n
We study the interaction between high-power interferers and 802.11n and compare against
the interaction between a low power interferer, Bluetooth, and 802.11n. We focus on three
high-power technologies that are prevalent in today's environments [7]: DSSS cordless
phones, baby monitors, and microwave ovens.
Experimental Setup: We use the Netgear N-300 USB-adapter and the Netgear N-300
router as the 802.11n client and AP respectively. Both devices support 2 x 2 MIMO. We
place the AP and the client at positions A and B in Fig. 3-1. In each run, we place the
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Figure 3-1: Testbed. An 802.11n transmitter located at A is communicating with an 802.11n receiver at B.
The interferer is placed in one of the locations 1 to 10.
interferer at one of the marked locations in Fig. 3-1. Our experiments include line-of-sight
and non-line-of-sight situations, and show scenarios in which the interferer is within one
foot of the 802.11n client as well as 90 feet away from it. We run iperf on the two 802.11n
devices with the 802.11n client acting as the iperf server. The AP sends UDP packets for
2 minutes and logs the average throughput observed every 500 ms. In each location, we
compute the observed 802.11n throughput first when the interferer is turned OFF and next
when it is ON.
U 3.1.1 Digital Cordless Phone
We experiment with the Uniden TRU 4465-2 DSSS cordless handset system. The phone
base and handset communicate using digital spread spectrum in the 2.4 GHz range. In
each experiment, we fix the 802.11n AP and client at locations A and B and place both the
cordless handset and the phone base at one of the locations in the testbed, 5 cm away from
each other.
Fig. 3-2(a) shows the 802.11n throughput with and without interference from the cord-
less phone. The figure shows that in the presence of the cordless phone, the 802.11n client
and AP could not establish a connection and hence experienced zero throughput.
The reason for this the phone base and handset use Time-Division Duplexing (TDD)
to communicate in the same frequency band. The handset transmits in the first time slot,
followed immediately by a transmission from the phone base. Since these devices contin-
uously transmit, the channel is never free. Thus, an 802.11n node that carrier senses the
medium never gets the opportunity to transmit. Furthermore, since the phone transmits
at about 25 mW [12], which is comparable to an 802.11 laptop, its interference continues
even at distances as far as 90 feet.
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Figure 3-2: WiFi throughput in the presence of high-power interferers.
0 3.1.2 Baby Monitor
We experiment with the C-501 wireless monitoring toolkit, which has two units: a 2.4 GHz
wireless camera that supports up to 4 different channels (i.e., 2.414 GHz, 2.432 GHz,
2.450 GHz and 2.468 GHz), and a wireless video receiver. For every interferer location,
we measure the 802.11n throughput with the camera ON and OFF, and plot the results in
Fig. 3-2(b). The figure shows that the 802.11n client and AP could not establish a connec-
tion and, hence, could not exchange any packets for all tested locations.
The reason again is that the camera transmits continuously, thus hogging the medium
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Figure 3-3: The impact of Bluetooth interference on 802.11n.
completely. These observations, compounded with the fact that the camera occupies a
relatively wide channel of 16 MHz and transmits at a fairly high power of 200 mW [2],
explain the inability of 802.11n to obtain any throughput.
E 3.1.3 Microwave Ovens
We use the SHARP R-310CW microwave oven. Fig. 3-2(c) shows the observed 802.11n av-
erage throughput for different placements of the microwave. The figure shows that when
the microwave is one foot away (in location 1), 802.11n suffers a throughput reduction of
90%. The 802.11n throughput improves as the microwave is moved away from the AP
and its client, and the throughput loss decreases to 35% at the farthest location from the
client. While the results are slightly better with a microwave oven, WiFi still experiences
significant reduction in throughput across all the locations.
E 3.1.4 Frequency Hopping Bluetooth
Finally, we evaluate the interference generated by Bluetooth devices. Bluetooth uses fre-
quency hopping across a 79 MHz band in the 2.402-2.480 GHz range, occupying 1 MHz at
any point in time. The most common devices use class 2 Bluetooth which transmits at a
relatively low power of 2.5 mW [5].
For each interferer location, we transfer a 100 MB file between two Google Nexus One
phones. We plot in Fig. 3-3 the throughput obtained by our 802.11n devices, in the presence
and absence of the Bluetooth traffic. The figure shows that except in location 1, which is
one foot away from the 802.11n client, the Bluetooth exchange has no observable impact
on the throughput of the 802.11n devices.
75
CHAPTER 3. COMBATING HIGH-POWER CROSS-TECHNOLOGY INTERFERENCE
N 3.1.5 Summary
The above empirical study shows the following:
" High-power cross-technology interference can completely throttle 802.11n. Further-
more, loss of connectivity can occur even when the interferer is in a non-line-of-sight
position and separated by 90 feet.
" While 802.11 and low-power interferers (e.g., Bluetooth) have managed a form of co-
existence where both devices stay operational, coexistence with high-power devices
(e.g., cordless phones, baby monitors, microwave, etc.) is lacking. Furthermore, the
typical outcome of the interaction between 802.11n and a high-power interferer is
that 802.11n either suffers a complete loss of connectivity or a significant throughput
reduction. In §3.8 we show that even if carrier sense is deactivated, 802.11n continues
to lose connectivity for many of the interferer's locations.
" Frequency isolation is increasingly difficult. Multiple of the studied interferers oc-
cupy relatively wideband channels of 16-25 MHz (e.g., camera and microwave).
Moreover, these devices can occupy any band in the 802.11 spectrum. For example,
both the cordless phone and the baby monitor have multiple channels that together
cover almost the whole frequency range of 802.11.
" Finally, the characteristics of an interferer may change in time and frequency. The
interferer may have ON-OFF periods, may move from one frequency to another, or
change the width of the channel it occupies, like a microwave. This emphasizes the
need for an agile solution that can quickly adapt to changes in the interference signal.
* 3.2 MIMO and OFDM Background
Consider the 2 x 2 MIMO system in Fig. 3-4. Say the sender transmits stream s1 (t) on the
first antenna, and s2(t) on the second antenna. The wireless channel linearly combines
the signal samples corresponding to the two streams. Therefore, the receiver receives the
following linear combinations on its two antennas:
yi(t) = hus1(t) + h2 1s 2(t) (3.5)
y2 (t) h12 si(t) + h22 s 2 (t), (3.6)
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where hij is a complex number whose magnitude and angle refer to the attenuation and
delay along the path from the it' antenna on the sender to the jth antenna on the receiver,
as shown in Fig. 3-4. If the receiver knows the channel coefficients, hij, it can solve the
above two linear equations to obtain the two unknowns, s1(t) and s2(t), and decode the
two transmitted streams.
To enable the receiver to estimate the channel coefficients, hij, a MIMO sender starts
each frame by transmitting a known preamble from each of its antennas, one after the
other. The receiver uses its knowledge of the transmitted preamble and the received signal
samples to compute the channel coefficients, which it uses to decode the rest of the bits in
the frame.
The above model assumes a narrowband channel, whose bandwidth is limited to a
few MHz. In wideband channels, different frequencies may experience different channels.
Thus, the channel function cannot be expressed as a single complex number; it has to be
expressed as a complex filter, and the multiplication becomes a convolution:
y1(t) = h* s(t) + h 21 * s2 (t)
Y2(t) = h12*si(t) + h 22 * s2 (t),
Modern wireless technologies like 802.11a/g/n, WiMax, and LTE handle such wide
channels by operating on the signal in the frequency domain using OFDM. OFDM divides
the channel frequency spectrum into many narrow subbands called OFDM subcarriers.
The receiver takes an FFT of the received signal and operates on individual OFDM subcar-
riers, as if they were narrowband channels, i.e., the receiver applies the model in Eqs. 3.5
and 3.6 to the frequency domain signal, and decodes the transmitted symbols.
In 802.11, there are 64 OFDM subcarriers, four of which are called pilots that have a
known symbol pattern to allow the receiver track the channel [68]. Additionally, 48 sub-
carriers are used to transmit data and the rest are unused for distortion reasons.
* 3.3 Problem Domain
TIMO deals with high power cross-technology interference in 802.11n networks. We focus
on typical situations that arise in the operation of 802.11 networks. In particular,
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Figure 3-4: Decoding in a standard 2-by-2 MIMO system.
* TIMO tackles scenarios in which the interferer is a single antenna device. This is
typically the case for current 802.11 interferers, like baby monitors, microwave ovens,
cordless phones, surveillance cameras, etc.
" TIMO applies to scenarios in which the interfering signal lasts more than a few sec-
onds. This constraint does not necessarily mean that the interferer transmits continu-
ously for that duration. For example, a microwave signal that lasts for a few seconds
satisfies our constraint despite having OFF periods.
" TIMO applies to scenarios where, in the absence of an interferer, the 802.11n receiver
can use MIMO multiplexing, i.e., it can receive multiple concurrent streams at some
bitrate. If the 802.11n receiver cannot multiplex streams from the same technology, it
cannot be made to multiplex streams from different technologies.
" TIMO can address environments with multiple concurrent interferers, as long as the
interferers are in different frequencies (i.e., different 802.11 OFDM subcarriers). We
believe this to be the common case in today's networks because the presence of mul-
tiple high-power interferers in the same band will cause them to interfere with each
other, and is likely to prevent the proper operation of the device.
* 3.4 TIMO
TIMO extends the MIMO design to operate across diverse wireless technologies that may
differ in modulation, coding, packet format, etc. It develops two primitives: The first prim-
itive enables a MIMO 802.11n pair to exchange packets in the presence of an unknown
interference signal, as if the unknown interference were a single-antenna 802.11 transmis-
sion. For example, an 802.11n AP-Client pair may use this primitive to correctly decode
packets in the presence of the ON periods of a microwave oven. The second primitive en-
ables a MIMO node to transmit in the presence of an unknown bi-directional technology
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without hampering reception at the receiver of the unknown technology. For example,
an 802.11n node may use this primitive to transmit in the presence of a cordless phone
without hampering the phone's operation. The next few sections describe this in detail.
* 3.5 Decoding In The Presence Of Cross-Technology Interfer-
ence
Consider a scenario in which two 802.11n nodes want to communicate in the presence
of high-power cross-technology interference. For clarity, we will explain the design in
the context of a 2-antenna 802.11n receiver decoding a single 802.11n transmission, in the
presence of an interferer. The results extend to any number of antennas as we show in
[52].
In this case, the signal at the 2-antenna 802.11n receiver is the sum of the signal of
interest, s(t), and the interference signal, i(t), after convolving them with their respective
channels to the receiver:
y1(t) = hj*i(t)-+h,*s(t) (3.7)
y 2 (t) = * i(t) + h's *s(t), (3.8)
where hi and h'i are the channel functions of the interference signal, and h, and h', are
channel functions of the signal of interest. We will explain TIMO's decoding algorithm
assuming the receiver knows the channel of the signal of interest. In §3.5.4, we explain
how the receiver obtains this channel in the presence of interference.
Since the signal of interest (i.e., that of 802.11n) is an OFDM signal, the receiver pro-
cesses its input in the frequency domain by taking an FFT. Thus, for each OFDM subcarrier,
j, the receiver obtains the following equations:
Yj = H Ij + Hsj S3 (3.9)
Y2 = HbIs+H' Sj, (3.10)
where the terms in the above equations are the frequency version of the terms in Eqs. 3.7
and 3.8, for a particular OFDM subcarrier. Thus, the receiver can express the signal of
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Figure 3-5: Flowchart of the different components.
interest as:
Y1j - - # Y - -S - for #j = ij' (3.11)
Hsj - #j Hsj H
All terms in Eq. 3.11 are known at the receiver, except for #j. The objective is to figure out
#3 in each subcarrier, and use it to decode the signal of interest, Sj, in that subcarrier.
A TIMO receiver has three main components shown in Fig. 3-5. 1) An algorithm for
computing the interferer's channel ratio in an OFDM subcarrier without knowing the in-
terferer's preamble or signal structure. 2) A decoder that allows the receiver to decode
the signal of interest given the interferer's channel ratio in every OFDM subcarrier. 3) An
iteration mechanism that reduces the noise in the computation of channel ratios, hence
increasing SNR. The following sections describe these components.
0 3.5.1 Computing the Interferer's Channel Ratio
A simplistic approach for computing the ratio 3j = would rely on that the signal S
in the OFDM pilots is known to the receiver. Thus, if one assumes #j is the same for all
OFDM subcarriers, one can simply substitute the signal Sj, where j is a pilot subcarrier,
in Eq. 3.11, and use that equation to compute the ratio 0. The receiver then uses this ratio
to compute signal values in other OFDM subcarriers that contain data symbols. However,
the assumption that the interferer channel ratio is the same in all OFDM subcarriers is typ-
ically invalid for several reasons. First, there might be multiple interferers each of them
operating in a different frequency band. For example, the interfering signal may be a com-
bination of two cordless phone signals each occupying upto 4 MHz and overlapping with
a different set of 802.11n OFDM subcarriers. Second, there might be an interferer that hops
across the OFDM subcarriers, but does not always occupy all subcarriers. This is the case
for the narrowband signal during the microwave ON period. Finally, the interferer may
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have a relatively wideband channel, like the baby monitor which can span upto 16 MHz.
In this case, the channel of the interferer may differ across the OFDM subcarriers due to
multipath and hence the channel ratio also changes across the subcarriers.
Thus, the receiver should compute the interferer's channel ratio for each OFDM sub-
carrier independently. Since most OFDM subcarriers carry data and contain no known
patterns, the receiver has to compute this ratio without any known symbols.
Below we use Eqs. 3.9 and 3.10 to obtain a closed form expression for the interferer's
channel ratio in each OFDM subcarrier. To do so, we first eliminate the contribution from
the signal of interest Si, by multiplying Eq. 3.10 with H and subtracting it from Eq. 3.9:
H --- HI )
Y1i - Hs7Y2j = HI s - )HigJ-
Next, we multiply the above equation with the conjugate of Y2 , and take the expectation:
- Y2j)Y 2  - H H )E[H'3 I1Y 2*|
sj i3 s3
H1) HI Z3833 S.
-(i)- H.)E[HgIg(H~JI +H 3 S>)]
H ) EE(I 3SJ])
ii S.)
H13  H'
( _ H- )Pj, (3.12)
where IX1 2  xx* denotes the square of the amplitude of the complex number x, and
E[I Sf*] = 0 because the signal of interest is independent from the interference signal and
hence their correlation is zero. Also Pj = E[IH8Ij 12] is the received interference power in
OFDM subcarrier j on the second antenna of the 802.11n receiver.
Eq. 3.12 has two unknown Og and Pj. Thus, if the receiver knows the interferer's re-
ceived power, Pj, it can solve Eq. 3.12 to obtain the desired ratio. To compute Pj , the
receiver takes Eq. 3.10, multiplies it by its conjugate, and then computes the expectation:
E[Y2jY2*| = E[(HJI3 + H'Sj)(H'3 Ij + HsSj)*]
E[H,'Ij 2] + E[|HsS1 2]
Pjg + Psi, (3.13)
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where P' is the power of the signal of interest on the second antenna in the jth OFDM
subcarrier. Again, to reach Eq. 3.13 we have exploited the fact that the interference signal
and the signal of interest are independent of each other.
We can solve Eq. 3.12 and Eq. 3.13 together to obtain the ratio:
H E[Y1 - HY2j Y2*jl Hs-
HE [Y 2 \2 ]_ p '. (3.14)
This equation enables the 802.11 receiver to compute the interferer's channel ratio without
any known symbols, simply by substituting the power and the channel ratio for s(t).
It is important to note that the above derivation exploits that expectations can be com-
puted by taking averages. The accuracy of this estimate increases as one averages over
more signal symbols. In §3.5.3 we will discuss how we can obtain a good accuracy without
averaging over many symbols.
0 3.5.2 Decoding the Signal of Interest
Once the 802.11n receiver has an estimate of the interferer's channel ratio, 3j, in each
OFDM subcarrier, it proceeds to decode its own signal of interest. One way to decode
would be to substitute Oj in Eq. 3.11 to compute Sj in the frequency domain. This approach
works well when the interferer is a narrowband signal, like a cordless phone. However,
it has low accuracy in scenarios the interferer has a relatively wideband channel, like a
baby monitor that spans 16 MHz. This is because wideband signals suffer from multi-
path effects; i.e., the signal travels from the sender to the receiver along multiple paths
with different delays. A wideband receiver receives the combination of multiple copies
of the same signal with different relative delays. This leads to inter-symbol interference
(ISI), which mathematically is equivalent to convolving the time-domain signal with the
channel on the traversed paths.
To deal with ISI, an OFDM transmitter inserts a cyclic prefix between consecutive sym-
bols. The receiver discards the cyclic prefix and takes the remaining signal, thus eliminat-
ing any interference from adjacent symbols. This, however, does not work when we have
a wideband interferer like the baby monitor. First, its signal may not have a cyclic prefix.
Second, even if it does, as noted by past work on concurrent 802.11n transmissions [135],
it is unlikely that the cyclic prefixes of the two devices are synchronized, in which case the
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receiver cannot discard a single cyclic prefix that eliminates ISI for both the devices.
The above discussion means that in the frequency domain, the interferer's signal, Ij,
will experience ISI which would add noise. As a result, Eqs. 3.9 and 3.10 have additional
noise terms due to ISI. While this is not a problem for the channel ratio estimation since
one can average across more samples to obtain an accurate estimate of fj; this additional
noise would reduce the SNR for the signal of interest and, hence, affect its throughput.
The solution to the ISI problem is, however, simple. The 802.11n receiver needs to
decode the signal of interest s(t) by eliminating interference in the time domain. Here, ISI
is simply a convolution with a filter, which can be removed by applying the inverse filter
(i.e., an equalizer). Thus, we consider again the initial time domain Eqs. 3.7 and 3.8 which
describe the signal at the 802.11n receiver:
yi(t) = hj*i(t)+h8 *s(t) (3.15)
y2(t) = h'*i(t)+h',*s(t), (3.16)
We want to find a filter, h, such that:
h * h' = hi
Given such a filter, the receiver can convolve h with Eq. 3.16 and subtract the resulting
equation from Eq. 3.15 to eliminate i(t) and obtain an equation in s(t), which it can decode
using a standard 802.11 decoder.4
The above filter can be represented in the frequency domain as:
H 
--H jH Hij Hj = j #
Thus, we can compute the desired filter h by taking the IFFT of the interferer channel
ratios, #j's, computed in §3.5.1.
To summarize, the 802.11n receiver first moves the received signal to the frequency
domain where it computes the interferer channel ratios using Eq. 3.14 while averaging over
multiple samples to reduce the ISI and noise. Then, it transforms the interferer channel
ratio into a time domain filter by taking an IFFT. Finally, it uses the filter to eliminate
4As described in §3.2, such a decoder would apply FFT and decode in the frequency domain.
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interference in the time domain. The receiver can now take this interference-free signal
and decode its signal of interest using a standard 802.11 decoder.
0 3.5.3 Iterating to Increase Accuracy
The algorithm in §3.5.1 computes expectations by taking averages over multiple OFDM
symbols. A packet, however, may not have enough OFDM symbols to obtain a highly
accurate estimate. Also averaging over multiple packets will reduce TIMO's ability to deal
with a dynamic interferer. Thus, in this section we are interested in obtaining an accurate
estimate of the interferer's channel ratio, #3, using only a few OFDM symbols.
To increase the accuracy of the estimate without much averaging, the receiver iterates
over the following two steps:
Initialization: The receiver obtains a rough estimate of /3 by averaging over a limited
number of OFDM symbols.
Step 1: The receiver uses its estimate of #3 to obtain the signal, s(t), as in §3.5.2. The
receiver then decodes s(t) using the standard decoder to obtain the transmitted bits.
Step 2: The receiver re-modulates the decoded bits to obtain an estimate of s(t), which we
call s(t). The receiver convolves s(t) with the channel functions and subtracts the results
from yi (t) and Y2 (t). Thus, we obtain the following:
1(t)=h * i(t) + h, * (s(t) -(t))
Q2(t) =h' * i(t) +h', * (s(t)- s(t)).
The receiver then obtains a new estimate for #j while treating (s(t) - s(t)) as the new signal
of interest.
After iterating between Step 1 and 2 for two or three times, the receiver obtains an
accurate estimate of the interferer's channel ratio #3, which it uses to decode signal s(t).
The reason why the above algorithm works is that in each iteration, the signal of interest
used in Step 2, (s(t) - s(t)), has a smaller magnitude. Since, in Step 2, the receiver is
focused on estimating the interferer's ratio, the signal of interest plays the role of noise;
reducing this signal's magnitude increases the accuracy of the ratio estimate. This higher
accuracy in the ratio #j percolates to the estimate of s(t) in Step 1. Consequently, the
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decoded bits are more accurate and lead to even smaller difference between s(t) and 8(t),
and hence an even more accurate Oj.
M 3.5.4 Estimating the 802.11n Channel Functions
So far, we have assumed that the 802.11n receiver knows the channel of the signal of in-
terest, Hy and H'.. To compute this channel we distinguish between two cases. First, the
signal of interest starts before the interference in which case the receiver can use the 802.11
preamble to compute the channel, as usual. Second, the interference signal starts before
the signal of interest. In this case, the receiver can easily compute the interferer's channel
ratio 7 7 = by taking the ratio of the signals it receives on its two antennas Yi1 = HijIj
and Y2 = H I. Once the receiver knows the interferer's channel ratio, it computes the
equalization filter described in 53.5.2 and uses it to eliminate the interference signal. The
receiver can then use the 802.11n preamble to compute the channel as usual.
Two points are worth noting: First, while it is easy to compute the interferer's channel
ratios when the interferer is alone on the medium, this does not eliminate the need to
continue tracking the interferer's channel ratio using the algorithm in @3.5.1. In particular,
the channel ratio may change as the interferer moves to a different frequency, as in the
narrowband phase of a microwave signal, or it might change for a mobile interferer, as
with the cordless phone.
Second, the above scheme will miss in scenarios in which the interference and the
802.11n signal starts during the same OFDM symbol. This event has a low probability,
and the resulting packet loss is minor in comparison to the packet loss observed without
TIMO. When such an event occurs the packet will be retransmitted by its sender as usual.
0 3.5.5 Finding the Interference Boundaries
Estimating the interferer's channel ratio, #3, using Eq. 3.14 requires the 802.11n receiver to
compute the expectations by taking averages over multiple OFDM symbols. This averag-
ing, however, needs to be done only over symbols that are affected by interference. Thus,
the 802.11n receiver needs to determine where, in a packet, interference starts and where
it stops. The question of identifying the sequence of symbols affected by interference has
been addressed in few recent systems, like PPR [77] and SoftRate [140]. Our approach
follows the same principles. Specifically, when the interference signal starts, it causes a
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Figure 3-6: Soft errors increase in the presence of interference.
dramatic increase in decoding errors. As shown in Fig. 3-6(a), these errors appear at the
PHY layer as large differences between the received symbol and the nearest constellation
points in the I and Q diagram. We refer to these differences as soft errors. Thus, for each
OFDM subcarrier, the 802.11n receiver computes the soft-error, and normalizes it by the
minimum distance of the constellation. As shown in Fig. 3-6(b), when the interferer starts,
the soft errors jumps; when it ends, they go back to their low values. In our implementa-
tion we consider a jump that is higher than doubling the errors as a potential interferer, i.e.,
interference above 3 dB. This means that we might miss low power interferers, but such
interferers can be dealt with using traditional methods like reducing the bit rate.
0 3.5.6 Putting it together
A TIMO receiver first performs packet detection as usual by looking for jumps in received
power (using standard window detection algorithms [681). Then, the receiver computes
the 802.11 preamble cross-correlation, in a manner similar to current 802.11. If the cross-
correlation stays low, the receiver works under the assumption that the signal of interest
may start later. Hence, it computes the channel ratios for the signal though it is not its
signal of interest. On the other hand, if the cross-correlation spikes, the receiver identifies
the packet as a signal of interest. It continues decoding the packet using a standard 802.11
decoder [144]. If the packet does not pass the checksum test, the receiver computes the
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soft-errors as described in @3.5.5. If the soft-errors jump by over 3 dB, the receiver initiates
the channel ratio estimation algorithm. Specifically, for each OFDM bin, the TIMO decoder
starts at the symbol where the soft errors jump and proceeds to compute the interference
channel ratios in an iterative manner as described in §3.5.3. Once the channel ratios are
estimated for each OFDM subcarrier, the receiver uses the decoder in §3.5.2 to decode its
signal of interest.
* 3.5.7 Complexity
While past work that deals with cross-technology interference [6, 133] typically employs
different mechanisms for different technologies, TIMO is technology agnostic and hence
its complexity stays constant as the number of technologies in the ISM band increases.
Further, the components used in TIMO such as correlation, equalization and projection,
are also used in MIMO receivers (though for a different purpose), and hence are amenable
to hardware implementations.
* 3.6 Ensuring The Interferer Can Decode
A MIMO transmitter can also encode its signal to prevent interference to a competing
transmission from a different technology. Specifically, let i(t) be the competing signal and
si(t) and s2 (t) the two streams that a 2-antenna 802.11n node transmits. The receiver of
the competing signal receives the following:
z(t) = hii(t) + hsisi(t) + hs2 s2 (t), (3.17)
where hi refers to the channel from its transmitter and hsi and h, 2 are the channels from the
2-antenna 802.11n transmitter. The 802.11n transmitter can cancel its signal at the receiver
of the competing technology by ensuring that the signals it transmits on its two antennas
satisfy s2 (t) - I s(t). Such a technique is referred to as interference nulling [136].5
We note that nulling does not require the knowledge of the exact channels to the re-
ceiver. It is sufficient to know the channel ratios to null the signal at some receiver. This is
crucial since for cross-technology scenarios, it is hard to estimate the exact channel.
sNote that having the 802.11n transmitter perform interference nulling does not require any modification
to decoding at the 802.11n receiver.
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But how does the 802.11n transmitter compute the channel ratio to the interferer's re-
ceiver? If the interfering technology is bi-directional in the frequency of interest, then our
802.11n nodes can use the interference caused by the receiver's response to compute the
channel ratio from the receiver to itself. This can be done by leveraging the algorithm
in §3.5.1. The required ratio for nulling, however, refers to the channels in the opposite
direction, i.e., from our 802.11n transmitter to the interfering receiver. To deal with this
issue, TIMO exploits that wireless channels exhibit reciprocity, i.e., the channel function in
the forward and backward direction is the same. Reciprocity is a known property that has
been validated empirically by multiple studies [59, 1541.6 Using reciprocity one can com-
pute the required channel ratio. Once the ratio is computed, the transmitter can perform in-
terference nulling. We note that since it is hard to synchronize wideband cross-technology
interferers with 802.11, to avoid ISI we perform nulling by using a time-domain equalizer
similar to §3.5.2.
Thus, interference nulling combined with our algorithm for estimating the interferer's
channel ratio provide a new primitive that enables a MIMO node to transmit in the pres-
ence of a different technology without hampering reception of that technology. This prim-
itive, however, requires the competing technology to be bidirectional, i.e., the competing
receiver acks the signal or transmits its own messages, like a cordless phone.
If the technology is bidirectional, then the MIMO transmitter can learn the channel ratio
to the communicating node pair, using the interference they create. The MIMO transmitter
then alternates between nulling its signal at the two communicating nodes. For example,
in the case of a cordless phone, the 802.11 transmitter has to switch between nulling its
signal at the handset and nulling its signal at the base. In the case of the cordless phone,
the switching time is constant, and for the tested phone it is 2.25 ms. Even if the switching
time is not constant, as long as the pattern of the interference is persistent (e.g., one data
packet, followed by one ack), the MIMO node can monitor the medium and immediately
switch every time the medium goes idle.
On the other hand, if the receiver of the competing technology is not bidirectional, an
802.11n device has no way to compute its channel ratio, and hence cannot cancel its signal
6To use it in our system, one needs to calibrate the effect of the hardware before applying reciprocity. This
calibration, however, is done once for the hardware. Furthermore, an 802.11n transmitter can perform this task
without the help of any other node because it merely involves taking the difference between the two transmit
chains attached to its two antennas.
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at the receiver of the competing technology. The impact of such interference will depend
on the competing technology. For example, interference does not hamper a microwave
oven function. Also, analog devices (e.g., an analog camera) have some level of resistance
to interference which causes smooth degradation in their signal, and while they suffer
from interference, they can still function if the interferer is not in close proximity (see §3.8).
In general, our objective is to create a form of coexistence between 802.11n and high-
power interferers that approaches the coexistence it enjoys with low-power devices like
Bluetooth, where the two technologies may interferer if they are in close proximity but the
interference is limited and does not cause either device to become completely dysfunc-
tional. Unidirectional devices which do not sense the medium or use any feedback from
their receiver tend to show some level of resistance to interference. Hence, even if the
802.11n node did not cancel its interference at their receiver, they can still support some
level of coexistence, as long as 802.11n can protect itself from their interference.
N 3.7 Implementation
We have built a prototype of TIMO using the USRP2 radio platform and the GNURadio
software package. A 2 x 2 MIMO system is built using two USRP2 radio-boards connected
via an external clock [9]. Each USRP2 is configured to span a 10 MHz channel by setting
both the interpolation rate and decimation rate to 10. The resulting MIMO node runs a
PHY layer similar to that of 802.11n, i.e., it has 64 OFDM subcarriers, a modulation choice
of BPSK, 4QAM, 16QAM, or 64QAM, and punctured convolution codes with standard
802.11 code rates [144]. Since we operate at half the 802.11 bandwidth, the possible bit
rates span 3 to 27 Mbps. We modify the receiver MIMO decoding algorithm to incorporate
TIMO (summarized in §3.5.6). We also implemented interference nulling at the MIMO
transmitters. To work with cross-technology interference, the transmitter first computes
the channel ratios and then uses them for nulling (as described in §3.6).
* 3.8 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate TIMO with three high-power interferers: a DSSS cordless phone, a microwave
oven, and a baby monitor.
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(b) Packet loss at the DSSS phone with and without TIMO.
Figure 3-7: Interference from a DSSS Cordless Phone: Figure (a) shows that TIMO significantly improves
the throughput of 802.11 USRP2-based nodes in the presence of interference from a DSSS phone. Figure
(b) shows that if 802.11 nodes transmit concurrently with a DSSS cordless phone, they can cause the phone
a dramatic packet loss at close distances. TIMO, however, enables such nodes to transmit concurrently
with the phone without hampering its performance.
N 3.8.1 Cordless Phone
Again, we use the Uniden TRU 4465-2 cordless phone as the interferer. We also use the
same testbed in Fig. 3-1.
Addressing Cross-Technology Interference: We first evaluate TIMO's ability to help
802.11n nodes operate in the presence of high power cross-technology interference. We
place two USRP-based 802.11n nodes in locations A and B in Fig. 3-1. In each run, we
place the cordless phone system in one of the 10 interferer locations in Fig. 3-1. We transfer
a 20 MB file between the 802.11n pair at the best bitrate for the channel in the presence
of interference from the cordless phone. This rate is determined by initially trying all the
possible bitrates and choosing the one which yields the highest throughput for the rest of
the run. The 802.11 receiver logs the received samples and processes them both with and
without TIMO.
Note that in contrast to the experiments done with commercial 802.11n nodes, the USRP
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implementation of 802.11n does not use carrier sense. Carrier sense is hard to implement in
software due to its strict timing requirements. This constraint, however, can be beneficial.
In particular, the lack of carrier sense provides insight into whether the throughput loss
of commercial 802.11n is due to the nodes sensing the phone's signal and abstaining from
transmitting, or due to their packets being corrupted by interference.
Fig. 3-7(a) plots the throughput of the 802.11 MIMO nodes in the presence of the phone
signal, with and without TIMO. The figure reveals the following:
" Without TIMO, interference from the cordless phone causes the 802.11 nodes to com-
pletely lose connectivity in half of the testbed locations. This loss of connectivity
occurs even though the nodes have deactivated carrier sense and are using the best
bit rate for the channel. This means that the interference in these locations is too high
even for the lowest bit rate supported by 802.11. This loss in connectivity can be
attributed to the fact that the phone system transmits continuously at a high power.
Hence, the 802.11 packets are always subject to strong interference. As the interferer
moves away from the 802.11 USRP-based nodes, their throughput improves because
of reduced interference.
" In contrast, with TIMO, the 802.11 nodes never experience disconnectivity. Also,
their throughput becomes much higher and close to optimal ( 24.5Mbps) at most lo-
cations. The throughput decreases slightly as the phone moves closer to the 802.11
receiver in location B because of residual interference, but continues to be 78% of
the optimal throughput even when the phone is one foot away from the 802.11 re-
ceiver. These results indicate that TIMO is successful at exploiting MIMO capability
to address 802.11 cross-technology interference.
" Comparing the throughput of the USRP-based 802.11n implementation to that of
commercial 802.11n in @3.1 shows that while carrier sense contributed to the loss of
connectivity particularly when the interferers are in locations 6-10, it is not the main
reason since even though the USRP nodes do not implement carrier sense, they still
lose connectivity in 50% of the locations.
Transmitting without Harming the Competing Technology: Next, we evaluate TIMO's
ability to allow 802.11n to transmit concurrently with a cordless phone in the same fre-
quency band, but without harming the phone's transmission. The commercial phone does
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not give us access to packets, making it hard to evaluate the impact of TIMO's interference
nulling. Instead, we implement the phone's physical layer in GNURadio and experiment
with a USRP-based DSSS phone. We try to match the physical layer description of the
Uniden phone. In particular, the transmitter feeds digital bits to a scrambler, differential
encoder, and a spread spectrum module. The spread spectrum module sends bits at a data
rate of 1.366 Mbps over FSK modulation. The receiver computes the correlation with the
spreading code and outputs the data bits. For every packet we use the CRC to detect if it
was correctly received.
We place the USRP nodes that perform the role of the phone base and handset at loca-
tion A and B in the testbed. We then place a 802.11 USRP transmitter at each of locations
1 to 10 in the testbed, and let it transmit at the same time as the USRP phone. The 802.11
USRP transmitter uses TIMO to null its signal at the phone.
The 802.11 transmitter has to alternate between nulling its signal at the phone base and
the handset. Since the Uniden phone packets have a fixed duration of 2.25 ms [12], this
switching can easily happen on 802.11 hardware. However, due to the software nature of
GNURadio, it is hard to alternate with the phone system at a granularity of about 2.25 ms.
Thus, in our experiments, we increase the inter-packet time and the packet duration to
20 ms, which allows us to alternate with the phone system in software.
Each run of the experiment has three parts. First, the phone handset and base exchange
packets without any interference from the 802.11n transmitter. Next, the handset and base
exchange packets with interference from the 802.11 node but without TIMO. Finally, the
handset and base exchange packets concurrently with the 802.11n node which uses TIMO.
Fig. 3-7(b) shows the packet loss rate at the handset for the above three cases. The figure
shows three main trends.
" In comparison with 802.11n, the DSSS phone is more resilient to cross-technology
interference. This is due to its use of FSK combined with a high redundancy DSSS
code. Despite this resilience, without TIMO, the phone suffers a high loss rate at
locations close to the 802.11 nodes.
" In contrast, TIMO significantly reduces the loss rate at the handset across all the
locations. Further, in locations 2-10 the loss rate is almost as low as that without any
interference. We note that this is true even for locations where the interferer is closer
to the handset than the base is to the handset (locations 2-4). Thus, we conclude that
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Figure 3-8: Interference from a Baby Monitor: Figure (a) shows that TIMO significantly improves the
throughput of 802.11 nodes in the presence of interference from a baby monitor. Figure (b) shows that
while TIMO cannot cancel its signal at the camera's receiver because it use a unidirectional communication,
the camera's signal is watchable in all locations but the two closest to the 802.11 nodes.
TIMO can help 802.11 and DSSS phones coexist.
9 Finally, when the 802.11 interferer is less than a foot from the handset (location 1), the
packet loss rate is higher than that without interference. This is because, in practice,
it is difficult to completely eliminate interference using interference nulling. The
residual interference may cause an increase in packet loss rate at such close distances.
However, even at location 1, while TIMO did not completely eliminate interference,
it still reduces the packet losses by more than 14x, from 100% to about 6-7%.
0 3.8.2 Baby Monitor
Next, we evaluate TIMO with a baby monitor.
Impact of baby monitors on 802.11n: To evaluate this, we repeat the previous experiment
after replacing the microwave with the C-501 baby monitor. For every interferer location,
we run the system with and without TIMO, and plot the results in Fig. 3-8(a). The figure
shows that TIMO significantly increases the throughput in the presence of interference
from the tested baby monitor. In particular, without TIMO the 802.11 nodes experience
complete disconnectivity for 60% of locations of the baby monitor. In contrast, with TIMO
no scenario causes disconnectivity and the overall throughput is significantly higher. We
note that in comparison to the performance of commercial 802.11n nodes, the USRP-based
802.11n implementation does not use carrier sense, and hence was able to transmit and
obtain some throughput in scenarios where the commercial 802.11n nodes refrained from
transmitting due to carrier sense.
Impact of 802.11n transmissions on baby monitors: Communication in the baby monitor
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Figure 3-9: 802.11 throughput with interference from a Microwave Oven: The figure shows that TIMO
increases resilience to microwave interference.
system is one-way. The camera continuously broadcasts the analog video. A monitor in
range of the device receives the signal, decodes it and displays it on its screen. Given
no signal from the video receiver, TIMO is limited in its ability to protect the transmitted
video. Thus, we would like to check how the camera is affected by interference from our
802.11 implementation (which use the same power level as a laptop, i.e., about 30 mW).
To do so, we place the camera and its video receiver in locations A and B in the testbed.
We move the 802.11-USRP node across the various interferer locations, and at each lo-
cation, we ensure it interferes with the camera's transmission. We compare the received
video quality with and without interference from 802.11. We measure video quality us-
ing PSNR, which is a standard video metric. A PSNR of less than 20 dB is hard to watch,
whereas PSNRs in the range 25-30 dB are good. The PSNR can be computed only with re-
spect to the original video. However, the camera does not provide us access to the original
video before transmission over the wireless medium. To obtain a video baseline, we focus
the camera on a static image for all experiments, and make it transmit the same frame 1000
times. Then, we take the average pixel value in these 1000 versions of the same frame and
consider this to be the ground truth. All experiments are run with the camera focused on
the same picture so that they can be compared with this ground truth.
Fig. 3-8(b) shows the PSNR of the received video both with and without interference
from our USRP-based 802.11 implementation. The figure shows that at the closest two
locations, which are less than 6 feet away from the 802.11 interferer, the video is not watch-
able. However, for the rest of the locations, the video quality stays watchable. Further,
for seven out of the ten testbed locations, the video PSNR hardly changes from its value
without interference. This is expected because devices that blast without checking for in-
terference or without feedback tend to be relatively resilient to some level of interference.
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We note that since the monitoring system is uni-directional, TIMO cannot cancel its
signal at potential video receivers; hence, we observe that interference degrades the moni-
toring system's performance at nearby locations. However, in contrast to the current mode
of operation, where 802.11 loses connectivity in most locations due to interference, TIMO
is an improvement over the status quo because it reduces the range of interference to close-
by locations. This moves the system to a scenario where the two technologies enjoy some
level of coexistence, which despite being far from optimal, is more acceptable than the
current situation.
0 3.8.3 Microwave Oven
We evaluate TIMO's performance in the presence of interference from the microwave oven
used in the experiments in §3.1. We repeat the experiment we conducted with the cordless
phone, where we place the USRP-based 802.11 devices in locations A and B, and let them
exchange traffic with the microwave on and off. We perform the experiment for each of
the ten interferer locations in the testbed. In each run, the 802.11 transmitter uses the best
bitrate as in §3.8.1.
Fig. 3-9 shows the average throughput and standard deviation, with and without
TIMO. Without TIMO, the performance of the USRP2 nodes is relatively similar to that of
the commercial 802.11n nodes. Specifically, at short distances, the throughput is very low
due to increased interference. As the microwave is moved away, the nodes start getting
packet through during the OFF periods of the microwave. In contrast, TIMO significantly
increases resilience to interference from the microwave, allowing the 802.11 USRP node
to deliver packets efficiently even during the ON periods of the microwave. Microwave
ovens leak significantly high power during the ON periods, which could reach 1 Watt [20].
The results show that TIMO is effective even with such high-power interferers.
TIMO's approach is based on treating cross technology interference as if it were a stream
from a single-antenna node of the same technology. Residential microwave ovens are
equipped with a cavity magnetron which radiates energy in the 2.4 GHz range. Since
they have only one magnetron radiating energy, theory concludes that they act as a single
antenna device [133]. Our results confirm theoretical conclusions and show that TIMO can
successfully treat a microwave as a single-antenna interferer.
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Figure 3-10: TIMO with Multiple Interferers. The figure shows the throughput CDFs for three technologies
that are transmitting concurrently in overlapping frequencies: 802.11n, DSSS phone, and ZigBee.
0 3.8.4 Multiple Interferers
This experiment includes three node pairs with different transmission technologies: our
2 x 2 802.11n implementation, our DSSS phone implementation, and a GNURadio ZigBee
implementation. The 802.11n devices occupy a 10 MHz channel, the DSSS phone occupies
a 4 MHz channel, and the ZigBee devices occupy 5 MHz. The center frequencies of these
devices are picked such that the phone interferes with the first half of the 802.11 channel,
whereas the ZigBee device interferes with the second half. We place these six nodes ran-
domly at the marked locations in Fig. 3-1. We make the three pairs transmit concurrently,
and we repeat each run with and without TIMO. As before, we make the inter-packet ar-
rival and the packet duration for the cordless phone and ZigBee nodes 20 ms, to allow for
a software implementation.
96
-o 160
a No Iterations (Pure Averaging)
5 140 One Iteration
cr -am Two Iterations
120 Three Iterations
~ 100 - Four Iterations
E 80
' 60
0
" 40
.o
E 20
Z 0F
BPSK 4QAM 16QAM 64QAM
Figure 3-11: Tradeoff Between the Number of Averaged Symbols and the Number of Iterations: With three
iterations, TIMO can achieve the same accuracy as a baseline that knows the structure and the preamble of
the interferer, while maintaining the averaged symbols less than 22 for all modulations.
Fig. 3-10(a) plots the CDF of 802.11 throughput with and without TIMO. The figure
shows that without TIMO, about 67% of the locations cannot get any packets through and
the average throughput is low. In contrast, with TIMO no locations suffer disconnectivity
and the average throughput increases significantly.
Fig. 3-10(b) and 3-10(c) plot the packet loss rate of the competing technologies: the
DSSS phone and ZigBee. The figure shows that if 802.11n transmits concurrently, without
TIMO, these technologies can suffer significant packet loss. However, if 802.11n employs
TIMO, then its interference increases loss rates by less than 0.5%, which is negligible. Thus,
TIMO can help diverse technologies co-exist in the same frequency band while placing the
burden of interference prevention on high-end MIMO nodes instead of low-end single
antenna systems.
N 3.9 Micro Benchmarks
Finally, we zoom in on the components of TIMO to examine the tradeoff between averag-
ing over a larger number of symbols and applying the same algorithm iteratively over a
smaller number of symbols.
We transfer a 20 MB file between two 2 x 2 802.11 USRP2 nodes. A third USRP2 node
plays the role of an unknown interfering technology, and transmits a signal unknown to
the 802.11 USRP2 nodes. We run the experiment for random placement of the three nodes
in various locations in Fig. 3-1. We want to compute the amount of averaging and the
number of iterations that TIMO needs to obtain an accurate estimate of the interferer's
channel ratio. To obtain a ground truth of the channel ratios, we provide a baseline receiver
with the full knowledge of the transmitted interference signal so that it can use the whole
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signal as if it were a preamble, and compute a very accurate estimate of the interferer's
channel. We compute this estimate over periods of 1 ms each, which is significantly lower
than the coherence time for indoor static channels at 2.4 GHz. For each run, we process the
signal using the baseline receiver and TIMO.
Fig. 3-11 plots the number of symbols that TIMO needs to average over to obtain an
estimate of the channel ratio that is within 3% of the value obtained with the baseline. The
figure shows the results for the four modulations in 802.11 (BPSK, 4QAM, 16QAM and
64QAM). The plots reveal the following trends.
* The iterative algorithm yields a significant reduction in the number of symbols re-
quired to average over to obtain an accurate estimate of the interferer's channel ratio.
e Across all modulation schemes, two to three iterations are sufficient, and the return
from more iterations is negligible. The reason why there is a ceiling for the iteration
gain is that iterating does not provide more information; it only provides a better
estimation using the collected information. After some point, the algorithm becomes
limited by the intrinsic noise in the collected measurements.
e Given three iterations, TIMO needs to average over less than 22 symbols even at the
highest modulation scheme.
* 3.10 Related Work
Wireless interference has been the topic of much recent research. Work in this area falls
under two broad categories:
(a) Interference Across Technologies: One can identify three main approaches within this
category. The first approach attempts to eliminate interference by isolating the signals in
time, frequency or space. The most common isolation approach is to employ frequency-
based isolation, such as OFDM subcarrier suppression [104, 115, 67], variable channel
width [28], or other fine grained frequency fragmentation techniques [152, 25, 105]. TIMO,
on the other hand, enables independent technologies to share the same frequencies with-
out interfering with each other. Directional antennas may also be used to provide spa-
tial isolation and reduce interference. However, directional antennas are difficult to use
in indoor scenarios where the signal tends to bounce off walls and furniture and scatter
around [136]. In contrast, TIMO works in scattering environments and applies even when
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the two receivers are in the same direction.
The second approach uses mitigation schemes to modify transmissions to be more re-
silient to interference (e.g. by coding or by lowering the bit rates). Mitigation proposals
like PPR [77], though designed and evaluated for the same technology, can work across
technologies. These schemes however assume interference is fairly transient and limited
to some bytes in each packet. In contrast, TIMO can deal with persistent interference.
Finally, some proposals identify the type of interference (is it ZigBee? Bluetooth?) and
inform the user so he may switch off the interfering device [6, 85]. Others leverage the spe-
cific characteristic of a particular technology to design a suitable coexistence strategy [1331.
Like this prior work, TIMO aims to provide coexistence of different wireless technologies.
TIMO provides a single approach that works with different technologies, e.g., microwave
ovens, cordless phones, etc, and applies even to unknown technologies.
(b) Interference from the Same Technology: Recent work in this category include in-
terference cancellation [63], ZigZag [56] and analog network coding [80] which address
the problem of interference from other 802.11 nodes. The closest to ours is prior work
on MIMO systems which enables multiple transmitters to transmit concurrently without
interference. This includes schemes like SAM [135], Interference Alignment and Cancella-
tion [59], and beamforming systems [17]. Unlike these schemes, however, TIMO delivers
a MIMO system that enables cooperation with multiple different wireless technologies.
Finally, TIMO is related to prior work on interference management in cellular networks,
which uses multiple antennas to mitigate interference from nodes operating in adjacent
cells [136, 4]. In contrast to this work, however, TIMO develops new algorithms that can
address cross-technology interference.
* 3.11 Discussion
Finally, we would like to comment on the scope of TIMO. TIMO presents a MIMO design
that enables 802.11n to communicate in the presence of high-power cross-technology in-
terference. TIMO exploits 802.11n's MIMO capability to treat a high-power signal from a
different technology as if it were another stream from the same technology, hence enabling
diverse technologies to share the same frequency band. We show via a proof-of-concept
implementation that TIMO enables 802.11n to communicate effectively in the presence of
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typical interferers.
TIMO also provides a basic framework for a new form of coexistence, in which differ-
ent technologies do not necessarily have to find unoccupied bands and could, in crowded
environments, occupy the same band, thus increasing spectral efficiency. Further, beyond
802.11n, the algorithms and techniques presented in this work generalize to other technolo-
gies and frequency bands. Specifically, cross-technology interference is a general problem
faced not only by 802.11n, but also technologies in the new white space frequencies [18]
that suffer from cross-technology interference, including TV broadcasts and wireless mi-
crophone transmissions. TIMO's approach of using occupied frequencies can, in principle,
be used with these technologies to enable better coexistence and higher spectral utilization.
CHAPTER 4
Non-Invasive Approach to Securing
Medical Implants
The past few years have produced innovative health-oriented networking and wireless
communication technologies, ranging from low-power medical radios that harvest body
energy [83] to wireless sensor networks for in-home monitoring and diagnosis [129]. To-
day, such wireless systems have become an intrinsic part of many modern medical de-
vices [110]. In particular, implantable medical devices (IMDs), including pacemakers, car-
diac defibrillators, insulin pumps, and neurostimulators all feature wireless communica-
tion [110]. Adding wireless connectivity to IMDs has enabled remote monitoring of pa-
tients' vital signs and improved care providers' ability to deliver timely treatment, leading
to a better health care system [94].
Recent work, however, has shown that such wireless connectivity can be exploited to
compromise the confidentiality of the IMD's transmitted data or to send the IMD unau-
thorized commands-even commands that cause the IMD to deliver an electric shock to
the patient [65, 66]. In other systems, designers use cryptographic methods to provide
confidentiality and prevent unauthorized access. However, adding cryptography directly
to IMDs themselves is difficult for the following reasons:
* Inalterability: In the U.S. alone, there are millions of people who already have wireless
IMDs, and about 300,000 such IMDs are implanted every year [155]. Once implanted,
an IMD can last up to 10 years [45], and replacing it requires surgery that carries risks
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of major complications. Incorporating cryptographic mechanims into existing IMDs
may be infeasible because of limited device memory and hence can only be achieved
by replacing the IMDs. This is not an option for people who have IMDs or may
acquire them in the near future.
" Safety: It is crucial to ensure that health care professionals always have immediate
access to an implanted device. However, if cryptographic methods are embedded
in the IMD itself, the device may deny a health care provider access unless she has
the right credentials. Yet, credentials might not be available in scenarios where the
patient is at a different hospital, the patient is unconscious, or the cryptographic key
storage is damaged or unreachable [66, 94]. Inability to temporarily adjust or disable
an IMD could prove fatal in emergency situations. 1
" Maintainability: Software bugs are particularly problematic for IMDs because they
can lead to device recalls. In the last eight years, about 1.5 million software-based
medical devices were recalled [46]. Between 1999 and 2005, the number of recalls of
software-based medical devices more than doubled; more than 11% of all medical-
device recalls during this time period were attributed to software failures [46]. Such
recalls are costly and could require surgery if the model is already implanted. Thus,
it is desirable to limit IMDs' software to only medically necessary functions.
This work explores the feasibility of protecting IMDs without modifying them by imple-
menting security mechanisms entirely on an external device. Such an approach enhances
the security of IMDs for patients who already have them, empowers medical personnel to
access a protected IMD by removing the external device or powering it off, and does not
in itself increase the risk of IMD recalls.
We present a design in which an external device, called the shield, is interposed between
the IMD and potential counter-parties-e.g., worn on the body near an implanted device.
The shield acts as a gateway that relays messages between the IMD and authorized nodes.
It uses a novel physical-layer mechanism to secure its communication with the IMD, and
it uses a standard cryptographic channel to communicate with other authorized nodes.
The shield counters two classes of adversarial actions: passive eavesdropping that
threatens the confidentiality of the IMD's transmissions, and active transmission of unau-
'Note that distributing the credentials widely beyond the patient's primary health care providers increases the proba-
bility of the key being leaked and presents a major key revocation problem.
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thorized radio commands to the IMD. First, to provide confidentiality for the IMD's trans-
missions, the shield continuously listens for those transmissions and jams them so that
they cannot be decoded by eavesdroppers. The shield uses a novel radio design to si-
multaneously receive the IMD's signal and transmit a jamming signal. The shield then
transmits the IMD's signal to an authorized endpoint using standard cryptographic tech-
niques. Second, to protect the IMD against commands from unauthorized endpoints, the
shield listens for unauthorized transmissions addressing the IMD and jams them. As a
result of jamming, the IMD cannot decode the adversarial transmissions, and hence the
adversary fails to make the IMD execute an unauthorized command.
A key challenge that we had to overcome to realize this architecture is to design a small
wearable radio that simultaneously jams the IMD's signal and receives it. We build on
prior work in the area of full-duplex radio design, which enables a single node to transmit
and receive simultaneously [31, 38]. However, prior work requires large antenna separa-
tion and hence yields large devices unsuitable for our application. In particular, the state-
of-the-art design for full-duplex radios [31] exploits the property that a signal reverses its
phase every half a wavelength; it transmits the same signal from two antennas and puts a
receive antenna exactly half a wavelength closer to one of the transmit antennas than the
other. An antenna separation of half a wavelength, however, is unsuitable for our context:
the IMDs we consider operate in the 400 MHz band [43] with a wavelength of about 75 cm.
A shield that requires the antennas to be rigidly separated by exactly half a wavelength
(37.5 cm) challenges the notion of wearability and therefore patient acceptability.
This work presents a full-duplex radio that does not impose restrictions on antenna
separation or positioning, and hence can be built as a small wearable device. Our design
uses two antennas: a jamming antenna and a receive antenna, placed next to each other.
The jamming antenna transmits a random signal to prevent eavesdroppers from decoding
the IMD's transmissions. However, instead of relying on a particular positioning to cancel
the jamming signal at the receive antenna, we connect the receive antenna simultaneously
to both a transmit and a receive chain. We then make the transmit chain send an antidote
signal that cancels the jamming signal at the receive antenna's front end, allowing it to
receive the IMD's signal and decode it. We show both analytically and empirically that
our design delivers its security goals without antenna separation; hence it can be built as
a small wearable radio.
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Our design has additional desirable features. Specifically, because the shield can receive
while jamming, it can detect adversaries who try to alter the shield's signal to convey
unauthorized messages to the IMD. It can also ensure that it stops jamming the medium
when an adversarial signal ends, allowing legitimate devices to communicate.
We have implemented a prototype of our design on USRP2 software radios [73]. We use
400 MHz daughterboards for compatibility with the 402-405 MHz Medical Implant Com-
munication Services (MICS) band used by IMDs [43]. We evaluate our prototype shield
against two modern IMDs, namely the Medtronic Virtuoso implantable cardiac defibril-
lator (ICD) [102] and the Concerto cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT) [101].
Our evaluation reveals the following:
* When the shield is present, it jams the IMD's messages, causing even nearby (20 cm
away) eavesdroppers to experience a bit error rate of nearly 50%, which is no better
than a random guess.
" When the shield jams the IMD's packets, it can still reliably decode them (the packet
loss rate is 0.2%, which is negligible). We conclude that the shield and the IMD share
an information channel that is inaccessible to other parties.
* When the shield is absent, the IMD replies to unauthorized commands, even if the
adversary is in a non-line-of-sight location more than 14 m away, and uses a com-
mercial device that operates in the MICS band and adheres to the FCC power limit.
" When the shield is present and has the same transmit power as the adversary, the
IMD does not respond to unauthorized commands, even when the adversary is only
20 cm away.
" When the shield is absent and an adversary with 100 times the shield's power trans-
mits unauthorized commands, the IMD responds from distances as large as 27 m.
When the shield is present, however, the high-powered adversary's attempts suc-
ceed only from distances less than 5 m, and only in line-of-sight locations. The shield
always detects high-powered adversarial transmissions and raises an alarm. We con-
clude that sufficiently high-powered adversaries present an intrinsic limitation to our
physical-layer mechanism. However, the shield's presence reduces the adversary's
success range and informs the patient, raising the bar for the adversary's attempts.
The shield is, to our knowledge, the first system that simultaneously provides confiden-
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tiality for IMDs' transmissions and protects IMDs against commands from unauthorized
parties without requiring any modification to the IMDs themselves. Further, because it affords
physical-layer protection, it may also help provide a complementary defense-in-depth so-
lution to devices that feature cryptographic or other application-layer mechanisms.
Disclaimer. Operating a jamming device has legal implications that vary by jurisdiction
and frequency band. The definition of jamming also depends on both context and intent.
Our experiments were conducted in tightly controlled environments where no patients
were present. Further, the intent of a shield is never to interfere with communications that
do not involve its protected IMD. We recommend that anyone considering deployment of
technology based on this research consult with their own legal counsel.
E 4.1 IMD Communication Primer
Wireless communication appears in a wide range of IMDs, including those that treat heart
failure, diabetes, and Parkinson's disease. Older models communicated in the 175 KHz
band [66]. However, in 1999, the FCC set aside the 402-405 MHz band for medical im-
plant communication services (MICS) [43]. The MICS band was considered well suited
for IMDs because of its international availability for this purpose [40], its signal propaga-
tion characteristics in the human body, and its range of several meters that allows remote
monitoring. Modern IMDs communicate medical information in the MICS band, though
devices may use other bands for activation (e.g., 2.4 GHz or 175 KHz) [120]. IMDs share
the MICS band with meteorological systems on a secondary basis and should ensure that
their usage of it does not interfere with these systems. The FCC divides the MICS band
into multiple channels of 300 KHz width [43]. A pair of communicating devices uses one
of these channels.
IMDs typically communicate infrequently with a device called an IMD programmer
(hereafter, programmer). The programmer initiates a session with the IMD during which it
either queries the IMD for its data (e.g., patient name, ECG signal) or sends it commands
(e.g., a treatment modification). By FCC requirement, the IMD does not normally initiate
communications; it transmits only in response to a transmission from a programmer [43]
or if it detects a life-threatening condition [74].
A programmer and an IMD share the medium with other devices as follows [43]. Be-
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fore they can use a 300 KHz channel for their session, they must "listen" for a minimum
of 10 ms to ensure that the channel is unoccupied. Once they find an unoccupied channel,
they establish a session and alternate between the programmer transmitting a query or
command, and the IMD responding immediately without sensing the medium [75]. The
programmer and IMD can keep using the channel until the end of their session, or until
they encounter persistent interference, in which case they listen again to find an unoccu-
pied channel.
* 4.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
* 4.2.1 Assumptions
We assume that IMDs and authorized programmers are honest and follow the protocols
specified by the FCC and their manufacturers. We also assume the availability of a secure
channel for transmissions between authorized programmers and the shield; this channel
may use the MICS band or other bands. We further assume that the shield is a wearable
device located close to the IMD, such as a necklace. Wearable medical devices are common
in the medical industry [99, 124]. We also assume that the adversary does not physically
try to remove the shield or damage it. We assume that legitimate messages sent to an IMD
have a checksum and that the IMD will discard any message that fails the checksum test.
This latter assumption is satisfied by all wireless protocols that we are aware of, including
the ones used by the IMDs we tested (§4.8). Finally, we assume that the IMD does not
normally initiate transmissions (in accordance with FCC rules [43]); if the IMD initiates a
transmission because it detects a life-threatening condition, we make no attempt to protect
the confidentiality of that transmission.
* 4.2.2 Threat Model
We address two classes of commonly considered radio-equipped adversaries: passive
eavesdroppers that threaten the confidentiality of the IMD's transmissions, and active ad-
versaries that attempt to send unauthorized radio commands to the IMD [46, 95].
(a) Passive eavesdropper: Such an adversary eavesdrops on the wireless medium and
listens for an IMD's transmissions. We allow this adversary the following properties:
9 The adversary may try different decoding strategies. It may consider the jamming
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Figure 4-1: Protecting an IMD without modifying it: The shield jams any direct communication with the
IMD. An authorized programmer communicates with the IMD only through the shield, with which it
establishes a secure channel.
signal as noise and try to decode in the presence of jamming. Alternatively, it can im-
plement interference cancellation or joint decoding in an attempt to simultaneously
decode the jamming signal and the IMD's transmission. However, basic results in
multi-user information theory show that decoding multiple signals is impossible if
the total information rate is outside the capacity region [1361. We ensure that the in-
formation rate at the eavesdropper exceeds the capacity region by making the shield
jam at an excessively high rate; the jamming signal is random and sent without mod-
ulation or coding.
" For the purpose of this thesis, we assume that the adversary can have as many an-
tennas as the shield. In [55], we evaluate how our system works in the presence of
an adversary with more antennas than the shield.
" The adversary may be in any location farther away from the IMD than the shield
(e.g., at distances 20 cm and greater).
(b) Active adversary: Such an adversary sends unauthorized radio commands to the IMD.
These commands may modify the IMD's configuration or trigger the IMD to transmit un-
necessarily, depleting its battery. We allow this adversary the following properties:
* The adversary may use one of the following approaches to send commands: it may
generate its own unauthorized messages; it may record prior messages from other
sources and play them back to the IMD; or it may try to alter an authorized message
on the channel, for example, by transmitting at a higher power and causing a capture
effect at the IMD [121].
" The adversary may use different types of hardware. The adversary may transmit
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with a commercial IMD programmer acquired from a hospital or elsewhere. Such an
approach does not require the adversary to know the technical specifications of the
IMD's communication or to reverse-engineer its protocol. However, an adversary
that simply uses an unmodified commercial IMD programmer cannot use a transmit
power higher than that allowed by the FCC. Alternatively, a more sophisticated ad-
versary might reverse-engineer the IMD's communication protocol, then modify the
IMD programmer's hardware or use his own radio transmitter to send commands.
In this case, the adversary can customize the hardware to transmit at a higher power
than the FCC allows.
9 The adversary may be in any location farther away from the IMD than the shield.
* 4.3 System Overview
To achieve our design goal of protecting an IMD without modifying it, we design a device
called the shield that sits near the IMD and acts as a proxy. An authorized programmer
that wants to communicate with the IMD instead exchanges its messages with the shield,
which relays them to the IMD and sends back the IMD's responses, as shown in Fig. 4-1.
We assume the existence of an authenticated, encrypted channel between the shield and
the programmer. This channel can be established using TEP from the next chapter.
The shield actively prevents any device other than itself from communicating directly
with the IMD. It does so by jamming messages sent to and from the IMD. Key to the
shield's role is its ability to act as a jammer-cum-receiver, which enables it to jam the IMD's
transmissions and prevent others from decoding them, while still being able to decode
them itself. It also enables the shield to detect scenarios in which an adversary tries to
overpower the shield's own transmissions to create a capture effect on the IMD and deliver
an unauthorized message. By proxying IMD communications without requiring patients
to interact directly with the shield, our design aligns with IMD industry trends toward
wireless, time- and location-independent patient monitoring.
The next sections explain the jammer-cum-receiver's design, implementation, and use
against passive and active adversaries.
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Figure 4-2: The jammer-cum-receiver design uses two antennas: A jamming antenna that transmits the
jamming signal, and a receive antenna. The receive antenna is connected to both a transmit and receive
chain. The antidote signal is transmitted from the transmit chain to cancel out the jamming signal in the
receive chain.
U 4.4 Jammer-Cum-Receiver
A jammer-cum-receiver naturally needs to transmit and receive simultaneously. This sec-
tion presents a design for such a full-duplex radio. Our design has two key features: First,
it imposes no size restrictions and hence can be built as a small wearable device. Second,
it cancels the jamming signal only at the device's receive antenna and at no other point in
space-a necessary requirement for our application.
Our design, shown in Fig. 4-2, uses two antennas: a jamming antenna and a receive
antenna. The jamming antenna transmits a random jamming signal. The receive antenna
is simultaneously connected to both a transmit and a receive chain. The transmit chain
sends an antidote signal that cancels the jamming signal at the receive antenna's front
end, allowing the receive antenna to receive any signal without disruption from its own
jamming signal.
The antidote signal can be computed as follows. Let j(t) be the jamming signal and
x(t) be the antidote. Let Hself be the self-looping channel on the receive antenna (i.e., the
channel from the transmit chain to the receive chain on the same antenna) and Hjamarec
the channel from the jamming antenna to the receive antenna. The signal received by the
shield's receive antenna is:
y(t) = Hjam-rec j(t) + H 5lf x(t). (
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To cancel the jamming signal at the receive antenna, the antidote must satisfy:
x(t) - Hjam-+rec j(t). (4.2)
Hself
Thus, by transmitting a random signal j(t) on its jamming antenna and an antidote x(t)
on its receive antenna, the shield can receive signals transmitted by other nodes while
jamming the medium.
Next, we show that the antidote cancels the jamming signal only at the shield's receive
antenna, and no other location. Let Hjami and Hrecni be the channels from the shield's
jamming and receive antennas, respectively, to the adversary's location 1. An antenna
positioned at 1 receives the combined signal:
y(t) = Hjam4i j(t) + Hrec-+ x(t) (4.3)
= (Hjam-+i - Hrec +i Hjam-rec ) jt). (4.4)
HseIf
For the jamming signal to be cancelled out at location 1, the following must be satisfied:
Hjam-*i 
- Hjam-+rec (4.5)
Hrec+i Hself
Locating the shield's two antennas very close to each other ensures that at any location
1 the attenuation from the two antennas is comparable, i.e., I Hma 1 (see Chapter 7
in [136] for a detailed analysis). In contrast, I Hj rec | < 1; |Hsef is the attenuation on
the short wire between the transmit and receive chains in the receive antenna, which is
significantly less than the attenuation between the two antennas that additionally have to
go on the air [51]. For example, in our USRP2 prototype, the ratio IHm --rec -27 dB.
Thus, the above condition is physically infeasible, and cancelling the jamming signal at
the shield's receive antenna does not cancel it at any other location.
We note several ancillary properties of our design:
e Transmit and receive chains connected to the same antenna: Off-the-shelf radios such as
the USRP [73] have both a receive and a transmit chain connected to the same an-
tenna; they can in principle transmit and receive simultaneously on the same an-
tenna. Traditional systems cannot exploit this property, however, because the trans-
mit signal overpowers the receive chain, preventing the antenna from decoding any
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signal but its own transmission. When the jamming signal and the antidote signal
cancel each other, the interference is cancelled and the antenna can receive from other
nodes while transmitting.
* Antenna cancellation vs. analog and digital cancellation: Cancelling the jamming signal
with an antidote is a form of antenna cancellation. Thus, as in the antenna cancella-
tion scheme by Choi et al. [31], one can improve performance using hardware com-
ponents such as analog cancelers [114]. In this case, the input to the analog canceler
will be taken from points a and b in Fig. 4-2; the output will be fed to the passband
filter in the receive chain.
" Channel estimation: Computing the antidote in equation 4.2 requires knowing the
channels Hself and Hja, rec. The shield estimates these channels using two meth-
ods. First, during a session with the IMD, the shield measures the channels immedi-
ately before it transmits to the IMD or jams the IMD's transmission. In the absence of
an IMD session the shield periodically (every 200 ms in our prototype) estimates this
channel by sending a probe. Since the shield's two antennas are close to each other,
the probe can be sent at a low power to allow other nodes to leverage spatial reuse
to concurrently access the medium.
* Wideband channels: Our discussion has been focused on narrowband channels. How-
ever, the same description can be extended to work with wideband channels which
exhibit multipath effects. Specifically, such channels use OFDM, which divides the
bandwidth into orthogonal subcarriers and treats each of the subcarriers as if it was
an independent narrowband channel. Our model naturally fits in this context.2
* 4.5 Versus Passive Eavesdroppers
To preserve the confidentiality of an IMD's transmissions, the shield jams the IMD's signal
on the channel. Since the wireless channel creates linear combinations of concurrently
transmitted signals, jamming with a random signal provides a form of one-time pad,
where only entities that know the jamming signal can decrypt the IMD's data [127]. The
shield leverages its knowledge of the jamming signal and its jammer-cum-receiver capa-
bility to receive the IMD's data in the presence of jamming.
2 More generally, one could compute the multi-path channel and apply an equalizer [52] on the time-domain antidote
signal that inverts the multi-path of the jamming signal.
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Figure 4-3: Typical interaction between the Virtuoso IMD and its programmer: Without jamming (a), the
IMD transmits in response to an interrogation. The bottom graph (b) shows that the IMD transmits within
a fixed interval without sensing the medium.
To realize our design goal, the shield must ensure that it jams every packet transmitted
by the IMD. To this end, the shield leverages two properties of MICS-band IMDs [43, 75]:
" An IMD does not transmit except in a response to a message from a programmer.
The shield can listen for programmer transmissions and anticipate when the IMD
may start transmitting.
" An IMD transmits in response to a message from a programmer without sensing the
medium. This allows the shield to bound the interval during which the IMD replies
after receiving a message.
Fig. 4-3 shows an example exchange between a Medtronic Virtuoso implantable car-
diac defibrillator (ICD) and a programmer (in this case, a USRP). Fig. 4-3(a) shows that the
Virtuoso transmits in response to a programmer's message after a fixed interval (3.5 ms).
To check that the Virtuoso indeed does not sense the medium, we made the programmer
USRP transmit a message to the Virtuoso and within 1 ms transmit another random mes-
sage. Fig. 4-3(b) plots the resulting signal and shows that the Virtuoso still transmitted
SECTION 4.5. VERSUS PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS
after the same fixed interval even though the medium was occupied.
Given the above properties, the shield uses the following algorithm to jam the IMD's
transmissions. Let T1 and T 2 be the lower and upper bounds on the time that the IMD takes
to respond to a message, and let P be the IMD's maximum packet duration. Whenever the
shield sends a message to the IMD, it starts jamming the medium exactly T milliseconds
after the end of its transmission. While jamming, the shield receives the signal on the
medium using its receive antenna. The shield jams for (T2 - Ti) + P milliseconds.
Additionally, to deal with scenarios in which the IMD may transmit in response to an
unauthorized message, the shield uses its ability to detect active adversaries that might
succeed at delivering a message to the IMD (see §4.6(d)). Whenever such an adversary is
detected, the shield uses the same algorithm above, as if the message were sent to the IMD
by the shield itself.
We note that each shield should calibrate the above parameters for its own IMD. In
particular, for the IMDs tested in this work, the above parameters are as follows: T
2.8 ms, T2 = 3.7 ms, and P = 21 ms.
Our design of the shield sets three sub-goals:
(a) Maximize jamming efficiency for a given power budget: It is important to match the
frequency profile of the jamming signal to the frequency profile of the jammed signal [93].
To understand this issue, consider the example of the Virtuoso cardiac defibrillator. This
device operates over a channel bandwidth of 300 KHz. However, it uses FSK modulation
where a '0' bit is transmitted at one frequency fo and a '1' bit is transmitted at a differ-
ent frequency fi. Fig. 4-4 shows the frequency profile of the FSK signal captured from
a Virtuoso cardiac defibrillator. A jammer might create a jamming signal over the entire
300 KHz. However, since the frequency-domain representation of the received FSK signal
has most of its energy concentrated around fo and fi, an adversary can eliminate most of
the jamming signal by applying two band-pass filters centered on fo and fi.
Therefore, an effective jammer should consider the structure of the IMD's signal when
crafting the jamming signal, shaping the amount of energy it puts in each frequency ac-
cording to the frequency profile of the IMD signal. Fig. 4-5 compares the power profile of a
jamming signal that is shaped to fit the signal in Fig. 4-4 and an oblivious jamming signal
that uses a constant power profile. The figure shows that the shaped signal has increased
jamming power in frequencies that matter for decoding.
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Figure 4-4: The frequency profile of the FSK signal captured from a Virtuoso cardiac
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Figure 4-5: Shaping the jamming signal's profile to match an IMD's allows the shield to focus its jamming
on frequencies that matter for decoding, as opposed to jamming across the entire 300 KHz channel.
To shape its jamming signal appropriately, the shield generates the jamming signal by
taking multiple random white Gaussian noise signals and assigning each of them to a
particular frequency bin in the 300 KHz MICS channel. The shield sets the variance of the
white Gaussian noise in each frequency bin to match the power profile resulting from the
IMD's FSK modulation in that frequency bin. We then take the IFFT of all the Gaussian
signals to generate the time-domain jamming signal. This process generates a random
jamming signal that has a power profile similar to the power profile generated by IMD
modulation. The shield scales the amplitude of the jamming signal to match its hardware's
power budget. The shield also compensates for any carrier frequency offset between its RF
chain and that of the IMD.
(b) Ensure independence of eavesdropper location: To ensure confidentiality, the shield
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must maintain a high bit error rate (BER) at the adversary, independent of the adversary's
location. The BER at the adversary, however, strictly depends on its signal-to-interference-
and-noise ratio, SINRA [51]. To show that the BER at the adversary is independent of its
location, we show that the SINR at the adversary is independent of its location.
Suppose the IMD transmits its signal at a power Pi dB and the shield transmits the
jamming signal at a power P dB. The IMD's signal and the jamming signal will experience
a pathloss to the adversary of Li and Lj, respectively. Thus, the SINR at the adversary can
be written in dB as:
SINRA = (P - Li) - (P3 - Lj) - NA, (4.6)
where NA is the noise in the adversary's hardware. Since equation 4.6 is written in a
logarithmic scale, the pathlosses translate into subtractions.
The pathloss from the IMD to the adversary can be expressed as the sum of the pathloss
that the IMD's signal experiences in the body and on the air, i.e., Li =- Lbody + Lai, [110].
Since the shield and the IMD are close together, the pathlosses they experience on the air
to the adversary are approximately the same-i.e., Lair ~ Lj [136]. Thus, we can rewrite
equation 4.6 as:
SINRA = (P, - Lbody) - P3 - NA. (4.7)
The above equation shows that SINRA is independent of the adversary's location and can
be controlled by setting the jamming power P to an appropriate value. This directly im-
plies that the BER at the adversary is independent of its location.
(c) SINR tradeoff between the shield and the adversary: Similarly to how we computed
the SINR of an eavesdropper, we can compute the SINR of the shield (in dB) as:
SINRs = (P, - Lbody) - (J - G) - NG, (4.8)
where NG is the thermal noise on the shield and G is the reduction in the jamming signal
power at the receive antenna due to the antidote. The above equation simply states that
SINRs is the IMD power after subtracting the pathloss due mainly to in-body propagation,
the residual of the jamming power (P - G), and the noise.
Note that if one ignores the noise on the shield's receive antenna and the adversary's
device (which are negligible in comparison to the other terms), one can express the relation
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between the two SINRs using a simple equation:
SINRs = SINRA + G. (4.9)
This simplified view reveals an intrinsic tradeoff between the SINR at the shield and the
adversary, and hence their BERs. To increase the BER at the adversary while maintaining
a low BER at the shield, one needs to increase G, which is the amount of jamming power
cancelled at the shield's receive antenna. We refer to G as the SINR gap between the shield
and the adversary.
We show in §4.9.1 that for the tested IMDs, an SINR gap of G = 32 dB suffices to provide
a BER of nearly 50% at the adversary (reducing the adversary to guessing) while maintain-
ing reliable packet delivery at the shield.
* 4.6 Versus Active Adversaries
Next, we explain our approach for countering active adversaries. At a high level, the shield
detects unauthorized packets and jams them. The jamming signal combines linearly with
the unauthorized signal, causing random bit flips during decoding. The IMD ignores these
packets because they fail its checksum test.
The exact active jamming algorithm follows. Let Sid be an identifying sequence, i.e., a se-
quence of m bits that is always used to identify packets destined to the IMD. Sid includes
the packets' physical-layer preamble and the subsequent header. When the shield is not
transmitting, it constantly monitors the medium. If it detects a signal on the medium, it
proceeds to decode it. For each newly decoded bit, the shield checks the last m decoded
bits against the identifying sequence Sid. If the two sequences differ by fewer than a thresh-
old number of bits, bthresh, the shield jams the signal until the signal stops and the medium
becomes idle again.
The shield also uses its receive antenna to monitor the medium while transmitting.
However, in this case, if it detects a signal concurrent to its transmission, it switches from
transmission to jamming and continues jamming until the medium becomes idle again.
The reason the shield jams any concurrent signal without checking for Sid is to ensure that
an adversary cannot successfully alter the shield's own message on the channel in order to
send an unauthorized message to the IMD.
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We note five subtle design points:
(a) Choosing identifying sequences: Our algorithm relies on the identifying sequence Sid
in order to identify transmissions destined for the protected IMD. We therefore desire a
method of choosing a per-device Sid based on unique device characteristics. Fortunately,
IMDs already bear unique identifying characteristics. For example, the Medtronic IMDs
that we tested (the Virtuoso ICD and the Concerto CRT) use FSK modulation, a known
preamble, a header, and the device's ID, i.e., its 10-byte serial number. More generally,
each wireless device has an FCC ID, which allows the designer to look up the device in the
FCC database and verify its modulation, coding, frequency and power profile [42].3 One
can use these specifications to choose an appropriate identifying sequence. Furthermore,
once in a session, the IMD locks on to a unique channel, to receive any future commands.
Since other IMD-programmer pairs avoid occupied channels, this channel ID can be used
to further specify the target IMD.
(b) Setting the threshold bthresh: If an adversary can transmit a signal and force the shield
to experience a bit error rate higher than the IMD's, it may prevent the shield from jamming
an unauthorized command that the IMD successfully decodes and executes. However, we
argue that such adversarial success is unlikely, for two reasons. First, because the signal
goes through body tissue, the IMD experiences an additional pathloss that could be as
high as 40 dB [122], and hence it naturally experiences a much weaker signal than the
shield. Second, the IMD uses a harder constraint to accept a packet than the constraint the
shield uses to jam a packet. Specifically, the IMD requires that all bits be correct to pass
a checksum, while the shield tolerates some differences (up to bthresh bits) between the
identifying sequence and the received one. We describe our empirical method of choosing
bthresh in §4.9.1(c).
(c) Customizing for the MICS band: It is important to realize that the shield can listen to
the entire 3 MHz MICS band, transmit in all or any subset of the channels in this band,
and further continue to listen to the whole band as it is transmitting in any subset of the
channels. It is fairly simple to build such a device by making the radio front end as wide
as 3 MHz and equipping the device with per-channel filters. This enables the shield to
process the signals from all channels in the MICS band simultaneously.
3For example, the FCC ID LF5MICS refers to Medtronic IMDs we tested.
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The shield uses this capability to monitor the entire 3 MHz MICS band because an
adversary can transmit to the IMD on any channel in the band. This monitoring allows the
shield to detect and counter adversarial transmissions even if the adversary uses frequency
hopping or transmits in multiple channels simultaneously to try to confuse the shield. The
shield jams any given 300 KHz channel if the channel contains a signal that matches the
constraints described in the active jamming algorithm.
(d) Complying with FCC rules: The shield must adhere to the FCC power limit even when
jamming an adversary. However, as explained in §4.2, a sophisticated adversary may use
a transmission power much higher than the FCC limit. In such cases, the adversary will be
able to deliver its packet to the IMD despite jamming. However, the shield is still useful
because it can detect the high-powered adversary in real time and raise an alarm to attract
the attention of the patient or a caregiver. Such alarms may be similar to a cell phone
alarm, i.e., the shield may beep or vibrate. It is desirable to have a low false positive rate
for such an alarm. To that end, we calibrate the shield with an IMD to find the minimum
adversarial transmit power that can trigger a response from the IMD despite jamming. We
call this value Pthresh. When the shield detects a potentially adversarial transmission, it
checks whether the signal power exceeds Pthresh, in which case it raises an alarm.
Finally, we note that when the shield detects a high-powered active adversary, it also
considers the possibility that the adversary will send a message that triggers the IMD to
send its private data. In this case, the shield applies the passive jamming algorithm: in
addition to jamming the adversary's high-powered message, it jams the medium afterward
as detailed in §4.5.
(e) Battery life of the shield: Since jamming consumes power, one may wonder how often
the shield needs to be charged. In the absence of attacks, the shield jams only the IMD's
transmissions, and hence transmits approximately as often as the IMD. IMDs are typically
nonrechargeable power-limited devices that do not transmit frequently [411. Thus, in this
mode of operation, we do not expect the battery of the shield to be an issue. When the
IMD is under an active attack, the shield will have to transmit as often as the adversary.
However, since the shield transmits at the FCC power limit for the MICS band, it can last
for a day or longer even if transmitting continuously. For example, wearable heart rate
monitors that continuously transmit ECG signals can last 24-48 hours [153].
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Figure 4-6: Testbed setup showing shield, IMD, and adversary locations. We experiment with 18 adversary
locations, numbered here in descending order of received signal strength at the shield.
U 4.7 Implementation
We implement a proof-of-concept prototype shield with GNU Radio and USRP2 hard-
ware [73, 50]. The prototype uses the USRP's RFX400 daughterboards, which operate in
the MICS band [43]. The USRP2 does not support multiple daughterboards on the same
motherboard, so we implement a two-antenna shield with two USRP2 radio boards con-
nected via an external clock [76] so that they act as a single node. The two antennas are
placed right next to each other. Our design for a two-antenna jammer-cum-receiver re-
quires the receive antenna to be always connected to both a transmit and a receive chain.
To enable the shield's receive antenna to transmit and receive simultaneously, we turn off
the USRP RX/TX switch, which leaves both the transmit and receive chains connected to
the antenna all the time. Specifically, we set atrtxval=MIX-EN and atrrxval=ANTSW
in the TX chain, and we set atrtxval=MIXEN and atrrxval=MIXEN in the RX chain,
in the USRP2's firmware and FPGA code. Finally, we equip the shield with FSK modula-
tion and demodulation capabilities so that it can communicate with an IMD.
* 4.8 Testing Environment
Our experiments use the following devices:
* Medtronic Virtuoso DR implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) [102].
* A Medtronic Concerto cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT) [101].
* A Medtronic Vitatron Carelink 2090 Programmer [100].
9 USRP2 software radio boards [73].
In our in vitro experiments, the ICD and CRT play the role of the protected IMD. The
USRP devices play the roles of the shield, the adversary, and legitimate users of the MICS
band. We use the programmer off-line with our active adversary; the adversary records
the programmer's transmissions in order to replay them later. Analog replaying of these
captured signals doubles their noise, reducing the adversary's probability of success, so the
adversary demodulates the programmer's FSK signal into the transmitted bits to remove
the channel noise. The adversary then re-modulates the bits to obtain a clean version of
the signal to transmit to the IMD.
Fig. 4-6 depicts the testing setup. To simulate implantation in a human, we followed
prior work [66] and implanted each IMD beneath 1 cm of bacon, with 4 cm of 85% lean
ground beef packed underneath. We placed the shield next to the IMD on the bacon's
surface to simulate a necklace. We varied the adversary's location between 20 cm and
30 m, as shown in the figure.
* 4.9 Evaluation
We evaluate our prototype of a shield against commercially available IMDs. We show that
the shield effectively protects the confidentiality of the IMD's messages and defends the
IMD against commands from unauthorized parties. We experiment with both the Virtuoso
ICD and the Concerto CRT. However, since the two IMDs did not show any significant dif-
ference, we combine the experimental results from both devices and present them together.
Our results can be summarized as follows.
" In practice, our antenna cancellation design can cancel about 32 dB of the jam-
ming signal at the receive antenna (§4.9.1(a)). This result shows that our design
achieves similar performance to the antenna cancellation algorithm proposed in
prior work [31], but without requiring a large antenna separation.
" Setting the shield's jamming power 20 dB higher than the IMD's received power
allows the shield to achieve a high bit error rate at adversarial locations while still
being able to reliably decode the IMD's transmissions (§4.9.1(b)). The shield's in-
creased power still complies with FCC rules in the MICS band since the transmit
power of implanted devices is 20 dB less than the transmit power for devices outside
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the body [111, 112].
" With the above setting, the bit error rate at a passive eavesdropper is nearly 50% at
all tested locations-i.e., an eavesdropping adversary's decoding efforts are no more
effective than random guessing. Further, even while jamming, the shield can reliably
decode the IMD's packets with a packet loss rate less than 0.2%. We conclude that
the shield and the IMD share a channel inaccessible to other parties (§4.9.2).
" When the shield is present and active, an adversary using off-the-shelf IMD program-
mers cannot elicit a response from the protected IMD even from distances as small as
20 cm. A more sophisticated adversary that transmits at 100 times the shield's power
successfully elicits IMD responses only at distances less than 5 meters, and only in
line-of-sight locations. Further, the shield detects these high-powered transmissions
and raises an alarm. We conclude that the shield significantly raises the bar for such
high-powered adversarial transmissions (§4.9.3).
0 4.9.1 Micro-Benchmark Results
In this section, we calibrate the parameters of the shield and examine the performance of
its components.
(a) Antenna cancellation: We first evaluate the performance of the antenna cancellation
algorithm in §4.4, in which the shield sends an antidote signal to cancel the jamming signal
on its receive antenna.
In this experiment, the shield transmits a random signal on its jamming antenna and
the corresponding antidote on its receive antenna. In each run, it transmits 100 Kb without
the antidote, followed by 100 Kb with the antidote. We compute the received power at the
receive antenna with and without the antidote. The difference in received power between
the two trials is the jamming cancellation resulting from the transmission of the antidote.
Fig. 4-7 shows the CDF of the amount of cancellation over multiple runs of the exper-
iment. It shows that the average reduction in jamming power is about 32 dB. The figure
also shows that the variance of this value is small. This result shows that the antenna can-
cellation algorithm introduced in this work achieves similar performance to the algorithm
proposed by Choi et al. [31], but without requiring a large antenna separation.4
4Choi et al. [31] also combine antenna cancellation with analog and digital cancellation to obtain a total cancellation of
60 dB at the receive antenna. However, we show in §4.9.2 that for our purposes, a cancellation of 32 dB suffices to achieve
our goal of high reliability at the shield and nearly 50% BER at the adversary.
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Figure 4-7: Antenna cancellation: The antidote signal reduces the jamming signal by 32 dB on average.
(b) Tradeoffs between eavesdropper error and shield error: The aforementioned 32 dB of
cancellation at the shield's receive antenna naturally sets an upper bound on the jamming
power: if the residual error after jamming cancellation is too high, the shield will fail to
decode the IMD's data properly.
To explore the tradeoff between the error at the shield and the error at an eavesdropper,
we run the following experiment. We place the IMD and the shield at their marked loca-
tions in Fig. 4-6, and we place a USRP eavesdropper 20 cm away from the IMD at location
1. In each run of the experiment, the shield repeatedly triggers the IMD to transmit the
same packet. The shield also uses its jammer-cum-receiver capability to simultaneously
jam and decode the IMD's packets. The eavesdropper tries to decode the IMD packets, in
the presence of jamming, using an optimal FSK decoder [1031.
Fig. 4-8(a) plots the eavesdropper's BER as a function of the shield's jamming power.
Since the required jamming power naturally depends on the power of the jammed IMD's
signal, the x-axis reports the shield's jamming power relative to the power of the signal it
receives from the IMD. The figure shows that if the shield sets its jamming power 20 dB
higher than the power of the signal it receives from the IMD, the eavesdropper's BER is
50%. Thus the eavesdropper's decoding task is no more successful than random guessing.
Next, we check that the above setting allows the shield to reliably decode the IMD's
packets. As above, Fig. 4-8(b) plots the shield's packet loss rate as a function of its jamming
power relative to the power of the signal it receives from the IMD. The figure shows that
if the shield's jamming power is 20 dB higher than the IMD's power, the packet loss rate is
no more than 0.2%. We conclude that this jamming power achieves both a high error rate
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Figure 4-8: Tradeoff between BER at the eavesdropper and reliable decoding at the shield: If the shield
sets its jamming power 20 dB higher than the power it receives from the IMD, it can ensure that an eaves-
dropper sees a BER around 50% (a)-effectively reducing the eavesdropper to guessing-while keeping
the packet loss rate (PER) at the shield as low as 0.2% (b).
at the eavesdropper and reliable decoding at the shield.
We note that the shield's increased power, described above, still complies with FCC
rules on power usage in the MICS band because the transmit power of implanted devices
is 20 dB less than the maximum allowed transmit power for devices outside the body [111,
1121.
(c) Setting the jamming parameters: Next we calibrate the jamming parameters for coun-
tering active adversaries. The shield must jam unauthorized packets sent to the IMD it
protects. It must jam these packets even if it receives them with some bit errors, because
they might otherwise be received correctly at the IMD. We therefore empirically estimate
an upper bound, bthresh, on the number of bit flips an IMD accepts in an adversary's packet
header. The shield uses this upper bound to identify packets that must be jammed.
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Pthresh: Adversary power Minimum -11.1 dBm
that elicits IMD response Average -4.5 dBm
Standard Deviation 3.5 dBm
Table 4-1: Adversarial RSSI that elicits IMD responses despite the shield's jamming.
To estimate bthresh, we perform the following experiment. First, a USRP transmits unau-
thorized commands to the IMD to trigger it to send patient data. We repeat the experiment
for all locations in Fig. 4-6. The shield stays in its marked location in Fig. 4-6, but its jam-
ming capability is turned off. However, the shield logs all of the packets transmitted by the
IMD as well as the adversarial packets that triggered them. We process these logs offline
and, for packets that successfully triggered an IMD response despite containing bit errors,
we count the number of bit flips in the packet header. Our results show that it is unlikely
that a packet will have bit errors at the shield but still be received correctly by the IMD.
Out of 5000 packets, only three packets showed errors at the shield but still triggered a
response from an IMD. The maximum number of bit flips in those packets was 2, so we
conservatively set bthresh 4.
Next, we measure Pthresh, the minimum adversary RSSI at the shield that can elicit a
response from the IMD in the presence of jamming. To do so, we fix the location of the
IMD and the shield as shown in Fig. 4-6. Again we use a USRP that repeatedly sends a
command to trigger the IMD to transmit. We fix the adversary in location 1 and vary its
transmit power. Table 4-1 reports the minimum and average RSSI at the shield's receive
antenna for all packets that succeeded in triggering the IMD to transmit. We set Pthresh 3 dB
below the minimum RSSI in the table and use that value for all subsequent experiments.
0 4.9.2 Protecting from Passive Adversaries
To evaluate the effectiveness of the shield's jamming, we run an experiment in which the
shield repeatedly triggers the IMD to transmit the same packet. The shield also uses its
jammer-cum-receiver capability to jam the IMD's packets while it decodes them. We set
the shield's jamming power as described in §4.5. In each run, we position an eavesdrop-
per at a different location shown in Fig. 4-6 and make the IMD send 1000 packets. The
eavesdropping adversary attempts to decode the IMD's packets using an optimal FSK de-
coder [103]. We record the BER at the eavesdropper and the packet loss rate at the shield.
Fig. 4-9 plots a CDF of the eavesdropper's BER taken over all locations in Fig. 4-6. The
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Figure 4-9: CDF of an eavesdropper's BER over all eavesdropper locations in Fig. 4-6: At all locations,
the eavesdropper's BER is nearly 50%, which makes its decoding task no more successful than random
guessing. The low variance in the CDF shows that an eavesdropper's BER is independent of its location.
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Figure 4-10: Packet loss at the shield: When the shield is jamming, it experiences an average packet loss
rate of only 0.2% when receiving the IMD's packets. We conclude that the shield can reliably decode the
IMD's transmissions despite jamming.
CDF shows that the eavesdropper's BER is nearly 50% in all tested locations. We conclude
that our design of the shield achieves the goal of protecting the confidentiality of IMD's
transmissions from an eavesdropper regardless of the eavesdropper's location.
For the same experiment, Fig. 4-10 plots a CDF of the packet loss rate of IMD-
transmitted packets at the shield. Each point on the x-axis refers to the packet loss rate
over 1000 IMD packets. The average packet loss rate is about 0.2%, considered low for
wireless systems [39]. Such a low loss rate is due to two factors. First, we locate the shield
fairly close to the IMD, so it receives the IMD's signal at a relatively high SNR. Second, the
jamming cancellation is sufficient to maintain a high SNR that ensures a low packet loss
rate. We conclude that the shield can decode the IMD's packets, even while jamming.
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0 4.9.3 Protecting from Active Adversaries
We distinguish between two scenarios representing different levels of adversarial sophisti-
cation. In the first, we consider scenarios in which the adversary uses an off-the-shelf IMD
programmer to send unauthorized commands to the IMD. In the second, a more sophis-
ticated adversary reverse-engineers the protocol and uses custom hardware to transmit
with much higher power than is possible in the first scenario.
(a) Adversary that uses a commercial IMD programmer: The simplest way an adversary
can send unauthorized commands to an IMD is to obtain a standard IMD programmer and
use its built-in radio. Since commercial programmers abide by FCC rules, in this scenario,
the adversary's transmission power will be comparable to that of the shield.
Using an IMD programmer we obtained via a popular auction website, we play the
role of such an active adversary. We use the setup in Fig. 4-6, fixing the IMD's and shield's
locations and transmitting unauthorized commands from all the marked locations. As
shown in the figure, we experiment with both line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight locations
as well as nearby (20 cm) and relatively far locations (30 m).
To test whether the shield's jamming is effective against unauthorized commands, re-
gardless of which unauthorized command the adversary chooses to send, we experiment
with two types of adversarial commands: those that trigger the IMD to transmit its data
with the objective of depleting its battery, and those that change the IMD's therapy pa-
rameters. In each location, we play each command 100 times with the shield on and 100
times with the shield off. After each attempt, we check whether the command was suc-
cessful. To determine whether the first type of command was successful-i.e., whether it
elicited a reply-we sandwiched a USRP observer along with the IMD between the two
slabs of meat. To allow the USRP observer to easily check whether the IMD transmitted
in response to the adversary's command, we configure the shield to jam only the adver-
sary's packets, not the packets transmitted by the IMD. To determine whether a therapy
modification command was successful, we use the IMD programmer to read the therapy
parameters before and after the attempt.
Fig. 4-11 and Fig. 4-12 show the results of these experiments. They plot the probability
that adversarial commands succeed with the shield off (absent) and on (present), each as a
function of adversary locations. The locations are ordered by decreasing SNR at the USRP
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Figure 4-11: Without the shield triggering an IMD to transmit and deplete its battery using an off-the-shelf
IMD programmer succeeds with high probability. With the shield, such attacks fail.
observer. The figures show the following:
" When the shield is off, adversaries located up to 14 meters away (location 8) from
the IMD-including non-line-of-sight locations-can change the IMD's therapy pa-
rameters or cause the IMD to transmit its private data using precious battery energy,
in contrast to past work in which the adversarial range is limited to a few centime-
ters [661. We attribute this increased adversarial range to recent changes in IMD de-
sign that enable longer-range radio communication (MICS band) meant to support
remote monitoring and a larger sterile field during surgery.
" When the shield is on, it successfully prevents the IMD from receiving adversarial
commands as long as the adversary uses a device that obeys FCC rules on transmis-
sion power-even when the adversary is as close as 20 cm.
" There is no statistical difference in success rate between commands that modify the
patient's treatment and commands that trigger the IMD to transmit private data and
deplete its battery.
(b) High-powered active adversary: Next, we experiment with scenarios in which the
adversary uses custom hardware to transmit at 100 times the shield's transmit power. The
experimental setup is similar to those discussed above; specifically, we fix the locations
of the IMD and the shield and vary the high-powered adversary's position among the
numbered locations in Fig. 4-6. Each run has two phases: one with the shield off and
another with the shield on. Since we found no statistical difference in success rate between
unauthorized commands that trigger the IMD to transmit and those that change its therapy
parameters, we show results only for the therapy modification command.
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Figure 4-12: Without the shield, an adversary using an off-the-shelf programmer to send unauthorized com-
mands (in this case, to modify therapy parameters) succeeds with high probability. The shield materially
decreases the adversary's ability to control the IMD.
Fig. 4-13 shows the results of this experiment in terms of the observed probability of
adversarial success, with the shield both on and off. It also shows the observed probability
that the shield raises an alarm, which is how the shield responds to a high-powered (above
Pthresh) adversarial transmission. The figure further shows:
" When the shield is off, the adversary's increased power allows it to elicit IMD re-
sponses from as far as 27 meters (location 13) and from non-line-of-sight locations.
" When the shield is on, the adversary elicits IMD responses only from close locations.
Thus, the shield's presence raises the bar even for high-powered adversaries.
" Whenever the adversary elicits a response from the IMD in the presence of the shield,
the shield raises an alarm. The shield also raises an alarm in response to unsuccessful
adversarial transmissions that are high powered and emanate from nearby locations
(e.g., location 6). While this conservative alert results in false positives, we believe
it is reasonable to alert the patient that an adversary is nearby and may succeed at
controlling the IMD.
U 4.10 Coexistence
We investigate how the presence of a shield affects other legitimate users of the medium.
As explained in §4.1, the FCC rules for medical devices in the MICS band require such
devices to monitor a candidate channel for 10 ms and avoid using occupied channels.
As a result, two pairs of honest medical devices are unlikely to share the same 300 KHz
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Figure 4-13: High-powered adversary. Without the shield, an adversary transmitting at 100 times the
shield's power can change the IMD's therapy parameters even from non-line-of-sight locations up to 27 m
away. With the shield, the adversary is successful only from line-of-sight locations less than 5 m away, and
the shield raises an alarm.
channel. We focus our evaluation on coexistence with the meteorological devices that are
the primary users of the MICS band (and hence can transmit even on occupied channels).
In this experiment, we position the IMD and the shield in the locations marked
on Fig. 4-6. We make a USRP board alternate between sending unauthorized commands to
the IMD and transmitting cross-traffic unintended for the IMD. The cross-traffic is modeled
after the transmissions of meteorological devices, in particular a Vaisala digital radiosonde
RS92-AGP [14] that uses GMSK modulation. For each of the adversary positions in Fig 4-6,
we make the USRP alternate between one packet to the IMD and one cross-traffic packet.
The shield logs all packets it detects and reports which of them it jammed.
Post-processing of the shield's log showed that the shield did not jam any of the cross-
traffic packets, regardless of the transmitter's location. In contrast, the shield jammed all of
the packets that it detected were addressed to the IMD; see Table 4-2. Further, our software
radio implementation of the shield takes 270 + 23 ps after an adversary stops transmitting
to turn around and stop its own transmissions. This delay is mainly due to the shield's
being implemented in software. A hardware implementation would have a more efficient
turn-around time of tens of microseconds. (Note, for example, that a 802.11 card can turn
around in a SIFS duration of 10 ps.) The low turn-around time shows that the shield does
not continuously jam the medium (thereby denying others access to it).
U 4.11 Related Work
Recent innovations in health-related communication and networking technologies range
from low-power implantable radios that harvest body energy [83] to medical sensor net-
works for in-home monitoring and diagnosis [129]. Past work has also studied the vul-
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Standard Deviation 23 is
Table 4-2: Coexistence results: Jamming behavior and turn-around time in the presence of simulated me-
teorological cross-traffic.
nerabilities of these systems and proposed new designs that could improve their secu-
rity [65, 66]. Our work builds on this foundation, but it differs from all past works in that it
presents the first system that defends existing commercial IMDs against adversaries who
eavesdrop on transmissions or send unauthorized commands.
Our design is motivated by the work of Halperin et al., who analyzed the security
properties of an implantable cardiac device and demonstrated its vulnerability to adver-
sarial actions that compromise data confidentiality or induce potentially harmful heart
rhythms [65, 66]. They also suggested adding passively powered elements to implantable
devices to allow them to authenticate their interlocutors. Along similar lines, Denning et
al. propose a class of devices called cloakers that would share secret keys with IMDs [35];
an IMD would attempt to detect an associated cloaker's presence either periodically or
when presented with an unknown programmer. Unlike these three proposals, our tech-
nique does not require cryptographic methods and is directly applicable to IMDs that are
already implanted.
Other work has focused on the problem of key distribution for cryptographic secu-
rity. Cherukuri et al. propose using consistent human biometric information to generate
identical secret keys at different places on a single body [30]. Schechter suggests that key
material could be tattooed onto patients using ultraviolet micro-pigmentation [123].
Our work builds on a rich literature in wireless communication. Specifically, past work
on jamming focuses on enabling wireless communication in the presence of adversarial
jamming [92, 1131. Some past work, however, has proposed to use friendly jamming to
prevent adversarial access to RFID tags, sensor nodes, and IMDs [96, 117, 150]. Our work
is complementary to this past work but differs from it in that our jammer can transmit
and receive at the same time; this allows it to decode IMD messages while protecting their
confidentiality.
Our work is related to prior work on physical-layer information-theoretic security. Past
work in this area has shown that if the channel to the receiver is better than the channel to
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an eavesdropper, the sender-receiver pair can securely communicate [34, 130, 149]. Also,
our prior work proposes ijam, an OFDM-based technique that jams while receiving to
prevent unauthorized receivers from obtaining a protected signal [58]. iJam, however, is
not applicable to IMDs because it relies on the intrinsic characteristics of OFDM signals,
which differ greatly from IMDs' FSK signals. Further, ijam requires changes to both the
transmitter and receiver, and hence does not immediately apply to IMDs that are already
implanted.
Finally, our work also builds on past work on full-duplex radio [31, 38, 32]. Ours, how-
ever, differs from all past works in that it is the first to demonstrate the value of using
full-duplex radios for security. Furthermore, we implement a radio where the antennas
are placed next to each other so that it can be built as a small device and show both empir-
ically and analytically that our design secures IMDs using only 30 dB cancellation which
is significantly less than the 60-80 dB cancellation required by prior work [38, 31].
* 4.12 Discussion
This work addresses the problem of communication security for implanted medical de-
vices. The key challenge in addressing this problem stems from the difficulty of mod-
ifying or replacing implanted devices. We present the design and implementation of a
wireless physical-layer solution that delegates the task of protecting IMD communication
to an external device called the shield. Our evaluation shows that the shield effectively
provides confidentiality for IMDs' transmitted data and shields IMDs from unauthorized
commands, both without requiring any changes to the IMDs themselves.
More generally, the influx of wireless communication in medical devices brings a num-
ber of domain-specific problems that require the expertise of both the wireless and secu-
rity communities. IMDShield provides a case study for how one can leverage expertise
in wireless device design to secure medical implants. Beyond IMDShield, we believe that
this inter-disciplinary approach can enable novel domain-specific solutions that address
the security and privacy challenges in the medical domain.
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CHAPTER 5
Secure Pairing Without Passwords or
Prior Secrets
Recent trends in the security of home WiFi networks are driven by two phenomena: or-
dinary users often struggle with the security setup of their home networks [811, and, as a
result, some of them end up skipping security activation [146, 109]. Simultaneously, there
is a proliferation of WiFi gadgets and sensors that do not support an interface for entering a
key. These include WiFi sound systems, medical sensors, USB keys, light and temperature
sensors, motion detectors and surveillance sensors, home appliances, and game consoles.
Even new models of these devices are unlikely to support a keypad because of limitations
on their form factor, style, cost, or functionality. Responding to these two requirements-
easing security setup for home users, and securing devices that do not have an interface
for entering a key-the WiFi Alliance has introduced the Push Button Configuration (PBC)
mechanism [146]. To establish a secure connection between two WiFi devices, the user
pushes a button on each device, and the devices broadcast their Diffie-Hellman public
keys [36], which they then use to protect all future communication. PBC is a mandatory
part of the new WiFi Protected Setup certification program [147]. It is already adopted by
the major WiFi manufacturers (e.g., Cisco, NetGear, HP, Microsoft, Sony) and implemented
in about 2,000 new products from 117 different companies [145].
Unfortunately, the PBC approach taken by the WiFi Alliance does not fully address
WiFi security. Diffie-Hellman's key-exchange protocol [36] protects against only passive
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adversaries that snoop on the wireless medium to obtain key exchange messages. Since
the key exchange messages are not authenticated in any way, the protocol is vulnerable
to an active man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. That is, an adversary can impersonate
each device to the other, convincing both devices to establish a secure connection via the
adversary. With WiFi increasingly used in medical sensors that transmit a patient's vital
signals [62] and surveillance sensors that protect one's home [126], there is a concern that,
being vulnerable to MITM attacks, PBC may give users a false sense of security [146, 84].
One may wonder why the WiFi Alliance did not adopt a user-friendly solution that
also protects against MITM attacks. We believe the reason is that existing user-friendly so-
lutions to MITM attacks require devices to support an out-of-band communication chan-
nel [26, 98, 132, 60, 118, 97]. For example, devices can exchange keys over a visual channel
between an LCD and a camera [981, an audio channel [60], an infrared channel [19], a dedi-
cated wireless channel allocated exclusively for key exchange [26], etc. Given the cost, size,
and capability constraints imposed on many WiFi products, it is difficult for the industry
to adopt a solution that requires an out-of-band communication channel.
This work presents tamper-evident pairing (TEP), a novel protocol that provides simple,
secure WiFi pairing and protects against MITM attacks without an out-of-band channel.
TEP can also be incorporated into PBC devices and existing WiFi chipsets without hard-
ware changes.
TEP's main challenge in avoiding MITM attacks comes from operating on a shared
wireless network, where an adversary can mask an attack behind cross traffic, making it
difficult to distinguish an adversary's actions from legitimate traffic patterns. To under-
stand this, consider a key exchange between Alice and Bob, where Bob sends his Diffie-
Hellman public key to Alice. Lucifer, the adversary, could tamper with this key exchange
as follows:
" Collision: Lucifer can jam Bob's message, causing a collision, which would not look
out-of-the-ordinary on a busy wireless network. The collision prevents Alice from
decoding Bob's message. Lucifer can now send his own message to Alice, in lieu of
Bob's message, perhaps with the help of a directional antenna so that Bob does not
notice the attack.
" Capture effect: Lucifer can transmit simultaneously with Bob, but at a significantly
higher power, to produce a capture effect at Alice [142]. In this case, Alice will decode
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Figure 5-1: The format of a tamper-evident message (TEM).
Lucifer's message, in which he impersonates Bob, despite Bob's concurrent transmis-
sion. Bob will not know about Lucifer's transmission.
Timing control: Lucifer can try to impersonate Alice by continuously occupying the
wireless medium after Bob sends out his key, so that Lucifer can send out a message
pretending to be Alice, but Alice does not get a chance to send her legitimate key.
To address these attacks in TEP, we introduce a tamper-evident message (TEM) primitive.
The key characteristics of a TEM message is that an attacker can neither hide a TEM trans-
mission from other nodes within radio range, nor can it modify the content of the TEM
without being detected. Thus, a TEM provides stronger guarantees than payload integrity
because it also protects the fact that a message was transmitted in the first place.
Fig. 5-1 shows the structure of a TEM. First, to ensure that Lucifer cannot mask Bob's
TEM message by introducing a collision, the TEM starts with an exceptionally long packet.
Since standard WiFi collisions are significantly shorter, Alice needs to detect only excep-
tionally long collisions (i.e., exceptionally long bursts of energy) as potential attacks on the
key exchange process.
Second, to ensure that Lucifer cannot alter the payload of Bob's TEM by transmitting
his own message at a high power to create a capture effect, we force any TEM message to
include silence periods. As shown in Fig. 5-1, the payload of the TEM message is followed
by a sequence of short equal-size packets, called slots, where the transmission of a packet
is interpreted as a "1" bit, and an idle medium is interpreted as a "0" bit. The bit sequence
produced by the slots must match a hash of the TEM payload. If Lucifer overwrites Bob's
message with his own, he must transmit slots corresponding to a hash of his message,
including staying silent during any zero hash bits. However, since the hash of Lucifer's
message differs from that of Bob's message, Bob's message will show up on the medium
during Lucifer's "0" slots. Alice will detect a mismatch between the slots and the message
hash and reject Lucifer's message.
Third, to ensure that legitimate nodes do not mess up the timing of Alice and Bob's key
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exchange, the TEM message includes a CTS-to-SELF, as shown in Fig. 5-1. CTS-to-SELF
is an 802.11 message that requires honest nodes to refrain from transmitting for a time
period specified in the packet. TEP leverages this message for two goals. First, it uses it to
reserve the medium for the duration of the TEM slots to ensure that legacy 802.11 nodes,
unaware of the structure of a TEM message, do not sense the medium as idle and transmit
during a TEM's silent slots. Second, TEP also uses CTS-to-SELF to reserve the medium
for a short period after the TEM slots, to enable Alice to send her key to Bob within the
interval allowed by PBC. Once Alice starts her transmission, the medium will be occupied,
and honest 802.11 nodes will abstain from transmitting concurrently. If Lucifer transmits
during the reserved time frame, Alice will still transmit her TEM message, and cause a
collision, and hence an invalid TEM message that Bob can detect.
We build on TEM to develop the TEP pairing protocol. TEP exploits the fact that any at-
tempts to alter or hide a TEM can be detected. Thus, given a pairing window, any attempt
by an adversary to interfere with the pairing exchange translates into either an increase in
the number of TEM messages or some invalid TEM messages. This allows the pairing de-
vices to detect the attack and indicate to the user that pairing has failed and that she should
retry. The cost of such a mechanism is that the user has to wait for a pre-determined du-
ration of the pairing window. In §5.4.4, we describe how one may eliminate this wait by
having a user push the button on a device a second time.
This work formalizes the above ideas to address possible interactions between the pair-
ing devices, adversaries, and other users of the medium, and formally proves that the
resulting protocol is secure against MITM attacks. Further, we build a prototype of TEP as
an extension to the Ath5k wireless driver, and evaluate it using off-the-shelf 802.11 Atheros
chipsets. Our findings are as follows:
" TEP can be accurately realized using existing OS and 802.11 hardware. Specifically,
our prototype sender can schedule silent and occupied slots at a resolution of 40ps,
and its 9 5 th percentile scheduling error is as low as 1.65ps. Our prototype receiver
can sense the medium's occupancy over periods as small as 20ps and can distinguish
occupied slots ("1" bits) from silent slots ("0" bits) with a zero error rate.
" Results from running the protocol on our campus network and applying the traces
from the network during the SIGCOMM 2010 conference, show that TEP never con-
fuses honest 802.11 traffic for an attack. Furthermore, though our implementation
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is for 802.11, it can coexist with nearby Bluetooth devices which do not respect TEP
silent slots. In this case, TEP can still exchange a key using 1.4 attempts, on average.
Contributions: This work presents, to our knowledge, the first wireless pairing protocol
that defeats MITM attacks without any key distribution or out-of-band channels. It does
so by introducing TEM, a new key exchange message constructed in a manner that ensures
an adversary can neither hide the fact that a message was transmitted, nor alter its payload
without being detected. Our protocol is prototyped using off-the-shelf 802.11 devices and
evaluated in production WiFi networks.
U 5.1 Related Work
There has been a lot of interest in user-friendly secure wireless pairing, which has led to a
number of innovative solutions [26, 98, 19, 132, 60, 118, 97]. TEP builds on this foundational
work. However, TEP is the first to provide a secure pairing scheme that defeats MITM
attacks without out-of-band channels, or key distribution or verification.
Closest to TEP is the work on integrity codes [24], which protects the integrity of a mes-
sage's payload by inserting a particular pattern of ON-OFF slots. Integrity codes, however,
assume a dedicated out-of-band wireless channel. In contrast, on shared channels, honest
nodes may disturb the ON-OFF pattern by acquiring the medium during the OFF slots.
Further, the attacker can hide the fact that a message was transmitted altogether, by us-
ing collisions or a capture effect. We build on integrity codes, but introduce TEM, a new
communication primitive that not only protects payload integrity but also ensures that an
attacker cannot hide that a message was transmitted. We further construct TEP by integrat-
ing TEM with the 802.11 standard, the PBC protocol, and the existing OS network stack.
Finally, we implement TEP on off-the-shelf WiFi devices and evaluate it in operational
networks.
TEP is also related to work on secure pairing, which traditionally required the user to
either enter passwords or PINs [22, 70], or distribute public keys (e.g., STS [37], Radius in
802.11i [71], or any other public key infrastructure). These solutions are appropriate for
enterprise networks and for a certain class of home users who are comfortable with se-
curity setup. However, the need to ease security setup for non-technical home users has
motivated multiple researchers to propose alternative solutions for secure pairing. Most
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Figure 5-2: A timeline depicting the operation of Push Button Configuration (PBC) between an enrollee
and a registrar.
previous solutions use a trusted out-of-band communication channel for key exchange.
The simplest channel is a physical wired connection between the two devices. Other vari-
ants of out-of-band channels include the use of a display and a camera [98], an audio-based
channel [60], an infra-red channel [19], a tactile channel [132], or an accelerometer-based
channel [97]. While these proposals protect against MITM attacks, many devices cannot
incorporate such channels due to size, power, or cost limitations. In contrast, TEP eases the
security setup for home users and defeats MITM attacks, without any out-of-band channel.
Finally, multiple user studies [146, 81, 109] have emphasized the difficulty in pairing
devices for ordinary users. Our work is motivated by these studies. TEP requires the
user to just push a button on each device-exactly as in PBC-and does not require any
additional user involvement in key generation or verification.
* 5.2 PBC and 802.11 Background
M 5.2.1 Push Button Configuration
The WiFi-Alliance introduced the Push Button Configuration (PBC) mechanism to ease
the security setup process for ordinary users, and to deal with devices that do not have an
interface to enter passwords or PINs. In this section, we provide an overview of how PBC
works.
Consider a home user who wants to associate an enrollee (PBC's term for the new device,
e.g., a gaming console) with a registrar (PBC's term for, effectively, the access point). The
user first pushes a button on the enrollee and then, within 120 seconds (called the walk
time), pushes the button on the registrar. Once the buttons are pushed on the two devices,
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the devices perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish a secret key.
As shown in Fig. 5-2, once the button is pushed on the enrollee, it periodically sends
probes [1461 requesting replies from registrars whose PBC button has been pressed. Once
the enrollee receives a reply, it makes a note of the reply and continues to scan all the 802.11
channels for additional replies. If the enrollee receives replies from more than one registrar,
across all 802.11 channels, it raises a session overlap error, indicating that the user should
try again later. On the other hand, if it receives a reply from only one registrar, it proceeds
with the registration protocol, using the Diffie-Hellman key from that one reply.
A registrar, for its part, stays on its dedicated channel, and replies to probe requests only
if the user has pushed its PBC button. Once the button is pushed, the registrar replies to
PBC requests from potential enrollees. To detect conflicts, the registrar checks for requests
in the last 120 seconds. If there are requests from more than one enrollee, the registrar
signals a session overlap error and refuses to perform the PBC registration protocol, re-
quiring the user to retry. If there was only one enrollee request, the registrar proceeds with
the registration protocol using the Diffie-Hellman public key from that one request.
While PBC's use of Diffie-Hellman protects the devices from eavesdropper attacks, an
active adversary can hide or change any of the messages, by resorting to collisions, capture
effect attacks, or hogging the medium and delaying these messages. This allows an adver-
sary to gain access to the user's registrar (e.g., their home network), the enrollee device, or
to intercept and alter any future messages between the enrollee and registrar. Defending
against such adversaries requires a system that is robust to MITM attacks, which is the
main contribution of TEP.
0 5.2.2 802.11
Since our protocol involves low-level details of the 802.11 standard, we summarize the rel-
evant aspects of 802.11 in this section. 802.11 requires nodes to sense the wireless medium
for energy, and transmit only in its absence. 802.11 nodes can transmit using a range of bit
rates, with the minimum bit rate of 1 Mbps. Coupling this with the fact that the maximum
packet size used by higher layers is typically 1500 bytes, an honest node can occupy the
channel for a maximum of 12 ms. 802.11 requires back-to-back packets to be separated by
an interval called the DCF Inter-Frame Spacing (DIFS), whose value can be 34pus, 50ps, or
28ps, depending on whether the network uses 802.11a, b, or g. 802.11 acknowledgment
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Term Definition
Tamper-evident message A wireless message whose presence and the integrity of its payload are guaran-
teed to be detected by every receiver within radio range (Figure 5-1).
Synchronization packet An exceptionally long packet whose presence indicates a TEM. To detect a syn-
chronization packet, it is sufficient to detect that the medium is continuously
occupied for the duration of the synchronization packet, which is 19 ms.
Payload packet The part of a TEM containing the data payload (e.g., a device public key).
ON-OFF slot The interval used to convey one bit from sender to receiver. The slot time is
40ps. The bits in the slots are balanced, as described in §5.4.1.
Occupied/ON slot A slot during which the medium is busy with a transmission.
Silent/OFF slot A slot during which the medium is idle.
Sensing window The interval over which the receiver collects aggregate information for whether
the medium is occupied or silent.
Fractional occupancy The fraction of time the medium was busy during a sensing window.
Table 5-1: Terminology used to describe TIMO.
packets, however, can be transmitted after a shorter duration of 10ps, called the Short
Inter-Frame Spacing (SIFS).
* 5.3 Security Model
TEP addresses the problem of authenticating key exchange messages between two wireless
devices, in the presence of an active adversary that may try to mount a man-in-the-middle
attack.
* 5.3.1 Threat Model
The adversary can eavesdrop on all the signals on the channel, including all prior com-
munications. The adversary can also be active and transmit with an arbitrary power, at
any time, thereby corrupting or overpowering other concurrent transmissions. The adver-
sary may know the TEP protocol, the precise times when devices transmit their announce-
ments, and their exact locations. In addition, the adversary can know the exact channel
between the pairing devices, and the channel from the pairing devices to the adversary.
The adversary can also be anywhere in the network and is free to move. Multiple adver-
saries may exist in the network and can collude with each other.
The adversary can have access to state-of-the-art RF technologies: he can have a multi-
antenna system, he may be able to simultaneously receive and transmit signals, and he
can use directional antennas to ensure that only one of the pairing devices can hear its
transmissions.
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The adversary, however, does not have physical control over the pairing devices or their
surroundings. Specifically, the adversary cannot place either of the two devices in a Fara-
day cage to shield all signals. We also assume that the adversary cannot break traditional
cryptographic constructs, such as collision-resistant hash functions.
Finally, we assume that the PBC buttons operate according to the PBC standard [146]
and that the user performs the PBC pairing as prescribed in the standard, i.e., the user puts
the two devices in range then pushes the buttons on the two devices within 120 seconds of
each other.
* 5.3.2 Security Guarantees
Under the assumptions outlined above, TEM guarantees that an adversary cannot tamper
with the payload of a TEM message, or mask the fact that a TEM message was transmit-
ted. Building on the TEM mechanism, TEP guarantees that in the absence of an active
adversary, two pairing devices can establish secure pairing. In the presence of an adver-
sary who is actively mounting MITM attacks (or in the presence of more than two devices
attempting to pair at the same time), TEP ensures that the pairing devices will signal an
error and never be tricked into pairing with the adversary (or, more generally, with the
wrong device). In other words, TEP provides the PBC security guarantees augmented
with protection against MITM attacks.
* 5.4 TEP Design
TEP's design is based upon the TEM mechanism, a uni-directional announcement proto-
col that guarantees that adversaries cannot tamper with or mask TEM messages without
detection. TEP uses TEM to exchange public keys between the PBC enrollee and registrar
in a way that resists MITM attacks. At a high level, when an enrollee enters PBC mode, it
sends out a TEM message containing its public key. When a registrar in PBC mode receives
this message (or suspects that an adversary may have tried to tamper with or mask such
a message), it responds with its own public key. Both the enrollee and the registrar col-
lect all TEM messages received during PBC's walk time period. If, during that time, each
received exactly one unique public key (and no tampered messages), they can conclude
that this public key came from the other party, and can use it for pairing. Otherwise, PBC
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2 bit 128 bits
Figure 5-3: Data encoded in the ON-OFF slots. The first two bits specify the direction of the message, and
the rest of the bits contain a cryptographic hash of the payload.
reports a session overlap error (e.g., because multiple enrollees or registrars were pairing
at the same time, or because an adversary interfered), and asks the user to retry.
The rest of this section describes our protocol in more detail, starting with the TEM
mechanism, using terminology defined in Table 5-1.
E 5.4.1 Tamper-Evident Message (TEM)
The goal of TEM is to guarantee that if an attacker tampers with the payload of a TEM
message, or tries to mask the fact that a message was transmitted at all, a TEM receiver
within communication range will detect such tampering. In other words, TEM receivers
will always detect when a TEM message was, or may have been, transmitted.
To provide this guarantee, TEM messages have a specialized structure, as shown in
Figure 5-1. First, there is a synchronization packet, which protects the TEM's transmission
from being masked, by unambiguously indicating to a TEM receiver that a TEM message
follows. The synchronization packet contains random data, to ensure that an adversary
cannot cancel out its energy.1
Second, the TEM message contains the announcement payload. The payload is always
of fixed length, to ensure that an adversary cannot truncate or extend the payload in flight,
but otherwise has no restrictions on its content or encoding. In our pairing protocol, the
payload of a TEM message contains the sender's Diffie-Hellman public key, along with
other registration information.
Third, the TEM message contains ON-OFF slots, which guarantee that any tampering
with a TEM payload is detectable. Similar to the synchronization packet, the content of the
ON slots is randomized. The first two slots, as shown in Fig. 5-3, encode the direction flag,
which defines whether this TEM message was sent by an enrollee (called a TEM request,
flag value "10") or by a registrar (called a TEM reply, flag value "01"). The remaining slots
'In practice, it is very hard to cancel a signal in flight but in theory an attacker that knows the transmitted
signal and the channels to the receiver can construct a signal that cancels out the original signal at the receiver.
Making the data random eliminates this option.
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contain a cryptographic hash of the payload. While it is possible to also encode the payload
using slots, it would be inefficient for long payloads, and unnecessary, since protecting a
cryptographic hash suffices. To detect tampering, TEM encodes all slots in a way that
guarantees that exactly half of the slots are silent, as we describe in §5.4.1.
(a) Detecting Tampering
To determine if an adversary may have tampered with a TEM message, a TEM receiver
performs several checks. First, the receiver continuously monitors the medium for possi-
ble synchronization packets. If it detects any burst of energy at least as long as the syn-
chronization packet, it interprets it as the start of a TEM announcement. The receiver
conservatively assumes that any such period of energy is a TEM message, and signals a
missed message if it is unable to decode and verify the subsequent payload. To minimize
false positives, we choose a synchronization packet that is longer than any regular con-
tiguous WiFi transmission. An adversary cannot cancel out a legitimate synchronization
packet because the adversary cannot eliminate the power on the channel. In fact, since the
payload of the synchronization packet is random, the adversary cannot cancel the power
from the packet even if he knows the exact channel between Alice and Bob, and is fully
synchronized with the transmitter. Thus, an adversary cannot tamper with the presence of
a TEM message by masking it out.
Second, once a TEM receiver detects the start of a TEM announcement, it attempts to
decode the payload packet and the hash bits in the ON-OFF slots. If the receiver cannot
decode the payload (i.e., the packet checksum fails), it indicates tampering. If the payload
is decoded, the receiver verifies that the hash bits match the hash of the payload- i.e., it
verifies that hashing the payload produces the same bits in the ON-OFF slots and that the
number of ON slots is equal to that of OFF slots. If the receiver cannot verify the hash
bits, it conservatively assumes that an adversary is tampering with the transmission. Once
tampering is detected, the receiver signals a session overlap error (as in PBC), requiring
the user to retry later.
(b) Balancing the ON-OFF Slots
An adversary can transform an OFF slot to an ON slot (by transmitting in it) but cannot
transform an ON slot to an OFF slot. Hence, to ensure that the adversary cannot tamper
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with even a single OFF slot without being detected, we make the number of the OFF slots
in a TEM message equal to that of the ON slots, i.e., we balance the slots. The number of
slots is fixed by the TEP protocol, thus avoiding truncation or extension attacks. Since the
direction flag is already encoded in two balanced bits, we now focus on balancing the rest
of the slots.
Our balancing algorithm takes the hash bits of the TEM payload and produces a bal-
anced bit sequence to be sent in the ON-OFF slots. One inefficient but simple transfor-
mation is to use Manchester encoding of the hash bits to produce a balanced output bit
sequence with twice as many output bits. TEM, however, introduces an efficient encod-
ing that takes an even number, N, of input bits and produces M = N + 2 [logN] output
bits which have an equal number of zeros and ones. The details of our efficient encoding
algorithm are presented in [53].
(c) Interoperating with 802.11
To interoperate with other 802.11 devices that may not be TEM-aware, the ON-OFF slots
are preceded by a CTS-to-SELF packet, which reserves the medium for the TEM message.
This serves two purposes. First, since the sender does not transmit during the OFF slots,
another 802.11 node could sense the wireless medium to be idle for more than a DIFS
period, and start transmitting its own packet during that OFF slot. The 802.11 standard
requires 802.11 nodes that hear a CTS-to-SELF on the channel to abstain from transmitting
for the period mentioned in that packet, which will ensure that no legitimate transmission
overlaps with the slots. Second, in case of a TEM message from an enrollee to a potential
registrar, the CTS-to-SELF packet reserves the medium so that the registrar can immedi-
ately reply with its own TEM message. This prevents legitimates nodes from hogging the
medium and delaying the registrar's response. However, reserving the channel for the
entire length of a TEM message is inefficient, if no registrar is present. To avoid under-
utilization of the wireless medium, the enrollee's CTS-to-SELF only reserves the channel
for a DIFS period past its slot transmissions. If a PBC-activated registrar is present, it must
start transmitting its response message within the DIFS period. On the other hand, if there
is no registrar, other legitimate devices will resume transmissions promptly.
To maximize the probability that all devices can decode the CTS-to-SELF, it is transmit-
ted at the most robust bit rate of 1 Mbps. Current 802.11 implementations obey a CTS-to-
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SELF that reserves the channel up to 32 ms. Our TEM message requires 144 slots,2 and the
slot duration is 40 ps (@5.5). This translates to about 5.8 ms, which is less than the 32 ms
allowed by the CTS-to-SELF.
Finally, as shown in Figure 5-1, there is a gap between the synchronization and pay-
load packets. If this gap is large, other 802.11 nodes would sense an idle wireless medium,
and start transmitting, thus appearing to tamper with the TEM. To avoid this, we exploit
the fact that 802.11 nodes are only allowed to transmit if they find the medium continu-
ously idle for a DIFS. Thus, a TEM sender sends the payload packet immediately after the
synchronization packet with a gap of a SIFS, which is much less than DIFS.
(d) API Summary
For the sender side, TEM provides a single blocking function,
* void TEMSEND (bool dir, str msg, time t),
which sends an announcement containing payload msg. The dir flag specifies the direction
of the message, that is, whether it is a request message (from the enrollee) or a reply mes-
sage (from the registrar). Time t specifies the deadline by which the message must start
transmission. The TEM sender tries to respect carrier-sense in the medium access control
(MAC) protocol, and waits until the medium is idle before transmitting its message. How-
ever, if the message cannot be transmitted by time t (e.g., because an adversary is hogging
the medium), the sender overrides the MAC's carrier-sense, and transmits the announce-
ment anyway, so that recipients will detect tampering. Note that the CTS-to-SELF requires
honest nodes to release the medium for the registrar to transmit its own TEM reply.
For the receiver side, TEM provides two functions,
* handle TEMRECVSTART (bool dir), and
* msglist TEMRECVGET (handle h).
The first function, TEMRECV-START, starts listening on the wireless medium for TEM
messages that are either requests (from an enrollee) or replies (from a registrar), based on
the dir flag. The second function, TEMRECVGET, is used to retrieve the set of messages
2Two of the slots are for the direction bit, and the remaining 142 are for the bit-balanced hash bits. More
specifically, the bit balancing algorithm, in §5.4.1, takes N input bits and outputs N + 2 [logN] bits. Since the
hash is a 128 bit function, the bit balancing algorithm produces 142 bit balanced hash bits.
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accumulated by the receiver since TEMRECVSTART or TEMRECVGET was last invoked.
If TEM-RECV-GET could not decode a possible TEM message (or verify that it was not tam-
pered with), it returns a special value RETRY, which causes the caller (i.e., TEP) to re-run
its protocol. As an optimization, if all of the TEM messages that TEMRECV-GET was un-
able to decode were overlapping with the receiver's own transmissions (i.e., a concurrent
TEM-SEND), TEMRECVGET returns a special value OVERLAP instead of RETRY. We de-
scribe in §5.5.4 how a node detects TEM messages that overlap with its own transmissions,
and in [53] how we use the overlap information to optimize wireless medium utilization.
U 5.4.2 Securing PBC using TEM
Using the TEM mechanism, we will now describe how TEP-a modified version of the
PBC protocol-avoids man-in-the-middle attacks.
Once the button is pressed on the enrollee, the enrollee repeatedly scans the 802.11
channels in a round robin manner, as in the current PBC protocol. On each channel, the
enrollee transmits a TEM request, i.e., a TEM message with the direction flag set to "10".
The TEM request contains the enrollee's public key (and any PBC information included in
an enrollee's probe). If an adversary continuously occupies the medium for tx-tmo (e.g.,
1 second), the enrollee overrides carrier-sense and transmits its message anyway. The en-
rollee then waits for a TEM response from a registrar, which is required to immediately
respond. The enrollee records the responses, if any, and after a specified period on each
channel it moves to the next 802.11 channel and repeats the process. The enrollee contin-
ues to cycle through all 802.11 channels for PBC's walk time period. The enrollee's logic
corresponds to the following pseudo-code to build up r, the set of registrar responses:
r <- 0
for 120 sec + #channels x (titmo + 2 x tem-duration) do > walk time + max enrollee scan
period
switch to next 802.11 channel
h +- TEMRECV-START (reply)
TEMSEND (request, enroll-info, now + txztmo)
SLEEP (tem-duration)
r +- r U TEMRECVGET (h)
end for
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A registrar follows a similar protocol. Once the PBC button is pressed, the registrar
starts listening for possible TEM requests on its 802.11 channel. Every time a TEM mes-
sage is received, the registrar records the message payload, and immediately sends its own
TEM message in response, containing the registrar's public key. It is safe to reply imme-
diately because the sender's TEM message ended with a CTS-to-SELF, which reserved the
medium for the registrar's reply. The registrar's pseudo-code to build up e, the set of
enrollee messages, is as follows:
e <- 0
h <- TEMRECVSTART (request)
for 120 sec + #channels x (tx-tmo + 2 x tem-duration) do > walk time + max enrollee scan
period
m- TEMRECVGET (h)
if m 7 0 then > enrollee, RETRY, or OVERLAP
e <- e U m
TEMSEND (reply, registrar-info, now)
> send reply immediately
end if
end for
After the PBC's walk time expires, both the enrollee and the registrar check the list
of received messages. Successful pairing requires that both the enrollee and the registrar
receive exactly one unique public key via TEM messages, and that no messages were tam-
pered with (i.e., TEMRECVGET never returned RETRY or OVERLAP). If exactly one public
key was received, it must have been the public key of the other party, and TEP can safely
proceed with pairing. If more than one public key was received, or RETRY or OVERLAP
was returned, then a session overlap error is raised, indicating that more than one pair
of devices may be attempting to pair, or that an adversary is mounting an attack. In this
situation, the user must retry pairing.
(a) Reducing Medium Occupancy
The protocol described above is correct and secure (as we will prove in 55.6.1). However,
it can be inefficient if somehow multiple registrars transmit overlapping replies at almost
the same time. Each of them will then assume it may have missed a request from some
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Figure 5-4: Timelines of five example runs of the TIMO protocol.
enrollee (since it sensed a concurrent TEM message), and each will re-send its reply. This
cycle may continue for the walk time of 120 seconds, unnecessarily occupying the wireless
medium. In [53], we describe an optimization that avoids this situation and we prove that
the optimized protocol maintains the same security guarantees.
M 5.4.3 Example scenarios
Figure 5-4 shows how TEP works in five potential scenarios. In scenario (a), there is no at-
tacker. In this case, the enrollee sends a request to which the registrar replies immediately.
The two devices can thus proceed to complete pairing after 120 seconds. In scenario (b),
the enrollee transmits its request, but the attacker immediately jams it so that the registrar
can not decode the enrollee's request. However, the registrar detects a long burst of energy,
which the registrar interprets as a TEM announcement, causing it to reply to the enrollee.
In scenario (c), the enrollee sends the request; the attacker then captures the medium
at the same time as the registrar, and transmits a reply, at a high power, impersonating
the registrar. Because of capture effect, the enrollee decodes the message payload from the
attacker. But since the registrar and the attacker transmit the hash function of different
messages in the ON-OFF slots, the enrollee notes that the slots do not have equal number
of zeros and ones and hence detects tampering with the announcement.
's request
In scenario (d), the adversary sends a request message in an attempt to gain access to
the registrar; as stipulated by TEP, the registrar replies to this request. However, since
the registrar waits for 120 seconds before completing the pairing, it also hears the request
from the enrollee. Since the registrar receives requests from two devices, it raises a session
overlap error.
Finally, in scenario (e), the adversary sends a TEM request, receives the registrar's reply,
and then continuously jams the enrollee using a directional antenna. By using a directional
antenna, the adversary ensures that the registrar does not detect the jamming signal and
hence does not interpret it as an invalid TEM. The enrollee carrier-senses, detects that
the medium is occupied, and does not transmit until it times out after txtmo seconds, at
which point it ignores carrier sense and transmits its TEM request. The registrar listens to
this request message and detects the presence of the enrollee. Since the registrar receives
requests from two devices, it raises a session overlap error.
N 5.4.4 Making Pairing Faster
The extension of PBC to use TEM, described above, requires the enrollee and registrar to
wait for 120 seconds before completing the association process. If the enrollee does not
wait for a full 120 seconds, and simply picks the first responding registrar, it may pick
an adversary's registrar-a legitimate registrar only replies when its PBC button has been
pushed, and the user might push the registrar's PBC button slightly later than the en-
rollee's. Because the enrollee does not know if the user has already pushed the registrar's
button, it has to wait for 120 seconds to be sure that the user has pushed the button. In this
section, we describe how one can eliminate this delay.
First, if the user always pushes the enrollee's button before the registrar's button, then
the registrar does not need to wait for 120 seconds; the registrar needs to wait for just the
time it takes an enrollee to cycle through all of 802.11's channels (which is less than 12s).
Second, we can also eliminate the enrollee's wait time. Specifically, if the user explicitly
tells the enrollee that the registrar's button was pushed, the enrollee can complete the
association process after one cycle through the 802.11 channels, eliminating the additional
wait time.
For example, one approach would be to have the user first press the button on the
enrollee, then press the button on the registrar, and then again push the button on the
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enrollee. Note that, in this approach, the registrar does not have to wait for 120 seconds:
because the registrar's button is always pushed after the enrollee, the registrar knows that
the enrollee is active, and is guaranteed to see the enrollee's TEM message within the
time required for the enrollee to cycle through all 802.11 channels. (Of course, if the 120
second period expires on the enrollee without any additional button pushes, the enrollee
can proceed to completion as before, with 2 total button pushes from the user.)
* 5.5 TEM on Off-the-shelf Hardware
We implement TEM on Atheros AR5001X+ chipsets by modifying the ath5k driver, and
running TEM's timing-sensitive code in a kernel driver.
M 5.5.1 Scheduling Slot Transmission
To reduce the air time of a TEM, we must minimize the size of a single slot packet in the
ON-OFF slots. Since the slot packet's payload need not be decoded (just the presence or
absence of a slot packet conveys a 1 or 0 bit), we transmit slot packets at the highest bitrate,
54 Mbps, for a total of 40 ps.
In addition to reducing the size of a slot packet, TEM must transmit slot packets at
precise slot boundaries. Queueing in the kernel and carrier-sense in the card make precise
transmission timing challenging. We avoid kernel queueing by implementing TEM in a
kernel driver and using high-resolution timers. We avoid delays in the wireless card itself
through several changes to the card firmware and driver, as follows. For the duration of the
slots, we disable binary exponential backoff (802.11 BEB) by setting CWMIN and CWMAX
to 1. To prevent carrier-sense backoff, we disable automatic noise calibration by setting the
noise floor register to "high". We place slot packets in the high-priority queue. Finally, we
disable the transmitter's own beacons by disabling the beacon queue. In aggregate, these
changes allow us to make slot packets as short as 40 ps and maintain accurate slot timing.
* 5.5.2 Energy Detection at the Receiver
A TEM receiver detects a synchronization packet and distinguishes ON from OFF slots by
checking the energy level on the medium. Hence, the receiver needs to distinguish the
noise level, which is around -90dB, from an actual transmission. To do this, we set the
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noise floor to -90dB and deactivate auto-calibration while running TEP.3
While an ideal receiver would detect energy at the finest resolution (i.e., every sig-
nal sample), existing wireless chipsets do not give access to these samples. Instead,
we exploit two registers provided by the ath5k firmware: AR5K_PROFCNT_CYCLE and
AR5K_PROFCNTRXCLR. The first register is incremented every clock cycle based on the
clock on the wireless hardware. The second register on the other hand is increment only if
the hardware finds high energy during that clock cycle.
Using these registers, we define a sensing window (SW) as the interval over which the
receiver collects aggregate information for whether the medium is occupied or silent, as
defined in Table 5-1. At the beginning of a SW, a TEM receiver resets both registers to 0,
and reads them at the end of the SW. The ratio of these two registers at the end of the
SW, A5-RFN-X , is defined as thefractional occupancy. By putting a threshold on
the fractional occupancy, a TEM receiver can detect whether the medium is occupied in a
particular SW, and hence can detect energy bursts and measure their durations in units of
the sensing window. Similar to the sender, a TEM receiver runs in the kernel to precisely
schedule sensing windows.
Our implementation dynamically adjusts the length of the sensing window to minimize
system overhead. The TEM receiver uses a long sensing window of 2 ms, until it detects a
burst of energy longer than 17 ms. This indicates a synchronization packet, at which point
the receiver switches to a 20 ps sensing window to accurately measure energy during slots,
providing on average two sensing window measurements for every slot.
The receiver must be careful to ensure that a 20 ps sensing window allows accurate
detection of slot occupancy. But, because the sender and receiver are not synchronized,
sensing windows may not be aligned with slots, and in the worst case, will be off by half
a sensing window, i.e., 10 ps. However, having a sensing window that is half the length of
a slot ensures that at least one of every two sensing windows is completely within a slot
(i.e., does not cross a slot boundary). Thus, to measure slot occupancy, the receiver com-
pares the variance of odd-numbered sensing window measurements and even-numbered
3 There is a tradeoff between the noise floor and the permissible distance between the pairing devices. In
particular, pairing devices separated by large distances have a weak signal and hence, to ensure detection, the
noise floor should be set to a low value. On the other hand, pairing devices that are closer have a stronger
signal, and hence the noise floor can be set to a higher value. We pick -90dB because it is the default noise
floor value in typical WiFi implementations. Manufacturers, however, can pick a higher default value, as long
as the pairing devices are placed closer to each other.
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sensing window measurements, and uses the one with the highest variance. Because the
slots are bit-balanced, the correct sequence will have an equal number of ones and zeros,
having the higher variance.
This technique for measuring slot occupancy is secure in the presence of an adversary.
As we will prove in Proposition 5.6.1, an adversary can introduce energy, but cannot cancel
energy in an occupied slot. Thus, the adversary can only increase - but cannot reduce-
the computed occupancy ratios in either the odd or the even windows. As a result, the
adversary cannot create a different bit sequence in either the odd or even windows which
still has an equal number of ones and zeros. Thus, sampling at twice the slot rate maintains
TEM's security guarantees.
M 5.5.3 Sending A Synchronization Packet
To transmit a long synchronization packet, TEM transmits the maximum-sized packet al-
lowed by our hardware (2400 bytes) at the lowest bit rate (1 Mbps), resulting in a 19 ms syn-
chronization packet. While many receivers drop such long packets (the maximum packet
size permissible by the higher layers is 1500 bytes), this does not affect a TEM receiver,
since it does not need to decode the packet; it only needs to detect a long burst of energy.
* 5.5.4 Checking for TEM While Transmitting
While executing the TEP protocol (which lasts for 120 seconds), a node must detect TEM
messages transmitted by other nodes even if they overlap with its own transmissions. We
distinguish two cases: First, when the node transmits a standard 802.11 packet, it conser-
vatively assumes that the channel has been occupied by part of a synchronization packet
for the duration of its transmission. The node samples the medium before and after its
transmission, checking for continuous occupancy by a synchronization packet. As our
evaluation shows (§5.6.3), the longest packets in operational WiFi networks are about 4 ms
(a collision of two packets sent at the lowest 802.11g rate of 6 Mb/s), making synchroniza-
tion packet false positives unlikely even with the conservative assumption that the entire
4 ms transmission overlapped with part of a synchronization packet (19 ms). 4
Second, a node that is transmitting a TEM request must not miss a concurrently trans-
4Note that even if some networks have normal packets that are much larger than 4 ms, this may create false
positives but does not affect the security of the protocol.
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mitted TEM reply, and similarly a node that is transmitting a reply must not miss a concur-
rent request. To detect partially-overlapping TEM messages, a node samples the medium
before and after every synchronization packet, and after the slots of every TEM message,
and if it detects energy, it assumes that it may have missed an overlapping TEM message
(and thus, TEMRECVGET will return OVERLAP, unless it observes other possibly-missed
messages, in which case it will return RETRY.) Since the total length of the ON-OFF slots is
shorter than the length of the synchronization packet, sampling the medium after the end
of a synchronization packet (i.e., before the start of the payload and slots) and after the end
of the slots suffices to detect an overlapping synchronization packet. Finally, in the case
when two TEM messages are perfectly synchronized, the node uses the direction bits to
detect a collision. Since the direction flag for a request is "10" and a reply "01", the node
checks for this scenario by checking the energy level during the OFF slot in the direction
field in its own transmission. If the OFF slot shows a high energy level, TEMRECVGET
will return OVERLAP (or RETRY, if there are other missed messages).
M 5.6 Evaluation
We evaluate TEP along three axes: security, accuracy, and performance. Our findings are:
" TEP is provably secure to MITM attacks.
" TEP can be accurately realized using existing OS and 802.11 hardware. Specifically,
our prototype sender can schedule ON-OFF slots at a resolution of 40ps, and its 9 5 th
percentile scheduling error is as low as 1.65pus. Our prototype receiver can sense the
medium's occupancy over periods as small as 20ps and can distinguish ON slots
from OFF slots with a zero error rate.
" Results from two operational networks-our campus network and SIGCOMM
2010-show that TIMO never confuses cross traffic for an attack. Further, even in
the presence of Bluetooth devices which do not obey CTS-to-SELF and may transmit
during TEP's OFF slots, TEP can perform key exchange in 1.4 attempts, on average.
* 5.6.1 Evaluating TEP's Security
We analyze TEP's security using the threat model in 55.3.1. To do so, we formally state our
definitions, then prove that a TEM is tamper resistant and that wireless pairing using TEP
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is secure to MITM attacks.
Definition Tamper evident: A message is said to be tamper evident if an adversary can
neither change the message's content without being detected nor hide the fact that the
message has been transmitted.
Before we proceed to prove that a TEM is tamper evident we first prove the following
proposition about the capability of an adversary.
Proposition 5.6.1 Let s(t) be the transmitted signal, and h(t) be the channel impulse function.
Assuming the transmitted signal is unpredictable, and the receiver is within radio range of the
sender, an adversary cannot cancel the signal energy at the receiver even if he knows the channel
function between the sender and receiver, h(t).
Proof. The received signal is a convolution of the transmitted signal and the channel
impulse function, plus the adversary's signal a(t), plus white Gaussian noise n(t), i.e.,
r(t) = h(t) * s(t) + a(t) + n(t). To cancel the received energy, the adversary needs to pro-
duce a signal a(t) so that r(t) n(t), or equivalently, h(t) * s(t) + a(t) < n(t). Since the
receiver is within radio range of the sender, we know h(t) * s(t) > n(t), and, since n(t)
is physically unpredictable, that a(t) - -h(t) * s(t). But an adversary that can compute
such an a(t) directly contradicts our assumption that s(t) is unpredictable, and thus an
adversary cannot compute such an a(t).
Since the synchronization packet and ON slots have random contents, Prop. 5.6.1 im-
plies that an adversary cannot hide the channel energy during the transmission of the
synchronization packet or the ON slots from a receiver. Based on this result we proceed to
prove the following:
Proposition 5.6.2 Given the transmitter and receiver are within range, and the receiver is sensing
the medium, a TEM, described in 5.4.1, is tamper evident.
Proof. We prove Prop. 5.6.2 by contradiction. Assume that one party, Alice, sends a TEM to
a second party, Bob. Suppose that Alice's TEM to Bob fails to be tamper-evident. This can
happen because the adversary succeeds either in hiding from Bob that Alice sent a TEM,
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or in changing the TEM content without being detected by Bob. To hide Alice's TEM,
the adversary must convince Bob that no synchronization packet was transmitted. This
requires the adversary to cancel the energy of the synchronization packet at Bob, which
contradicts Prop. 5.6.1. Thus, the adversary must have changed the announcement.
Suppose the adversary changed the data encoded in the slots. Prop. 5.6.1 says that the
adversary cannot cancel the energy in an ON slot, and hence cannot change an ON slot
to an OFF slot. Since the number of ON and OFF slots is balanced, the adversary cannot
change the slots without increasing the number of ON slots, and thus being detected. Thus,
the only alternative is that the adversary must have changed the message packet. Since the
ON-OFF slots include a cryptographic hash of the message, this means that the adversary
constructed a different message packet with the same hash as the original message packet.
This contradicts our assumption that the hash is collision-resistant. Thus, the adversary
cannot alter the announcement content, and TEM is tamper-evident. U
Although Prop. 5.6.2 guarantees that a TEM message is tamper-evident if the receiver
is sensing the medium, the receiver may be transmitting its own message at the same time.
We now prove that a TEM is tamper-evident even if the receiver transmits.
Proposition 5.6.3 Given a receiver (Bob) that can send its own messages, a TEM sent by a trans-
mitter (Alice) in range of the receiver is tamper-evident, if the receiver follows the concurrent-
transmission protocol of §5.5.4, and the receiver and transmitter send TEM messages with different
directions (request or reply).
Proof. If Bob detects the synchronization packet (SP) of Alice's TEM, the TEM is tamper-
evident: either Bob refrains from sending during that TEM, in which case Prop. 5.6.2 ap-
plies, or Bob transmits concurrently, and TEM.RECVGET will return RETRY or OVERLAP
If Bob fails to detect Alice's SP, it must have happened while Bob was sending his own
message (otherwise, Prop. 5.6.2 applies). Since regular 802.11 packets are shorter than a SP,
and g5.5.4 conservatively assumes the medium was occupied for the entire duration of the
transmitted packet, Bob could not have missed a SP while sending a regular packet. Thus,
the only remaining option is that Alice's SP overlapped with a TEM sent by Bob.
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Consider four cases for when Alice's SP was sent in relation to the SP of Bob's TEM.
First, if Alice's SP started before Bob's SP, Bob would detect energy before starting to trans-
mit his SP and return OVERLAP or RETRY (§5.5.4), making the TEM tamper-evident. Sec-
ond, if Alice's SP started exactly at the same time as Bob's SP, Bob would detect energy
during the direction bits and return OVERLAP or RETRY (§5.5.4), making the TEM tamper-
evident. Third, if Alice's SP started during Bob's SP, Bob would detect energy after his SP
and return OVERLAP or RETRY (§5.5.4), making the TEM tamper-evident. Fourth, if Alice's
SP started after Bob's SP ended, Bob would detect energy from Alice's SP after the end
of his TEM slots and return OVERLAP or RETRY (§5.5.4), making the TEM tamper-evident.
Thus, in all cases, the TEM is tamper-evident.
We now prove TEP is secure against a MITM attack.
Proposition 5.6.4 Suppose an enrollee and a registrar are within range, both arefollowing the TEP
protocol as described in §5.4.2 and the user does the stipulated actions required by PBC. Under the
threat model defined in §5.3.1, an adversary cannot convince either the enrollee or the registrar to
accept any public key that is not the legitimate public key of the other device.
Proof. We prove Prop. 5.6.4 by contradiction, considering first the registrar, and then the
enrollee. First, suppose an adversary convinces the registrar to accept a public key other
than that of the enrollee. By §5.4.2, this means the registrar received exactly one public
key (and, thus, did not receive the enrollee's key), and TEMRECV-GET never returned
OVERLAP or RETRY. By assumption, the enrollee and registrar entered PBC mode within
120 seconds of each other, which means they were concurrently running their respective
pseudo-code for at least #channels x (tx-tmo + 2 x tem-duration) seconds, and therefore
the enrollee must have transmitted at least one TEM message on the registrar's channel
while the registrar was listening. Prop. 5.6.3 guarantees that the registrar must have ei-
ther received that one message, or detected tampering (and returned OVERLAP or RETRY),
which contradicts our assumption that the registrar never received the enrollee's message
and never returned OVERLAP or RETRY. Thus, an adversary cannot convince the registrar
to accept a public key other than that of the enrollee.
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Second, suppose an adversary convinces the enrollee to accept a public key other than
that of the registrar. By §5.4.2, this means that the enrollee received exactly one public key
response to its requests (and, thus, did not receive the registrar's key), and TEMRECV-GET
never returned OVERLAP or RETRY. As above, there must have been a time when the reg-
istrar was listening, and the enrollee transmitted its request message on the registrar's
channel. Prop. 5.6.3 guarantees that the registrar must have either received the enrollee's
message, or detected tampering (and returned OVERLAP or RETRY). In both of those cases,
§5.4.2 requires the registrar to send a reply. Prop 5.6.3 similarly guarantees that the enrollee
must have either received the registrar's reply, or detected tampering (and returned OVER-
LAP or RETRY), which directly contradicts our supposition. Thus, an adversary cannot
convince the enrollee to accept a public key other than the registrar's, and TEP is secure.
0 5.6.2 Evaluating TEP's Accuracy
We check whether TEP can be accurately realized using existing operating systems and
off-the-shelf 802.11 hardware. Our experiments use our Ath5K prototype described in §5.5
and run over our campus network. Figure 5-5 shows the locations of the TEP nodes, which
span' 21,080 square feet (1,958 m2 ) with both line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight links.
(a) Transmitter
The performance of TEP hinges on the transmitter accurately scheduling the transmission
of the ON-OFF slots. The difficulty in accurate scheduling arises from the fact that we
want to implement the protocol in software using standard 802.11 chipsets. Hence, we are
limited by the operating system and the hardware interface. For example, if the kernel or
the hardware introduces extra delays between the slot packets, it will alter the bit sequence
conveyed to the receiver, and will cause failures. Given that our slot is 40ps, we need an
accuracy that is on the order of few microseconds. Can we achieve such an accuracy with
existing kernels and chipsets?
Experiment. We focus on the most challenging ON-OFF slot sequence from a schedul-
ing perspective: alternating zeros and ones which requires the maximum scheduling pre-
cision. We set the slot time to 40pts, by sending a packet at the highest bitrate of 54 Mbps.
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Figure 5-5: Locations of nodes (indicated by blue circles) in our experimental testbed, which operates as
part of our campus network.
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Figure 5-6: CDF of TIMO slot scheduling errors. The figure shows that the maximum scheduling error is
1.8 pis which is significantly lower than the slot duration of 40pis.
To measure the produced slots accurately, we capture the signal transmitted by our 802.11
sender using a USRP2 software radio board [72]. Our USRP2 board can measure signal
samples at a resolution of 0.16 p.s, allowing us to accurately compute the duration of the
produced slots. We run the experiment 1000 times for each sender in our testbed and
measure the exact duration of every slot. We then compute the scheduling error as the
difference between the measured slot duration and the intended 40 pbs.
Results. Fig. 5-6 shows the CDF of slot scheduling errors. The figure shows that the
median scheduling error is less than 0.4 ps and the maximum error is 1.8 pus. Thus, despite
operating in software and with existing chipsets, a TEP sender can accurately schedule the
ON-OFF slots at microsecond granularity.
(b) Receiver
TEP's security depends on the receiver's ability to distinguish ON slots from OFF slots. In
this section, we check that given that the receiver is within the sender's radio range (i.e.,
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Figure 5-7: CDFs of the fractional occupancy during ON slots and OFF slots. The figure shows that the two
distributions have no overlap and hence the receiver cannot confuse ON and OFF slots.
can sense the sender's signal), it can clearly distinguish ON slots from OFF slots.
Experiment. In each run, the sender sends a sequence of alternating ON-OFF slots,
using a slot duration of 40 ps. The receiver uses a sensing window of 2 0ps to measure frac-
tional occupancy. This means the receiver has twice as many measurements of fractional
occupancy as there are slots. As explained in §5.5.2, the receiver keeps either the odd or
even measurements depending on which sequence has higher variance. Hence, for each
slot, the receiver has exactly one fractional occupancy measurement. We then compare
the measured fractional occupancy for known ON slots vs. known OFF slots to determine
if the receiver can reliably distinguish between them based on measured fractional occu-
pancy. We randomly pick two nodes in the testbed to be sender and receiver, and repeat
the experiment for various node pairs in the testbed.
Results. Fig. 5-7 plots the CDFs of fractional occupancy for ON slots and OFF slots. The
figure shows that the two CDFs are completely separate; that is, there is no overlap in the
values of fractional occupancy that correspond to OFF slots and those that correspond to
ON slots. Hence, by looking at the fractional occupancy the receiver can perfectly distin-
guish the ON slots from OFF slots. This result shows that a TEP receiver based on current
OSes and 802.11 hardware can accurately decode the ON-OFF slots necessary for TEP.
0 5.6.3 Evaluating TEP's Performance
We are interested in how TEP interacts with cross traffic in an operational network. Cross
traffic does not hamper TEP's security (the proofs in §5.6.1 apply in the presence of cross
traffic). However, cross traffic may cause false positives, where a node incorrectly declares
that a TEP message has been tampered with by an adversary. Such events can unnecessar-
ily delay secure pairing.
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Figure 5-8: CDF of the duration of energy bursts in the SIGCOMM 2010 network and our campus network.
The figure shows that energy bursts caused by normal traffic are much shorter than a TEP synchronization
packet (19 ms). Thus, it is unlikely that TEP will confuse normal traffic as a synchronization packet.
We investigate TEP's interaction with cross traffic using results from two operational
networks: the SIGCOMM 2010 network, which is a heavily congested network, and our
campus network, which is a moderately congested network. As in §5.6.2, our experiments
use our modified Ath5k driver on AR5001X+ Atheros chipsets. In addition to cross-traffic
on the TEP channel, both networks carried traffic on adjacent 802.11 channels.
(a) Impact of Cross Traffic on a Sync Packet
In TEP, a receiver detects a TEM if the medium is continuously occupied for a period
longer than the duration of a synchronization packet (19 ms). We would like to check that
a receiver is unlikely to encounter false positives while detecting synchronization packets.
False positives could occur in two scenarios: either (1) legitimate traffic includes such con-
tinuous long bursts of energy, or (2) a TEP receiver is incapable of detecting the short DIFS
intervals that separate legitimate packets, and mistakes a sequence of back-to-back WiFi
packets as a continuous burst of energy.5 We empirically study each case below.
Experiment 1. We first check whether legitimate traffic can cause the medium to be
continuously occupied for a duration of 19 ms. We use two production networks: our
campus network and the SIGCOMM 2010 network. Since we would like to capture all
kinds of energy bursts, including collisions, we sense the medium using USRP2 radios.
USRP2s allow us to directly look at the signal samples and hence are much more sensitive
than 802.11 cards. We used a USRP2 board to eavesdrop on the channel on which these
networks operate and log the raw signal samples. In order to compute the length of bursts
5A data packet and its ACK are separated by a SIFS, which is smaller than a DIFS, but ACKs are short
packets and the next data packet is separated by a DIFS. Hence the maximum packing occurs with back-to-
back data packets without ACKs.
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on the channel, we need to be able to identify the beginning of a burst and its end in an
automated way. To do so, we use the double sliding window packet detection algorithm6
typically used in hardware to detect packet arrivals [134]. We collected over a million
packets on the SIGCOMM network and about the same number on our campus network.
We processed each trace to extract the energy bursts and their durations (as explained
above) and plot the CDF of energy burst durations in Fig. 5-8.
Result 1. The results in Fig. 5-8 show that all energy bursts in both networks lasted for
less than 4.3 ms, which is much shorter than a TEP synchronization packet. In particular,
the majority of energy bursts last between 0.25 ms and 2 ms. This corresponds to a packet
size of 1500 bytes transmitted at a bit rate between 6 Mb/s and 48 Mb/s, which spans the
range of 802.11g bit rates. A few bursts lasted for less time which are likely to be short
ACK packets. Also a few bursts have lasted longer than 2 ms. Such longer bursts are
typically due to collisions. Fig. 5-9 illustrates this case, where the second packet starts just
before the first packet ends, causing a spike in the energy level on the channel. Soon after,
the first packet ends, causing the energy to drop again, but the two transmissions have
already collided.7 Interestingly, the bit rates used in our campus network are lower than
those used at SIGCOMM. This is likely because at SIGCOMM, the access point was in
the conference room and in line-of-sight of senders and receivers, while in our campus, an
access point serves multiple offices that span a significant area and are rarely in line-of-
sight of the access point.
Overall, the results in Fig. 5-8 indicate that bursts of energy in today's production net-
works have significantly shorter durations than TEP's synchronization packet, and hence
are unlikely to cause false positives.
Experiment 2. The second scenario in which a node may incorrectly detect a synchro-
nization packet occurs when the node confuses a sequence of back-to-back packets sep-
arated by DIFS as a single continuous energy burst. Thus, we evaluate our prototype's
ability to distinguish a synchronization packet from a stream of back-to-back 802.11 pack-
6 The double sliding window algorithm compares the energy in two consecutive sliding windows. If there
is no packet, i.e., the two windows are both capturing noise, the ratio of their energy is around one. Similarly, if
both windows are already in the middle of a packet, their relative energy is one. In contrast, when one window
is partially sliding into a packet while the other is still capturing noise, the ratio between their energy starts
increasing. The ratio spikes, when one window is fully into a packet while the other is still fully in the noise,
which indicates that the beginning of the packet is at the boundary between the two windows. Analogously,
a steep dip in energy corresponds to the end of a packet [134].
7 Collisions of two 1500-byte packets transmitted at 6 Mb/s may be slightly longer than 4 ms because of the
additional symbols corresponding to link layer header and trailer, and the PHY layer preamble.
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Figure 5-9: The energy pattern of the maximum energy burst in the SIGCOMM trace. The figure indicates
that such relatively long bursts are due to collisions at the lowest bit rate of 6 Mb/s. The other spikes
correspond to packets sent at higher bit rates.
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Figure 5-10: CDF of fractional occupancy measured by a receiver for transmissions of either a synchroniza-
tion packet or a sequence of back-to-back 1500-byte packets separated by DIFS. The figure shows a full
separation between the two CDFs, indicating that a TEP receiver does not confuse back-to-back packets as
a synchronization packet.
ets. To do so, we randomly pick two random nodes in our testbed in Fig. 5-5, and make
one node transmit a stream of back-to-back 1500-byte packets at the lowest rate of 1 Mbps,
while the other node senses the medium using the default sensing window of 2 ms. We
then make the same sender transmit a stream of synchronization packets while the receiver
senses these packets using a 2 ms window. For both cases, we compute the fractional oc-
cupancy in each sensing window. We repeat the experiment with multiple node pairs and
compare the occupancy during back-to-back packets and synchronization packets.
Result 2. Fig. 5-10 compares the CDF of the fractional occupancy during a synchroniza-
tion packet and the CDF of the fractional occupancy when the sensing window includes
back-to-back packets separated by a DIFS,8 taken over 100K synchronization packets and
100K DIFS occurrences. The figure shows that the two CDFs are sufficiently separate mak-
ing it unlikely that TEP confuses back-to-back packets as a synchronization packet.
8 Sometimes the DIFS may be split between two consecutive sensing windows, in this case we include in
the CDF whichever of these two window has the lower fractional energy. This is because it is sufficient that
one sensing window shows a relatively low fractional occupancy to declare the end of energy burst.
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Figure 5-11: Energy pattern for TEM slots in the presence of a Bluetooth device causing interference.
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Figure 5-12: Number of attempts required for TEP to successfully pair in the presence of an interfering
Bluetooth device.
U 5.6.4 Performance with Non-802.11 Traffic
Finally, while 802.11 nodes comply with the rules of CTS-to-SELF, and abstain from trans-
mitting during TEM's ON-OFF slots, other devices may continue to transmit, causing TEM
nodes to detect tampering. Fig. 5-11 shows a collision between a TEM and a Bluetooth
transmission from an Android phone as captured by a USRP2. Bluetooth devices do not
typically decode 802.11 CTS-to-SELF packets, and hence, as shown in the figure, end up
transmitting during the ON-OFF slots. In this section we examine the impact of a nearby
Bluetooth device on TEM.
Experiment. We place a TEM sender in location 1 (Fig. 5-5) and make other nodes act
as TEM receivers. We co-locate a Bluetooth device next to the TEM sender. The sender pe-
riodically sends an announcement. The receivers first detect the synchronization packets,
decode the CTS-to-SELF, and then try to verify the slots. If the receiver can successfully
verify, it declares success. Otherwise, it attempts to verify the slots in the next time period.
Results. Fig. 5-12 shows the CDF of the number of required attempts before a TEM
receiver succeeds in receiving a correct TEM. Bluetooth transceivers operate on 79 bands
in 2402-2480 MHz and frequently jump across these bands. Thus, the probability that they
interfere with TEM in successive runs of the protocol is relatively low. The figure shows
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that, even in the presence of Bluetooth devices which cannot decode a CTS-to-SELF, a TEM
receiver requires 1.4 attempts on average, and 4 attempts maximum, before it receives the
announcement.
M 5.7 Discussion
This work presented Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP), the first wireless pairing protocol that
works in-band, with no pre-shared keys, and protects against MITM attacks. TEP relies on
a Tamper-Evident message (TEM) mechanism, which guarantees that an adversary cannot
tamper with either the payload in a transmitted message, or with the fact that the message
was sent. We formally proved that the design protects from MITM attacks. Further, we
implemented a prototype of TEM and TEP for the 802.11 wireless protocol using off-the-
shelf WiFi devices, and showed that TEP is practical on real-world 802.11 networks and
devices.
164
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation is about wireless interference. Traditional systems have re-
garded interference as an intrinsically harmful phenomenon that must be avoided. In this
dissertation, we take an alternate approach and show that it is better to understand the
nature of interference and incorporate this understanding into the design of protocols and
systems. By doing so, we were able to design and build practical systems that transform in-
terference from a harmful to a harmless phenomenon, and even a beneficial phenomenon.
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
e Decoding 802.11 Collisions: In contrast to traditional approaches that try to avoid col-
lisions between wireless devices, this dissertation presents the first 802.11 receiver
design that decodes 802.11 collisions, thus rendering them harmless. Our design
works without sender modifications and without any assumptions of packet syn-
chronization, large differences in power, or special codes.
9 Combating High-Power Cross-Technology Interference: We design the first WiFi receiver
that can decode in the presence of high-power cross-technology interference. We
also introduce a new form of cognitive communication where different technologies
do not necessarily have to use isolated frequencies, as in traditional cognitive com-
munication, but could in crowded environments use the same frequency band. This
enables packing more radios and data in the wireless spectrum.
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" Non-Invasive Approach to Securing Medical Implants: We show how to secure insecure
medical implants like pacemakers and cardiac defibrillators, without any modifi-
cation to the implants themselves. To do this, we design the first communication
system where, by leveraging interference, the receiver encrypts the transmissions,
on behalf of the transmitter. Since our solution does not require modifying exist-
ing implants, it helps millions of patients who already have these implants with no
cryptography.
" Secure Pairing Without Passwords or Prior Secret Keys: We design the first system to
establish secure wireless connections without using passwords, prior secret keys, or
out-of-band channels. Prior efforts assume that the adversary can arbitrarily create
interference and tamper with wireless messages. Thus they opt for using secret keys
or out-of-band channels. In contrast, by understanding interference, we design a
wireless message primitive that cannot be altered or hidden without detection. We
analytically prove the security of the resulting protocol and empirically demonstrate
its practicality.
* 6.1 Looking Forward
Wireless networking has witnessed a paradigm shift over the last five to seven years. The
field has been transformed from treating the physical layer as a black box and having
packets as the only interface to the medium, into designing networked systems that tightly
incorporate an understanding of the physical layer. This has allowed us to revisit and
address classic problems such as hidden terminals and password-free security, and also
make a foray into new domains like medical device security.
The next few years are going to be exciting for wireless research because of its ability to
change people's lives through diverse applications from smart phones and RFIDs to medi-
cal implants and brain-machine interfaces. However, as wireless connectivity gets incorpo-
rated into diverse devices and applications, the density of wireless deployments increases.
As a result, there is a need to design systems that can address interference at a very large
scale (1000s of devices in a small room). While this dissertation takes the first few steps in
this direction, addressing this problem at such a large scale in practice, remains an open
problem. Similarly, on the security side, as critical applications like emergency systems
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and brain-machine interfaces embrace wireless connectivity, there is an immediate need
to design provably secure systems that are resilient to physical layer attacks, including
interference and jamming. By embedding a better understanding of interference and the
physical layer into our protocols, we can design and build efficient and secure systems that
allow wireless networks to fully deliver upon their potential.
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